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Abstract 
 
Recent debates about environmental governance emphasize the roles of participation, 
evidence and deliberation.  Authors have discussed how deliberative theory can deepen 
commitments to public participation in policy debates.  Evidence, however, is often 
presented as neutral and objective fact, and on this basis is privileged in policy debates, 
preemptively defining environmental problems and solutions.  Under this circumstance, 
how can policy processes take deliberation seriously?  How can the politics of evidence 
be identified and openly addressed by participants in policy processes?   
 
These research questions are addressed by analyzing three cases of environmental 
governance mechanisms, in the developing country context of Paraguay.  The cases 
were selected for their emphasis on evidence and participation in decision-making.  
Also, each brings into question the politics of evidence, as their policy implications have 
raised debate and contention.  The specific governance mechanisms explored in this 
study are: 1) land classification for  conservation and rural development; 2) land use 
planning scenarios generated with a computer modeling program; and, 3) the 
development of  global certification standards for soy production within the 
‘Roundtable on Responsible Soy’.  Each is seen as a means of addressing what is widely 
seen as rapid and extensive environmental degradation in Paraguay, and also the historic 
and continued exclusion of much of the public in environmental decision-making.   
 
The principal findings of my analysis are that i) public participation in environmental 
governance is often constrained by what is considered evidence; and ii) evidence is 
considered such because it is assumedly based on fact, but evidence-based arguments 
are influenced by social and political factors.  As a result of these findings, I argue for a 
new approach to environmental governance – critical deliberative governance.  A reflexive, 
non-essentialist approach to knowledge strengthens deliberation, by making explicit the 
social basis for authority and credibility, and opening up its tenets to debate.  This 
critical approach to knowledge is vital for a democracy in which normative arguments 
are not effectively closed off by formal and authoritative expertise. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Improving environmental governance: questioning the participatory 
and evidence-based policy frameworks 
 
1.1 Getting the politics out of policy making 
In the face of looming environmental crisis and persistent poverty there is increasing 
pressure on policy makers to get the politics, particularly elite politics, out of policy 
making.  There are typically two responses to this.  The first response is to base 
sustainable decision-making on sound evidence and impartiality.  This entails expertise – 
often scientific expertise, and policy processes that aid and abet the transfer of this 
knowledge into policy content (Leshner 2002; Collins and Evans 2007; Gardner 2009). 
 
At the same time, the second response is a growing expectation that public stakeholders 
be involved in decision-making processes.  Departing from the modern ideal that policy 
should be a uniquely expert business, the argumentative and interpretive turns in policy 
analysis have permitted a broader range of valid perspectives to policy debates, 
including values, interests and opinions (Paehlke and Torgerson 2005; Yanow and 
Schwartz-Shea 2006; Fischer 2009).  Furthermore, some expect that democratized 
decision-making will lead to more equitable and ecologically benign outcomes (Smith 
2003).  The growing popularity and mainstreaming of such thinking has led 
international donors to increasingly place conditions on funding and assistance that 
involve public participation and deepening democracy.  In national contexts too, 
demands for more democratized forms of governance become heightened, particularly 
in Latin America as the political landscape is increasingly characterized by the ‘pink 
wave’ populist-socialist leadership: an explicit response to decades of neo-liberal 
reforms including the privatization of natural resources.   
 
Advocates of each of these positions, more participation and more evidence as a way of 
improving decision-making, point out their potential in terms of democratic 
development and environmental outcomes.  But assumptions about this potential have 
been deeply criticized.  Some claim that so-called participatory development has had 
questionable implications for democratic outcomes (Ferguson 1990; Li 2007) and 
whether or not citizens will  make ecologically rational decisions when given the choice 
is not easily discerned (Saward 1996; Mason 1999; Mitchell 2006; Dobson 2007).  
Participation, with a focus on local knowledge and ownership of project processes and 
outcomes is often described as tyrannical and laden with tokenism (Cooke and Kothari 
2001).  Likewise, the democratic potential of evidence-based policy is clearly rejected by 
many, as is its potential to make unambiguous contributions to good environmental 
outcomes (Irwin 1995; Fischer 2000; Turner 2003). Evidence-based policy is charged 
with overlooking the complexities of different perspectives on environmental problems 
and with misinterpreting the policy process (Fischer 2009).  Interventions based on 
participation and evidence-based policy often end up attracting similar criticisms: 
apolitical approaches to problem solving, simplistic interpretations of environmental 
problems, and top-down decision-making that does not take adequate account of local 
realities.   
 
Contemporary approaches to environmental governance have treated these critiques, 
and the tensions that exist between prescriptions of public participation and evidence in 
policy processes, in different ways. For one, strands within what is known as green 
politics have drawn heavily from Habermasian ideals to emphasize the problems of 
state bureaucracies and technocratic decision-making.  They have emphasized the role 
of public discourse in expanding and deepening mechanisms of democratic 
communication and ultimately, of achieving consensus (Dryzek 1990; Smith 2003; 
Baber and Bartlett 2005).  On the other hand, strands within the post-structuralist 
schools, have used the concepts of discourse and communication to signify strategic, 
sometimes coercive action, linked to contextual, historical trajectories of power 
relations.  While many constructivists are sympathetic to the democratization of public 
policy, the influences of Foucault are apparent in the ways in which the potential for 
democratic governance become dubious and problematic (Ferguson 1990; Jasanoff 
1990; Scott 1998).  
 
Improving environmental governance means examining both participation and 
evidence-based policy, including the dynamics between them.  Participation must be 
deepened through the theoretical tenets of deliberation – values, preferences and beliefs 
must become an integral part of a  legitimate and rational basis for policy.  However, 
this cannot come to pass as long as expert-driven evidence about what is and what is 
not sustainability is regarded as objective, neutral and thus, incontestable.  Opening 
evidence to critical analysis, by identifying the social and political commitments of 
evidence-based policy tools, we both legitimate and enable more and better policy 
deliberation.  Deliberation is legitimated because evidence is not exempted from 
normativity – thus, norms become an acceptable basis for decision-making.  
Deliberation is enabled because non-orthodox policy positions are not closed off from 
the debate, even if they run counter to ‘the evidence’.    
 
This thesis will explore and improve contemporary approaches to environmental 
governance, from the position that both democratic and environmental outcomes are 
important considerations for public policy.  The central research question is: How do 
policy positions reflect normative positions in spite of appearing to privilege factual evidence in 
environmental decision-making and what does this mean for the relative contribution of participation 
and evidence to policy making?  To answer this question, I consider the following, in the 
context of environmental decision-making:  
  
• How and why might public participation challenge evidence-based policy 
implications for policy?  
• What is considered to be evidence in environmental policy and how is it often 
privileged in policy debates?   
• How can we understand the social and political influences on evidence to 
develop better forms of governance?  
 
To address these questions, I examine approaches that emphasize deliberative decision-
making processes for ways in which they may understate, or neglect to address entirely, 
knowledge creation and deployment in policy debates.  Participants in such debates 
cannot (and should not aim to!) avoid various types of environmental knowledge in 
deliberations.  However, they must develop the ability to assess the social basis and 
political commitments of this knowledge.  This critical approach to knowledge is vital 
for a democracy, in which normative arguments are not effectively closed off by formal 
and authoritative expertise.   
 
In some respects, this critical approach is seen to threaten deliberative approaches by 
seeing all discourse rooted in power and politics, and surrendering any possibility of a 
legitimate, normative position.  However, it can also be argued that a more reflexive, 
less essentialist approach to knowledge can strengthen a deliberative approach to policy 
analysis, by making explicit the social basis for authority and credibility, and opening up 
its tenets to debate.  The aim is to 1) promote deliberation without being naïve about 
the politics of knowledge and discourse; and, 2) adopt a critical attitude about 
knowledge without abandoning the possibility of a normative basis for policy.  
 
This introductory chapter is divided into roughly two halves.  The first half proceeds by 
outlining the two sets of key concepts of this thesis.  Each set reflects a current, 
orthodox approach to environmental policy, and a corresponding approach which both 
critiques and improves upon the orthodoxy.  The first set is participation and 
improvements proposed in deliberation.  The second set is evidence-based policy and 
the improvements offered by studies on knowledge and expertise.  The second half of 
this chapter looks at how the research question will be addressed empirically, by 
introducing the context of the study and the cases.   
 
1.2 Current approaches to improving governance: Participation, deliberation 
and evidence 
Participation, deliberation and evidence-based policy are all concepts that are 
increasingly appearing in the environmental governance literature.  However, they are 
often used without a clear and explicit understanding of what they entail, and the ways 
in which they may or may not be compatible with each other.  Thus, there is a pressing 
need to look critically at these co-evolving concepts, to see how far they overlap, and in 
what ways they may complement each other.  However, there is also a need to examine 
potential contradictions between the concepts, in order to draw larger lessons about 
how environmental governance can be theoretically improved, with greater practical 
application.   
 
1.2.1 Public participation in decision-making 
Public participation in environmental policy is conceptually related to the participatory 
turn in development studies, which, loosely defined, aimed to put people in charge of 
decision-making that affects their lives.  In development studies, it responded to the 
inadequacy and sometimes disastrous consequences of top-down, externally driven 
development projects.  Participation theorists responded to disappointing outcomes 
attributed to top down mandates that often misinterpreted community realities, 
overlooked local knowledge and bypassed local authority structures (Chambers 1997).  
In the environment sector, community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) 
aimed to “return the stewardship of biodiversity and natural resources to local 
communities through participation, empowerment and decentralization” (Dressler, 
Buscher et al. 2010:5).  However, “while CBNRM emerged with promise and hope, it 
often ended in less than ideal outcomes when institutionalized and reconfigured in 
design and practice” (Dressler, Buscher et al. 2010:5).   
 
Since its origins as a radical response to externally driven, managerially oriented 
environmental policy, participation has become increasingly institutionalized, ushered 
into the mainstream by such documents as the IUCN’s ‘Caring for the Earth’ and the 
Earth Summit in Rio’s ‘Agenda 21’ (Adams 2001; Bäckstrand, Khan et al. 2010).  
Agenda 21 states boldly that, “one of the fundamental prerequisites for the achievement 
of sustainable development is broad public participation in decision-making” (UNCED 
1993:sec. 23.2).  Once associated with grassroots non-governmental organizations, 
participation has become integrated with the agendas of orthodox institutions, such as 
the World Bank.  While some see this as a progressive move on the part of such policy 
monoliths, changing with the times and adapting to the bottom up philosophy of 
participation, others see it as coopting of a term, emptying it of its original meaning and 
turning it into something unrecognizable.   
 
An important critique of the participatory turn is that political and emancipatory 
objectives are increasingly overridden by more pragmatic concerns.  For example, some 
assert that the principal advantage of participation is that state solutions are too costly 
and the outcomes disappointing (Gibson and Becker 2000).  Such ‘functional’ 
advantages of participation stress efficiency and effectiveness over more top-down 
approaches.  Examples of these functional advantages are (Coenen 2009:2): 
 
• participation will increase the legitimacy of decisions taken and reduce the level 
of conflict; 
• participation will contribute to the quality of decision –making because it will 
give the government the information necessary for decision-making and 
contribute to the systematic identification of problems and their causes, and to 
the consideration and assessment of alternative strategic options; and, 
• through participation, people will learn of the environmental problems that 
society faces and change their behaviour. 
 
Another issue that suggests participation needs to be re-examined and improved is that 
the participatory turn has not made inequality vanish. Moreover, there is a well-
established scepticism about the extent to which approaches that are assumedly 
participatory and ‘community-based’ are beneficial for ‘communities’, and lead to more 
democratic outcomes.  Within this debate, questions are raised about the nature of 
community, and the extent to which the term hides divisions and tensions based on 
gender, class, age, or other specific principles of social organization (Gujit and Shah 
1998).  Furthermore, there are also questions around the extent to which ‘community-
based’ decision-making, insofar as it is decentralized aggravates inequalities between 
local groups and individuals (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000).  The term community 
often implies cooperation, unity and harmony, in a simplified manner (Murray Li 2002).  
In fact, many communities have been shown to be more complex, characterized by 
heterogeneity, inequity and power differentiations (Agrawal and Gibson 1999).  This 
emphasizes the need for greater desegregation regarding the ‘community’ costs and 
benefits realized through interventions along socio-economic, political and gendered 
axes. Too often, ‘new opportunities’ mean new work for some, and new benefits for 
others - consolidating and even deepening existing inequalities (Ribot 1995).  
 
Policies based on greater participation in resource management do not necessarily offer 
the kinds of freedom and power presupposed, because these policies are “applied in the 
same institutional and political-economic context that shaped current socially skewed 
and ecologically deleterious outcomes” (Ribot 1995:1588).  Even within a new policy 
framework, people may be forced into similar kinds of decisions as before because of 
pre-existing conditions that make change costly and logistically difficult.  In such 
situations, ‘participation’ can bring about deleterious outcomes for local people because 
local responsibility and accountability increases, contextual deficits to implement desired 
change persist.  For example, experiences with decentralisation policies often result in 
authority structures that “…lack representation, downward accountability and/or 
sufficient powers” (Ribot 2003:54).  Furthermore, the relegation of rights and 
responsibilities to local communities, can also make local people responsible for 
working around, or repairing ecological damage that was not a result of local practices 
(Sundar 2000). 
 
Critics have also pointed out that the idiom of participation often hides another form of 
politics.  For example, the illusion of inclusiveness and participation can strengthen 
existing power structures between citizens and decision-makers, by creating fora for 
public involvement, but then restricting or disregarding that involvement so that it has 
no influence on policy.  For example, “In (some) cases, participation has largely been a 
token gesture designed only to increase public confidence in the policy process rather 
than genuinely seek out the opinions of the citizens for whom the policies were 
intended” (Fischer 2009:74).  In this vein, scholars, have illustrated how involving 
people in environmental projects, such as sustainable development or conservation, can 
create environmental ‘subjects’ as opposed to ‘empowered citizens’ (Agrawal 2005; 
Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006; Li 2007; Summerville, Adkins et al. 2008).   
 
One of the earliest and most influential political critiques of participation was Cooke 
and Kothari’s 2001 volume which suggests that rather than being emancipatory and 
empowering, participation actually embodied ‘the new tyranny’ (Cooke and Kothari 
2001).  The essays contained in the volume address three dimensions of tyranny (Cooke 
and Kothari 2001:7-8):  
 
• The tyranny of decision-making and control (participatory facilitators override 
existing legitimate decision-making processes);  
• The tyranny of the group (group dynamics lead to participatory decision that 
reinforce the interests of the already powerful); and, 
• The tyranny of method (participatory methods have driven out others which 
have advantages participation cannot provide).    
 
Some authors have persisted with the concept of participation, attempting to 
reconfigure it in ways that sidestep the tyranny critique, suggesting that ‘new 
approaches’ could perhaps morph participation into transformation (Hickey and Mohan 
2004; Kesby 2005).  This has involved replacing (or indeed, heavily supplementing) 
participation with concepts such as democratization, governance, and deliberation, 
supplanting the ‘participant’ of old, with a new and improved ‘citizen’!  In environment 
and development discourse ‘participatory’ involvement of local people, promoted in the 
1980’s, eventually gave way to the ‘New Policy Agenda’ of the 1990’s, imbued with the 
vernacular of governance (Edwards 1994; Edwards and Hulme 1996).  Governance 
implicates civil society and repositions the state, at least in part, as a facilitator that 
determines public preferences and integrates them with policy.  A strong civil society 
has been declared the new panacea for development and conservation, leading to 
greater satisfaction with the way in which society is governed and greater relevance of 
the policies that are instituted.  Within this framework, engagement of local populations 
in conservation and the planning and managing of natural resources has become more 
intensified and ‘democratized’.  Governance is posited as more than the latest strategy 
in project implementation; it signals the rise of a vernacular that widens the parameters 
of conventional thinking about democracy and democratic reform.  Governance creates 
conceptual allowance for the consideration of informal, spontaneous and dynamic 
arrangements as important aspects of the overall decision-making apparatus.   
 
1.2.2 Deliberative governance: Improving upon participation 
What has become much criticized as the pragmatic obsession of participatory 
approaches, and the ways in which participatory processes can be hijacked by powerful 
entities, no matter how well-meaning, is addressed through the concept of deliberation.  
Deliberation focuses on policy decision-making rather than implementation.  As a 
means of this decision-making, deliberation emphasizes equal and open communication 
and the dominance of the ‘superior’ and ‘reasoned’ argument, rather than preference 
aggregation.  Deliberation is very much a process driven approach to governance, 
underlining the importance of legitimacy and representation:  
 
…it is also about processes of judgment and preference formation and 
transformation within informed, respectful, and competent dialogue. 
Democratic legitimacy is sought in the participation in consequential 
deliberation of those subject to a decision (or their representatives) (Dryzek 
2010:3). 
 
The deliberative model posits that free, open and honest debate arises from 
communication between interested and informed individuals.  Most importantly, 
communication is not just the means of fairness and legitimacy in decision-making, but 
also the means of rationality in decision-making.   
 
The so-called ‘deliberative turn’ in governance theory came about around the 1990’s, as 
an effort to theorize the ‘democratization of democracy’ (Dryzek 2010).  This was at 
least in part an effort of advocates to address what they saw as the growing ‘democratic 
deficit’ - the increasing disengagement of citizens from politics, particularly in the U.S.  
Dryzek has identified further ‘turns’ (tendencies, trends) within the deliberative turn, 
that he says come ‘thick and fast’ after 2000 (Dryzek 2010).  Of particular relevance to 
this research, are:  
 
• the practical turn: an emphasis on strengthening the deliberative potential of real 
world political systems and processes; and, 
• the empirical turn: an emphasis on systematic research to test the claims of 
deliberative theorists. 
 
Its conceptual and practical importance has indeed been made clear over the past decade 
as the relevance of deliberation has outgrown the boundaries of political theory.  It has 
become a central conceptual and empirical concern for scholars in various fields of 
inquiry, including planning, science and technology studies, policy analysis and 
development studies.  Dryzek adds further, that deliberation has become “an 
international movement for political reform” (Dryzek 2010:3).   
 
The deliberative turn does not represent a wholescale departure from participation.  In 
fact, many deliberative theorists continue to use much of the language of participation 
(Hagberg 2010; Hildingsson 2010).  On the surface, the deliberative and participatory 
turns share at least a surface commitment to public inclusion in environmental 
governance.  At its core however, deliberation is not simply participation repackaged.  
There are some important differences, and in some fundamental respects, the ideas at 
the heart of deliberative democracy are a powerful critique of participation.  Foremost is 
that deliberation stresses decision-making rather than implementation.  This orientation 
puts less emphasis on the functional importance of local involvement in environment 
and development initiatives, and more emphasis on the normative basis for arguments.    
 
Deliberative theorists currently enjoy renewed popularity, particularly in discussions of 
environmental governance (Arias-Maldonado 2007; Chilvers 2009; Neef 2009; 
Bäckstrand, Khan et al. 2010).  Much of this work, however, under-recognizes potential 
barriers to deliberation.  Critics remain unconvinced that deliberation can achieve 
representative and legitimate policy processes and question whether deliberative policy 
input is anything more than a far flung ideal (Nye, Zelikow et al. 1997; Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse 2000; Ryfe 2005; Elgert 2011).  Perhaps most obviously, these critics 
claim that the possibility of open and equal debates between stakeholders is doubtful; 
this doubt arising when equal opportunities for affecting the agenda of the debate, and 
for defining the problems and acceptable frameworks for solutions, are not accessible to 
all (Elgert 2011).  Knight and Johnson comment that, “Because deliberation revolves 
centrally around the non-coerced give and take of reasoned argument it also requires a 
more substantive notion of equal opportunity of political influence” (1997:281).  This 
influence may be explicit, involving strategies such as overt domination, threats or 
bribes.  Blowers et al. (2005) suggest that “it is preferable to talk of democratic 
deliberation rather than deliberative democracy…” noting that, “it is the status of the 
arguments, not the status of the participants that matters” (2005:2).  However, this 
influence also exists at a more subtle, less malign, but perhaps more powerful and 
effective epistemological level.  Such is the political influence of evidence and expertise 
in environmental debate.  Taken uncritically, so-called evidence and expertise have the 
potential to shut down debate by providing policy positions that seem to be neutral, 
objective, and therefore uncontestable.  This will be discussed further in Chapter 3.      
     
1.2.3 Evidence-based policy 
The above discussion leads us to the discussion of a third response to the problem of 
capture - evidence-based policy.  This response is typified by calls for evidence to 
support decision-making, for improved uptake of research into practice, and for 
prioritization of research programs that respond in more direct and relevant ways to 
policy problems (Sanderson 2002).  These reflect emergent claims about the intimacy 
between the authoritative generation/application of evidence and good decision-
making, signalling an unprecedented willingness to turn public decision-making over to 
experts.  This broad paradigm has been institutionalized as ‘evidence-based’ policy.   
 
In fact, evidence-based policy doesn’t so much eliminate the problem of political 
capture, as control it, creating benign environmental effects.  Rather than politicians 
manipulating research or hijacking the policy process, researchers would capture the 
politicians and decision-makers.  This ‘counter-capture’ is encouraged in order to 
improve political will to implement good policy:  “in the end, good policy depends on 
the will of political leaders: they have to care about adopting environmental protection 
policies” (Ames and Keck 1997-1998:31).  Thus, while ‘capture’ per se, is generally 
viewed in a negative light, capture by benevolent forces can pressure public policy 
towards the public good (at least one vision of it!).  Evidence-based policy enables the 
capture of decision-makers on behalf of the ‘right’ influences.   
 
The evidence-based policy framework is both a philosophy and a practice that was 
institutionalized in the health and medical sectors in the UK.  Its influence has since 
spread to other public issues and to other nations.  Within this framework, the 
‘ascendancy of evidence’ embodies a ‘utilitarian turn in research’; where ‘pragmatism 
replaces ideology’; where professional practice represents a ‘retreat from priesthood’ 
(Solesbury 2001).  What exactly comprises evidence is of course, the cornerstone of 
both praise and critique of the evidence-based framework.  As Davies, Nutley et al. 
comment, “perhaps the unifying theme in all the definitions is that the evidence 
(however construed) can be independently observed and verified, and that there is 
broad consensus as to its contents (if not its interpretation)” (2000:2, parentheses 
original).  Basing policy decisions on evidence is expected to lead to better policy 
outcomes, and reduce the cost of doing so. If this isn’t benefit enough, government 
accountability and transparency are enhanced as evidence-based policy, with its focus 
on ‘speaking truth to power’, removes politics from the decision-making process.   
 
What counts as evidence, however, is less clear than what is expected to result from its 
application.  “There is nothing particularly novel – or controversial about the idea that 
policy should be based on evidence, but what can properly count as evidence in policy-
making is contentious” (Marston and Watts 2003:145).  However, Davies et al suggest 
that “perhaps the unifying theme in all the definitions is that the evidence (however 
construed) can be independently observed and verified, and that there is broad 
consensus as to its contents (if not its interpretation)” (2000:2).  In the UK public 
sector, for example, evidence is generally considered to be limited to research and 
statistics, policy evaluation, economic modelling, and expert knowledge (Nutley, Davies 
et al. 2002).   Marston and Watts respond that:  
 
…this comment on the preferred forms of evidence uncovers the potential 
problems of adopting a narrow view of what counts as valid knowledge… we 
begin to see that far from being a neutral concept, evidence-based policy is a 
powerful metaphor in shaping what forms of knowledge are considered closest 
to the ‘truth’ in decision-making processes and policy argument (2003:145).   
 
Knowledge based on scientific inquiry is most typically considered to be expert, and is 
assumed to reduce uncertainty, to be universally applicable, to provide a basis for 
prediction, and to be apolitical.  Meanwhile, knowledge termed ‘local’, ‘folk’, or 
‘traditional’ is often assumed to be particular, unduly influenced by politics and at worst, 
based on ignorance, superstition or lack of vision (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; Jasanoff 
and Martello 2004).  This ‘local’ knowledge is valued when it is congruent with scientific 
knowledge.  When it digresses, it cannot often compete with the authority and 
credibility of scientific knowledge.   
 
Despite challenges to the value of science in reducing uncertainty and creating 
consensus in decision-making (Collingridge and Reeve 1986), the use of science-based 
evidence for sustainable development policy is gaining ground (Kasemir, Jager et al. 
2003; Gardner 2009).  This became most apparent at the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) in 2002, and at one of the Summit’s major parallel events, the 
Science and Technology Forum.  At these events, “the importance of science and 
technology in enabling sustainable development was affirmed… (and) the participating 
governments acknowledged the essential role of science and technology in generating 
solutions to environmental and developmental issues” (Fukasaku and Mmampei 
2007:43). Indeed, the role of the WSSD in emphasizing the role of science in 
sustainability was foretold by Alan Leshner, Chief Executive Office for the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science and Executive Publisher of Science since 
2001: “When the World Summit on Sustainable Development convenes in 
Johannesburg, South Africa… it will serve as a powerful reminder that science and 
technology are at the core of both the world’s greatest problems and its most promising 
opportunities” (Leshner 2002:897).    
 
As a follow up to the WSSD, the conference on International Science and Technology 
Cooperation for Sustainable Development was held in 2005 and was seen as a response 
to pleas to “further enhance the consensus of the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) on the application of science and technology for sustainable 
development” (OECD 2005:9).  The conference has since materialized into an 
optimistic volume containing various accounts of ‘best practices’ and ‘indicators’ for 
gauging the process of sustainable development spurred on by the applications of 
science and technology (OECD 2005).   
 
The WSSD built on the ready-rooted and privileged position of science in sustainable 
development discourse.  Ten years earlier Agenda 21, already discussed for its emphasis 
on participation, revealed substantial focus on ‘science for sustainable development’.  
Sections detailing the ‘means of implementation’ (the fourth and final section of Agenda 
21), including ‘information for decision-making’, ‘promoting education, public 
awareness and training’, ‘transfer of environmentally sound technology, cooperation and 
capacity-building’ and in particular, ‘science for sustainable development’ emphasize the 
unquestioned, central role of science in sustainable development.  For example, Agenda 
21 says: “The sciences should continue to play an increasing role in providing for an 
improvement in the efficiency of resource utilization and in finding new development 
practices, resources, and alternatives” (UNCED 1993:257) . 
More recently, the concept of ‘sustainability science’ has assumed a substantial presence 
in the literature.  For example, the journal Sustainability Science was launched in 2006, 
and in 2008 sustainability science was given ‘a room of its own’ (Clark 2007) – a stand 
alone section - in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science (PNAS).  While 
sometimes positioned as a transdisciplinary framework, the epistemological 
commitments of sustainability science are clear: “individual disciplines can provide 
quantifiable criteria and indicators related to sustainability… (and further,) these 
indicators must conform to scientific standards of objectivity” (Komiyama and 
Takeuchi 2006:5). For some, as science comes to the fore in sustainability debates, 
sustainability science illustrates that finally, the global community is ‘taking sustainability 
seriously’ (Leshner 2002).   
 
1.2.4 Seeking an alternative to evidence-based policy: construction of landscapes, de-contextualized 
planning and discursive sustainability 
Like participation, evidence-based policy making and its proponents have born the 
brunt of much criticism.  Much of this criticism comes from science and technology 
studies (S&TS), which explores the social, political and cultural basis for the content of 
scientific thought (Latour 1993; Wynne 1996a; Yearley, Forrester et al. 2001) and its 
authority in society (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; Gieryn 1999).  S&TS also addresses the 
implications of this for public policy (Collingridge and Reeve 1986; Taylor and Buttel 
1992) and public life more generally.  This work has heavily influenced scholarship on 
broader themes such as quantification (Porter 1995), and even more broadly, expertise 
(Turner 2003; Fischer 2009).  Three important interrelated criticisms of the way in 
which evidence is commonly understood, that emerge from S&TS relate to:  
 
• social and political influences on how reality is interpreted and represented;  
• the importance of context for understanding environmental problems and the 
impacts of potential solutions; and, 
• the role of discourse in both interpreting and creating social reality. 
 
First, social science approaches have been gaining ground in environmental policy, and 
have called attention to the ways in which social influences impact the way we perceive 
and respond to environmental problems – even when perceptions and responses are 
put forward in scientific, evidence-based terms.  Social scientists argue against “the 
modernist narrative in which science first finds evidence of new environmental 
phenomena, and further discoveries and inventions inevitably lead to informed 
(evidence-based) social responses via avenues of prediction, rational choice, and 
control” (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998:4, parenthesis added).  Rather, these approaches 
point out the way in which environmental issues are represented is socially constructed 
(Taylor and Buttel 1992; Hannigan 1995; Redclift and Woodgate 1997). 
 
Social science approaches to environmental policy making can be characterized as 
emphasizing three potential properties.  As characterized by Jasanoff and Wynne 
(1998:4), these are characterized as:  
 
• Interpretation: tending to the significance of variation in meaning and the 
importance of context;  
• Reflection: recognizing the role of human consideration and ideas in the creation, 
maintenance and transformation of institutions; and, 
• Construction: social practices that influence how we represent the natural world 
and reality.   
 
The constructivist concept of co-production has emerged as an important framework to 
view how ways of viewing and understanding environmental problems come into being.  
Co-production is a way of thinking about the co-constitution of knowledge and 
understanding of different phenomena on the one hand, and power, culture and social 
structure (more broadly, social order) on the other.  Co-production fundamentally 
recognizes that, “society cannot function without knowledge any more than knowledge 
can exist without appropriate social supports… it calls attention to the social 
dimensions of cognitive commitments and understandings, while at the same time 
underscoring the epistemic and material correlates of social formation” (Jasanoff 
2004:3).   
 
Secondly, evidence-based environmental policy approaches tend to decontextualize 
environmental knowledge, extending its reach indefinitely.  Decontextualization is an 
outgrowth of an understanding of science as universal, and thus, its applicability to any 
temporal or spatial context without variance.  An expert in ‘objective evidence’ can 
speak about places she has never been; can describe sustainability in a faraway place 
without moving an inch.  This lack of contingency and context is noted by Porter: 
“science values experiences of a “public character,” observations and experiments that 
can be repeated, and hence that need not be taken on faith” (1995:73).  This critique 
brings to bear some serious problems with the so-called globalization of environmental 
problems, as environmental scientists come to see themselves as keepers of some global 
environment.  They bring solutions, understood to be standardized and universal in 
their application, to local contexts where environmental problems are bound up with 
much different socio-political meaning.   
 
The view of evidence as universal and unattached to human interpretation is what led 
Wynne to develop an argument concerning the ‘naïve sociology’ “that lies at the core of 
technical and institutional analyses of risk” (Irwin 2001:123).  Within this framework, 
Wynne emphasizes that: 
 
…even the most controlled, objective knowledge is embedded within a tacit 
framework of idealized, fixed relationships.  This is what allows it to be 
controlled knowledge.  But in unreflectively extending from the laboratory or 
computer model to make their observations about the real world, scientists rest 
the validity and the objectivity of their statements upon the built-in assumptions 
about that real world and the social shape and limits of the real risk system.  The 
‘objective’ framework floats on a sea of subjective commitments and 
assumptions which have to be more openly expressed and negotiated in risk 
assessment processes” (1989:44) 
 
This brings us to a third, linguistic critique of ‘evidence’ – critical discourse.  The 
linguistic turn, which gained prominence in policy analysis from the 1990’s had some of 
its most profound impacts on policy analysis through the concepts of argumentation 
(Fischer and Forester 1993), interpretation (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006) and 
discourse coalitions (Hajer 1995).  These approaches draw attention to the importance 
of language in policy debates, popularizing discourse as an analytical unit.  Many of 
these discursive approaches built upon critical discourse analysis pioneered theoretically 
by Foucault  and practically by Fairclough (1992).  One of the main tenets of critical 
discourse analysis is a radical departure from thinking that language was solely 
constituted by an objective, knowable reality, towards the idea that language is 
constitutive of reality. With critical discourse analysis there emerged a new feasibility 
that the study of language could be not just a theory of text, but a theory of human and 
social behaviour, “the releasing of language from imprisonment in its communicative 
role” (Paget 1995:635).  Likewise, in his approach to critical analysis, Fairclough takes 
discourse as a form of ‘social practice’, and acknowledges two implications of this:  
 
Firstly, it implies that discourse is a mode of action, one form in which people 
may act upon the world and especially upon each other, as well as a mode of 
representation… Secondly, it implies that there is a dialectical relationship 
between discourse and social structure, there being more generally such a 
relationship between social practice and social structure: the latter is both a 
condition for, and an effect of, the former. (Fairclough 1992:63-64).   
 
One such approach is the Discourse Coalition Framework (DCF) (Hajer 1995), 
developed as an alternative to pragmatic, instrumental ways of conceptualizing policy 
formation and policy change. Advocates of the DCF argue that orthodox approaches to 
studying policy formation and change focus too heavily on cognitive beliefs about 
causality, and also overestimate the stability of policy coalitions. In contrast, Hajer 
suggests that the most significant tie that binds policy coalitions is not knowledge and 
belief systems, but rather overarching storylines, or discourses, that are broadened and 
simplified, appealing to different actors for different reasons. Storylines are the 
“discursive cement that keeps a discourse-coalition together” (Hajer 1995:65).  
Discourses created through interaction, interpretation, and are therefore products of 
broader processes of social learning as opposed to comparatively narrow processes of 
cognitive learning (Hajer 1995). Forsyth notes that, the DCF is conceptually responsive 
to “a need to appreciate that agreements and communication will reflect local 
circumstances of language, shared interest, and perceived purpose between different 
parties, rather than be the absolute transfer of clearly defined concepts from one group 
to another” (2003:161).  
 
The DCF recognizes that those who engage with different specific disciplinary 
discourses on one level, despite potential incoherence and incongruence between them, 
can come to discursive agreement on another level: “despite the great variation of 
modes of speech, they somehow seem to understand one another” (Hajer 1995:46).  As 
Szarka puts it, “Hajer’s ‘discourse coalitions’ concept has hermeneutic value when 
actors sing in chorus – but not necessarily in the same choir” (2004:319). Thus, while 
broad discourses need to be compelling, they are also vague. Fischer elaborates: 
 
What people in an environmental discourse coalition support is an 
interpretation of threat or crisis, not a core set of facts and values that can be 
teased out through content or factor analysis. Rather than a stable core of 
cognitive commitments and beliefs, they share storylines that often tend to be 
vague on particular points and, at times, contradictory on others. (2003:103).  
 
Much of what is new about the DCF, as opposed to more evidence-based views of how 
policy processes emerge,  comes down to the analysis of how social power is exercised 
in policy contexts (Hajer 1995:46); the way in which power relationships are implicated 
in policy debates. The DCF depicts the relationship between power and policy change 
in a more subtle and pervasive, less centralized way. Discourse is the embodiment of 
power relations, though this is often concealed.   Thus, in the DCF, attention is turned 
towards “the combined effects of various micro powers or power/knowledge rather 
than to the study of the activities of a single sovereign” (Hajer 1995:39). Following this, 
while some authors argue that certification systems can be an impetus for social change, 
the concept of discourse coalitions suggests that the transformative potential of these 
ideas “may be reshaped and coopted by powerful narratives within stronger social 
networks” (Forsyth 2003:161). 
 
These three critiques of evidence (discussed further in Chapter 4) illustrate the 
fundamental connection between facts and norms.  Indeed, even policy that pretends to 
be strictly evidence-based, is not so.  Norms do matter and their influence resonates 
throughout ‘factual’ debates in environmental policy.  As put by Jasanoff: “Durable 
representations of the environment… do not arise from scientific activity alone, 
through scientists’ representations of the world as it is, but are sustained by shared 
normative and cultural understandings of the world as it ought to be” (Jasanoff 
2010:248).  This co-production of facts and norms will be discussed in more depth in 
Chapter 4.   
 
Yet frameworks such as evidence-based policy maintain that a reliance on what are 
sometimes misunderstood as straightforward, stand alone facts, is the unequivocal gold 
standard of policy making.  This compromises deliberation on two accounts.  First, 
evidence may disallow competing views that disregard or even refute the evidence.  
Secondly, the inordinate value placed on evidence for policy making, renders explicitly 
normative perspectives irrelevant to policy debate.  Indeed, the aim of examining the 
sometimes buried normative aspects of evidence is not, as Jasanoff and Wynne put it, 
“to understate the role of nature in shaping scientific (and expert) knowledge but to 
foster a deeper understanding of how scientific knowledge assumes authority in the 
public domain” (1998:5, parenthesis added).   
 
1.3 Participation and evidence in environmental governance in Paraguay: 
three cases of the politics of evidence   
Three case studies are analyzed to provide insights into the ways in which evidence and 
participation are respectively, and falsely, linked with facts and norms, and the 
implications this has for deliberative environmental governance.  Each case questions 
the extent to which facts and norms can be separated in the context of evidence for 
environmental policy.  If the potential for this separation is overestimated, it could lead 
to evidence that has unacknowledged normative content, bolstering the apparent 
neutrality, legitimacy and authority of evidence, restricting debate around the policy 
recommendations to which it gives rise.  Providing analytical clarity about the normative 
commitments of evidence would then lead to decision-making with improved 
environmental and democratic outcomes.  
 
Paraguay is a particularly relevant site for research on prospects for improving 
environmental governance through evidence and participation.  Given what many view 
as an environmental crisis and crushing poverty and inequality in Paraguay, international 
observers, domestic policy makers, Paraguayan NGOs and the citizenry at large see a 
need for improved environmental and democratic policy outcomes.  On the one hand, 
better decision-making is seen as dependent on access to science and technology and a 
modernized state that understands the importance of acting on evidence.  On the other, 
there are numerous calls for democratic reforms that will see decision-making based less 
on elite interests, and more on fairness.   Prominent voices in Paraguayan society link 
the need for better environmental governance with a “broader imperative of building 
and ensuring good democratic governance in the country” (Abed 2009:32).   
 
The much criticized environmental and social indicators in Paraguay are often attributed 
to highly centralized and partisan decision-making.  This is compounded by the 
historical legacy of the longest and allegedly most brutal dictatorship in Latin American 
history.  Alfredo Stroessner ruled the country for over thirty years, creating a culture of 
patronage, fear and mistrust.  In the decade following the fall of Stroessner, little 
seemed to change in terms of democratic development or reform.  But in subsequent 
decades, Paraguay’s political tide has shown signs of turning, with an emerging 
groundswell of demand for a reconsideration of how Paraguay’s political and productive 
resources are configured (Nickson and Lambert 2002:171).  In August, 2008, Fernando 
Lugo took office as the first non-Colorado president in 61 years.  His election platform 
was one of reform claiming “…the end of an exclusive Paraguay, a segregationist 
Paraguay, a notoriously corrupt Paraguay… Today begins the history of a Paraguay 
whose authorities will be implacable with thieves” (Reuters 2008).   
 
Three cases  from Paraguay provide insights into my research questions: i) land 
classification for conservation and rural development; ii) a computer modelling program 
used for land-use planning; and, iii) the development of global certification standards 
for soy production under the ‘Roundtable on Responsible Soy’.  These cases were 
chosen for this study on several bases.  First, land classification, land-use modeling and 
certification standards are cases of environmental governance: “interventions aiming at 
changes in environment-related incentives, knowledge, institutions, decision-making… 
the set of regulatory processes, mechanisms and organizations through which political 
actors influence environmental actions and outcomes” (Lemos and Argrawal 2006:298).  
Secondly, each case is a governance mechanism that generates evidence to support 
environmental decision-making: land classification generates maps, modelling creates 
scenarios, and the standards development process generates sustainability criteria.  Yet 
each case brings into question the politics of evidence, as the evidence-based policy 
implications have raised debate and contention.  The existence of hidden politics in 
such evidence is increasingly problematic in light of the growing emphasis on 
participation in environmental governance.  This brings us to the third selection criteria: 
the emphasis on participation in environmental governance is particularly highlighted by 
the selected cases, despite their origins in more expert-dominated, exclusionary 
decision-making.  This participatory emphasis is illustrated by the considerable attention 
surrounding wider debates about participatory conservation (Twyman 2000; Hernandez, 
Janapa et al. 2003; Chettri, Thapa et al. 2007), participatory modelling (Pickles 1995; 
Van der Sluijs 2001; Craig, Harris et al. 2002) and participatory development of 
certification standards (Klintman 2009; Auld and Gulbrandsen 2010).  The case studies 
are explained in more detail below, following a few words on the context in which they 
have been implemented.   
 
1.3.1 Conservation and society in the Mbaracayú 
The Mbaracayú region is located in the north east of Paraguay, in the department of 
Canindeyu.  To the north, the Cordillera de Mbaracayú marks the border between 
Paraguay and Brazil.  This part of Paraguay was once covered by the Interior Atlantic 
Forest, an ecoregion characterized by a number of endemic subtropical, tropical  and 
Cerrado tree species (Huang, Kim et al. 2009).  Driving into the CARJ region, one is 
struck by the beauty of bright red soils which are highly fertile and well suited to 
agriculture.  The yearly annual rainfall averages between 1600 and 1800 mm - the bulk 
of this falling in the rainy season extending from October and March.  The driest 
months are July and August.  Summers are hot and humid, reaching and surpassing 40 
degrees centigrade.  Winters are cold, temperatures reaching freezing at night.  
 
Deep concern about deforestation in the Interior Atlantic Forest was one reason that 
the Reserva Natural del Bosque Mbaracayú (RNBM), the Mbaracayú Forest Reserve, 
was established in 1991 (more details about the conditions around this establishment 
will be discussed in Chapter 5).  In 2000 the RNBM and the surrounding area, known as 
the Cuenca Alta del Rio Jejui (CARJ), the Upper Jejui River Watershed were together 
designated a UNESCO Man and Biosphere Reserve.  The 64,500 hectare RNBM is 
administered by a Paraguayan environmental NGO called the Fundación Moises 
Bertoni (FMB).  It is a privately owned reserve and recognized as such, ‘in perpetuity’ 
under Paraguayan law.  The reserve is off limits to any outsider without the FMB’s 
permission to enter, including people from the surrounding communities and 
settlements of the CARJ which make up the so-called ‘multiple use area’.  The FMB 
actively reinforces this restricted access to the reserve with fences and guns.  The only 
exception to the no-access rule is the Ache indigenous group, who are permitted to 
enter the RNBM, and to hunt and gather within it on two conditions: that they hunt 
only for ‘subsistence purposes’; and that they use only ‘with traditional weapons’ 
(Yanosky 2000).   
 
The reserve is part of the Interior Atlantic Forest, valued as a habitat for numerous and 
diverse species.  Many consider Paraguay’s Atlantic forest a globally important source of 
biodiversity and the RNBM is said to contain upwards of 90% of Paraguay’s species 
classified as ‘rare’ or ‘endangered’ (Hill and Padwe 2000)  Among these species are the 
jaguar, lowland tapir, and harpy eagle (Fragano and Clay 2003).  The RNBM is also 
valued for its organic density, insofar as it provides capacity for carbon sequestration.  It 
was this capacity that enabled conservationists to sell the environmental services of the 
RNBM to an American company in a trade-off scheme for two million US dollars in 
1990 – money that enabled the purchase of the land and its conversion to a reserve 
(discussed further in Chapter 5).  
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In addition to being prized for its high levels of biodiversity, the Interior Atlantic Forest 
is also widely considered among the world’s most threatened ecoregions. This 
corresponds with data from Paraguay, where researchers have used Landsat data to find 
that the country’s forested area was reduced to 176,741km² from 202,202km² between 
the 1990’s and the 2000’s (Huang, Kim et al. 2009).  Increasing the urgency of this 
scenario for the Mbaracayú, is that, of the five Paraguayan ecoregions, the Atlantic 
forest experienced the highest rates of deforestation (Huang, Kim et al. 2009).  Forested 
area in Canindeyu, reportedly shrank from 8262.97 km² in the 1990’s to 4903.05 km² in 
the 2000’s – a change in forest cover of a staggering 40.66% in roughly a decade 
(Huang, Kim et al. 2009).  By 2001 the Atlantic Forest had been declared one of the 
earth’s twenty-five official ‘biodiversity hotspots’ (to which nine were added in 
February, 2005, announced by Nature magazine headline: ‘9 More Crisis Areas for 
Biodiversity’).  This, according to Conservation International, who administers and 
manages the Biodiversity Hotspot program, means that the area is characterized by 
some of the earth’s richest biodiversity, containing a minimum of 1500 species of 
vascular plants (comprising more than .5% of the world’s species) and having lost at 
least 70% of its original habitat (Myers 2000; Conservation International 2006).   
 
The socio-economic diversity in the communities and settlements outside of the CARJ 
(outside of the RNBM) is every bit as fascinating as the biological diversity in the 
reserve.  It is characterized by multiple productive activities, and several distinct 
livelihood patterns, which roughly correspond with a range of ethnic identities.  Most 
people are largely agriculturalists and range from small-scale subsistence growers 
occupying ten hectare family farms to proprietors of large-scale soy plantations and 
cattle ranches covering hundreds of hectares.  Peasant livelihoods are diverse: small-
scale subsistence farming is supplemented by some cash crops, typify peasant 
production undertaken predominantly Paraguayan mestizo peasants or campesinos, along 
with a handful of Brazilians and ‘Brasiguayos’1.  In terms of population, campesinos, 
producing on a small-scale, are by far the largest group of Mbaracayú inhabitants.   
 
There are two Indigenous ethnicities represented in the area, one of which is Guarani, 
who much like the campesinos, primarily undertake subsistence crop production but 
                                               
1 The name given to Brazilians who have moved to and live permanently in Paraguay.  Differentiated 
from the absentee Brazilian landowners, Brasiguayos have integrated with Paraguayan society and most 
often speak Spanish and/or Guarani.    
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also engage in some cash crops production.  The Guarani, however, engage in collective 
production on collective lands, while peasant production is largely undertaken by family 
units on family-owned land.  Ache is the second Indigenous ethnicity represented in the 
Mbaracayú.  The Ache engage in and identify themselves with hunting and gathering, 
but with the encouragement and support of the FMB, are increasingly undertaking 
cultivation of subsistence and cash crops2.   
 
Finally, there are larger scale cattle ranching and soy growing operations that extend 
over hundreds of hectares.  With a few exceptions, these operations are owned by 
Brazilians, most of whom live in Brazil.  The largest landholdings in the CARJ are 
Brazilian-owned.     
 
Relations between these different groups in the CARJ cannot be described as 
harmonious.  Conflict and social tension runs deep in Canindeyu, as they do in many 
parts of Paraguay (Nagel 1999; Steward 2007).  Much of this conflict and tension stems 
from the ‘soy boom’ that has come to dominate the landscape and economy of 
Paraguay over the past three decades (Dros 2004; Nepstad, Stickler et al. 2006).  
Paraguay’s relatively cheap land has attracted international agriculturalists and investors, 
particularly from Brazil, and has aggravated pre-existing inequalities in land distribution.  
Social movements such as the Campesinos Sin Tierra (Peasants without Land) have 
emerged to protest inequality by engaging in land occupations (termed ‘invasions’ by 
large landholders) (Gillette 2004) and burning Brazilian flags (Painter 2008).  
Furthermore, the expansion of soy production throughout Canindeyu has been 
accompanied by increased pesticide use by large landholders.  The application of 
pesticides by aircraft has had detrimental effects on human and animal health, and on 
the crops of surrounding campesino communities.  Beyond careless or reckless use of 
pesticides, there have also been cases where it appears that pesticide has been used as a 
weapon.  For example, in 2009 CNN and Amnesty International reported that “more 
than 200 indigenous people who refused to vacate their land in eastern Paraguay were 
                                               
2 Promoting agriculture among non-agriculturalists is controversial, but is promoted to “assure the 
present and future sustainability of the Ache people”, in terms of access to food and cash crops.  For the 
present this supplements their hunting and gathering activities in the Reserve, but also could be required 
to supplant these activities altogether should the time come when the Ache are no longer permitted 
access to the protected area.  Continued access to the Mbaracayú for the Ache is debated within the FMB 
and high levels of disagreement exist as to whether or not their activities are affecting resource abundance 
over the long term.  There is a general agreement, however, that if the Ache are shown to have an impact 
on overall biodiversity in the Reserve, their access should be disallowed (personal communication).    
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sprayed… with what some believe was pesticide, sending seven to the hospital” (CNN 
2009).   
 
According to many, the soy boom is also to blame for much of the deforestation in 
Paraguay (Altieri and Pengue 2005; Hecht 2005; ASEED 2006).  Between 2000/01 and 
2007/08, soy production increased 3.5 metric tons to 6.8 metric tons (Garcia-Lopez and 
Arizpe 2010), which corresponded with an expanded area under cultivation of 2 million 
hectares from 1.3 hectares (Garcia-Lopez and Arizpe 2010).  As one of the country’s 
principal soy growing areas (Dros 2004), the forests of Canindeyu, and thus the 
Mbaracayú region, are seen to be particularly at risk from soy expansion (discussed 
further in Chapter 7).   
 
Small scale agriculturalists are also held responsible for much of the deforestation in the 
Mbaracayú region, often charged with engaging in unsustainable agricultural practices 
(Di Bitetti, Placci et al. 2003).  Constructing an image that is familiar in many developing 
areas, these practices are generally labelled as shifting cultivation, and blamed for a 
vicious cycle of poverty and environmental degradation.  These agricultural practices, it 
is alleged, are unsustainable because they degrade soil quality and under constant use, 
render the soil unproductive.  As this degradation takes place, the producer must shift 
production to other parts of his land, or abandon the land altogether and find a new 
place to clear further forests, live and produce.  On a regional landscape, once this land 
is gradually used up, the producer will eventually have no further options than to 
migrate to other parts of the country or to cease production and move into an 
employment market that is already insufficient to provide jobs to all who are in need.  
This story has become so commonplace, as to serve as the conceptual framework for 
UNESCO’s Man and Biosphere program, which advocates for the integration of 
conservation and ecological research with the promotion of sustainable agriculture 
(discussed further in Chapter 5).        
 
More acute causes of deforestation, namely forest fires, also have heavy impacts.  In 
September of 2007, Paraguay came under the grip of forest fires that came to be 
described as among the world’s 10 most devastating fires of the twentieth century 
(SAARC Disaster Management Centre 2008).  The fires were difficult to reach because 
of rudimentary or non-existent infrastructure, leading FMB management to declare that 
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the only way they could be extinguished would be with helicopters (personal 
communication).  National resources to combat the fires were insufficient; and with 
slow-in-coming and limited international assistance the fires spread fast, consuming 
thousands of hectares of forest before they could be sufficiently extinguished.  In 
addition to forest, the fires consumed the subsistence and cash crops of thousands of 
small producers, affecting over 125,000 people (SAARC Disaster Management Centre 
2008).  The RNBM and surrounding areas were hard hit (personal communication, 
various FMB staff, September, 2007).    
 
The most common official explanations linked the veritable inferno to the common 
agricultural practices of clearing forest and renewing cropland with fire.  Combined with 
dry conditions brought on by a country-wide drought, fires raged out of control.  In 
discussions with local people, however, other potential reasons for the setting of fires 
came to light.  Indeed, in light of the fact that many of the fires started along the 
perimeter of the reserve fed speculation as to who was responsible for the fires, and 
what the reasoning or motivation may have been.  Many observers suggest that the fires 
have some connection with the illegal marijuana plantations that are commonplace in 
this part of Canindeyu and thrive because of excellent growing conditions, extremely 
little police presence, and close proximity to the relatively unmonitored border between 
Paraguay and Brazil.  One theory suggests that the Mbaracayú fires could be an act of 
revenge, pointing out that the fires occurred shortly after a sweep of the area by the 
United States Drug Enforcement Agency during which they set fire to hectares of 
marijuana crops.  Subscribing to the guess that the fires were an act of revenge, others 
suggest that it may be in response to arrests of trespassers from surrounding 
communities, who despite prohibition by law, enter the reserve to hunt wild meat.  
While the 2007 fires were the worst ever experienced in the Mbaracayú, they were not 
the first.  Several times during my fieldwork, while driving through the reserve, I 
discussed these potential explanations for scorched areas with my colleagues.   
 
These explanations resonate with work done in Indonesia on the use of fire as a 
weapon, found to increase with: insecurity of access to resources; perceptions of 
inequity and injustice; and, increased involvement of external actors in forest 
governance (Colfer 2002).  While the cause of the fires in and around the Mbaracayú 
remains unclear, some of the guesses above seem more feasible in light of further 
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context and history of the FMB in the CARJ.  It is indeed the case that the FMB has 
made many allies in and around the CARJ, working with several hundred families.  The 
organization is also, however, regarded suspiciously at best, by some.  Some people take 
the FMB as a facade for some undisclosed rich and powerful American landowner.  For 
some, the FMB is a front for the American government to steal water.  Some take the 
FMB’s rural development workers as American spies, and there were instances during 
my fieldwork when the well was poisoned with pesticide and threats elicited to burn 
down the FMB office.   
 
This complicated, at times tumultuous context has been further textured by the 
significantly reduced role of the state in funding and implementing environmental 
protection (Bebbington and Thiele 1993; Sundberg 2003).  In Paraguay, as elsewhere, 
NGOs and other private actors have filled this gap.  Indeed the environmental 
governance architecture prominently features international and national environmental 
NGOs, big business and local industry that increasingly advance sustainable 
development.  Such is the impetus for the three interventions discussed in this thesis.  
Each of these emphasizes the significance of expert led, evidence-based policy to guide 
decision-making on the one hand, and optimism about public participation in emergent 
decision-making, on the other.  In the first, rural development is a means for small scale 
cultivators to participate in orthodox conservation projects.  In the second, landscape 
modelling provides outcome scenarios so that stakeholders can discuss preferences, 
priorities and trade-offs.  In the third, the Roundtable on Responsible Soy brings 
different interests and perspectives together to contribute to the definition of a 
sustainable soy sector.   
 
1.3.2 Case 1: Construction of conservation landscapes in the Mbaracayú 
The first case, presented in Chapter 5, examines the construction of landscapes through 
the FMB’s work with conservation and rural development in the Mbaracayú region.  
Under the FMB model, conservation is undertaken in an orthodox manner: the RNBM 
is privately owned, and protected by park guards.  In addition to conservation, the FMB 
engages the surrounding communities in rural development.  Two principal dimensions 
of the rural development program are: promoting alternative crops and sustainable 
production techniques.  Each of these dimensions are aimed at improving productivity 
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and income, at the same time as reducing the environmental impact of smallholder 
production.   
 
In FMB texts, the ways in which the Mbaracayú landscape is classified, is a familiar story  
– one that leads to a view of the FMB programme, as a rational means to sustainable 
ends.  For example, the people of the CARJ are characterized as extremely poor and as 
‘lacking education and understanding of the importance of the Mbaracayú forest’ 
(Fundación Moises Bertoni 2002; Alberta Research Council 2007).  Poverty and 
ignorance (both about sustainable practices and the value of sustainability itself) thus 
drive the dependence of small producers on unsustainable agriculture, which 
characterizes cultivation in the CARJ (Fundación Moises Bertoni 2002; Alberta 
Research Council 2007).  The familiarity of this story, in some respects, is enabled by 
inattention to contextual and historical events and processes which lend themselves to a 
surprisingly predictable and seemingly sensical view of the landscape.  This view, while 
often accurate in a partial or superficial way (leading to continued acceptance and 
propagation), often turns out to be overly simplistic or even misrepresentative.   
 
Rural development is expected to both contribute to conservation efforts and to add a 
participatory dimension to conservation in several ways.  First, it will improve peasant 
livelihoods and quite simply, reduce the need to seek to exploit resources in the 
RNBM.  Assuming that local people illegally access the RNBM out of need, providing 
new and improved ways of boosting household income will reduce pressure on the 
resources contained in the RNBM.  Secondly, protected areas cannot exist indefinitely 
as isolated ‘islands’.  In order to assure their continued existence, there must be 
attention paid to sustainability outside protected areas, as “massive forest loss in the 
surrounding… may also be a precursor to rapid forest loss within the protected areas” 
(Huang, Kim et al. 2009: pg 8-9).  The creation of forest islands also complicates the 
matter of connectivity: developing ‘biological corridors’ between protected areas 
allowing wildlife to move between them, thereby expanding the amount of habitat 
available to them (Bennett 1998).  Thirdly, rural development is expected to improve 
relations between the FMB and surrounding communities (Padwe 2001).  Good social 
relations are an important way to influence peoples’ behaviour.  Additionally, in light 
of increasing concern of funders, about the role of local people in sustainable 
development, and the impact of environmental programs on them, demonstrating 
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good social relations with communities surrounding the RNBM is an important 
element in the ways in which the FMB secures funding for its projects.  Fourthly, it is 
expected will enhance local peoples’ understanding and contribution to sustainability in 
the CARJ; particularly reduced deforestation and reduced pressure on the forest 
reserve.   
 
Chapter 5 questions this orthodox, mundane construction of the Mbaracayú landscape.  
It argues that rather than be taken for granted, intervention landscapes should be seen 
as outcomes of socio-political influences.  Such influences spring from relationships and 
protocols between international NGOs, local NGOs and inhabitants (Sundberg 2003), 
but also from broader dynamics such as national identity formation and resource 
distribution.  Indeed, a more critical look at the ways in which the intervention 
landscape of the Mbaracayú region has been constructed questions the wisdom of the 
FMB’s sustainability program – involving conservation and rural development.  It 
presents alternative views of the intervention landscape, through the lens of historical 
inequalities that may influence local interpretations of conservation, and nuanced 
reasons that rural development often fails to improve peasant livelihoods or incite a 
spirit of participation in conservation and environmental sustainability.  Thus, these 
alternative views question the appropriateness of the FMB’s interventions.   
 
1.3.2 Case 2: Decontextualized planning with computer models 
The second case, discussed in Chapter 6, analyzes a modelling software program 
adapted for the Mbaracayú region.  Adapted from its original use in Alberta, Canada, 
the program is called a landscape cumulative effects simulation (ALCES) program and 
is promoted as a powerful tool for mapping out long-term trends in economic, social 
and ecological outcomes vis-à-vis land-use patterns and policy choices. It is also 
positioned as a tool for deliberative governance, bringing stakeholders together around 
central land-use issues to discuss, debate, and reach consensus.  The creators of the 
software, envisage that:  
 
In practice… the greatest utility of our modelling approach will be in facilitating 
land-use planning among groups of stakeholders.  The primary benefit of the 
model is that it provides a level playing field of stakeholders to assess the costs 
and benefits associated with alternative management options (Schneider, Stelfox 
et al. 2003: online resource).   
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Outcomes are measured in ALCES by key indicators: measurable variables that 
accurately reflect progress, or lack of progress, towards certain predefined goals.  
Because indicators define desirable outcomes, they should be developed with local 
participation.  Thus, in conjunction with the development of the ALCES scenarios, 
project staff undertook work with communities in order to develop ‘community-based 
indicators’ for potential use in the modeling exercise.  Ultimately, no indicator 
developed in this way was used with ALCES.  This was mainly because of an 
overwhelming lack of data and the indicators chosen in the community-based work 
were not quantitatively and incrementally associated with land-use.   
 
The simulations, prepared by an expert technician, used the following indicators: large 
producer income; small producer income and ‘natural area’.  The simulations showed 
clearly and simply that unless small producers in the CARJ switch from their current 
‘unsustainable’ practices, to ‘sustainable agriculture, the end result will be 
“environmental and social ‘ruin and destruction’” (Carlson 2006:12).  Agricultural 
income will plummet and the remaining natural area outside of the RNBM will be 
converted to a barren wasteland.  If they do switch, however, to a gamut of sustainable 
practices, then the fortunes of the CARJ will be reversed.    
 
Chapter 6 discusses the ways in which this development and analysis of the ALCES 
scenarios reflects ‘naïve planning’ in contrast to a (more) adequately complex, carefully 
considered and nuanced view of the CARJ context.  For example, during the basic, 
preliminary task of ‘establishing planning principles’ it is assumed that advantages and 
disadvantages of various land-uses will accrue to stakeholders in the same kinds of ways.  
It is also assumed that values can be aggregated to a point where they become universal, 
without losing meaning.  It is found, however, that agreement about broad goals such as 
‘maintaining biodiversity’ quickly lose coherence once questions arise about which 
biodiversity is important, and which are the best ways of conserving it.  Furthermore, 
the ALCES models are presented as an objective, realistic view of prospects in the 
CARJ.  However, following the work of other authors on the social construction of 
‘natural’ and ‘objective’ categories (Yearley 1999; Robbins 2003) even the basic 
categories used in ALCES (ie: small and large producers; natural area) are not fixed and 
remain debatable.   
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1.3.3 Case 3: Discursive sustainability at the roundtable on responsible soy 
The third case, discussed in Chapter 7, is the Roundtable on Responsible Soy (RTRS), 
an international stakeholder process for establishing criteria for ‘responsible soy’.  
Paraguay and other soy producing countries including Brazil, Argentina and Bolivia 
have experienced the ‘soy boom’ over the past three decades.  For some this has been a 
financial boon, but the cultivation of soybeans has become a controversial business, 
perceived by many to occupy a central role in environmental and social problems.  
Evictions of peasant and indigenous populations, pesticide-related epidemics and 
deaths, and even kidnappings and murders have been linked to the soybean as conflict 
infects the soy producing countryside.   
 
In response to this, and to an increasingly global awareness of the issues associated with 
the soy industry, stakeholders in soy production have come together in meetings to 
figure out how to establish standards for production that will make it less problematic.  
The RTRS, as other standard-setting entities, is on its way to becoming a powerful 
international institution for global governance, within which the criteria for responsible 
soy production will be created, housed and managed.   While this process is distinctly 
political, it has relied heavily on expert scientific opinions to make the best judgments 
about how to qualify and quantify sustainability, or as it was expressed at the 
Roundtable, ‘responsibility’ in the soy industry.   
 
Despite the apparent promise that a proposal of ‘sustainable soy’ was expected to have 
for addressing the concerns expressed by campesino organizations, rather than 
participating in the talks, many participated in a ‘counter-conference’, which culminated 
in a demonstration of protest, involving hundreds of people, outside the RTRS.  The 
anti-soy discourse that emerged from this counter-conference and more generalized 
opposition has stood in direct contrast to the discourse of the RTRS. 
 
Chapter 7 discusses the emergence of these discourses of sustainability as linked to 
social identity.  Within the RTRS, making soy sustainable is largely about sustainable 
agricultural practices and zoning soy expansion away from areas of perceived ecological 
importance.  Yet this technical, environmentalized view of sustainability in the soy 
industry is particular to those who have the power and wealth in society – often wealthy 
non-Paraguayans.  But from a different social purview, that of the peasant, the 
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possibility of sustainable soy is much more unlikely.  Indeed, I was told once that ‘la 
soja es completamente a contra el campesino’ – soy is completely against the 
campesino.  This chapter discusses what the emergence of the sustainable soy discourse 
has meant so far, and could mean for the future of opposition in the mainstream policy 
debate.   
 
1.4 Thesis outline: Towards critical deliberative governance? 
Before a more detailed discussion and analysis of the cases is undertaken, Chapter 2 will 
outline my methodology and Chapters 3 and 4 will set out the theoretical project 
addressed by this thesis.  This project interrogates participation and evidence 
respectively - questioning the potential for an emergent theory of governance that is 
both critical and deliberative.  Such a theory would entail an improvement of current 
approaches to environmental policy with developments in deliberative theory and 
critical, social science approaches to knowledge and expertise.  This theoretical project 
draws from deliberative theory, arguing that both the basis of and the means for public 
participation need to be strengthened by emphasizing policy as primarily, if not 
exclusively, a normative and social phenomenon.  Chapter 3 characterizes the 
contribution of deliberative theory to the substantive area of environmental politics.  
Deliberative theory draws heavily on Habermasian ideals of the public sphere and 
communicative action and are explored as a model for deliberative governance.   
 
Theoretical improvements for environmental governance must also draw on social 
science theories of knowledge and expertise, such as Science and Technology Studies 
(STS).  Chapter 4 discusses how expertise can pose a barrier to policy deliberation, and 
explores how deliberative processes can be improved through a more critical, historical 
approach to knowledge, communication and democracy that attends to issues of the 
influence of power over public matters.  This entails discussion of more post-
structuralist-influenced notions of knowledge, discourse and democracy and the 
challenges they pose to deliberative theorists.  This coalescence of deliberative 
governance and post-structuralist discourse is achieved through recognizing and 
reconciling the tensions between them.   
 
After the cases are presented and analyzed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, Chapter 8 will offer a 
concluding discussion of the principal emergent themes in this thesis.  This chapter 
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returns to the key issues raised in this chapter and relates them more broadly to 
theoretical and empirical implications for a critical deliberative environmental 
governance.   
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Chapter 2 
Methodology: Exploring the politics of evidence 
 
My research aim is to develop a theoretically and empirically informed framework for 
how to examine the politics of evidence and improve broad based involvement in 
environmental governance.  It seeks to explore and explain why arguments based on 
what is considered to be evidence are often privileged in policy debates and how such 
evidence may preemptively define environmental problems and solutions.  This work 
examines how, under such circumstances, policy processes can take deliberation 
seriously by addressing the politics of evidence openly in policy processes. It specifically 
addresses the following questions:  
 
• How and why might public participation challenge evidence-based policy 
implications for environmental policy?  
• What is considered to be evidence in environmental policy and how is it often 
privileged in policy debates?   
• To what extent is evidence influenced by social and political factors?   
 
This chapter describes and explains the methodology undertaken to address these 
research questions and the overall research aim.  It is structured according to the four 
‘methodological dimensions’ identified by Bauer et al.: the design principle, data 
elicitation, data analysis and knowledge interests (2000:5).  Following these core 
elements of the methodological discussion, I discuss issues of  positionality, challenges 
and ethics in my research.  Summary comments conclude.   
 
2.1 Research design and case selection 
Researching evidence within the so-called ‘idiom’ of co-production takes on a wide 
variety of methodologies and approaches within a range of disciplines.  Drawing on 
much work within the study of expertise, my research is designed as an ethnographic, 
multi-sited case study approach. Despite the lack of much explicit methodological 
guidance in STS, substantial work in the area takes theoretical and methodological cues 
from ethnography (Hess 2001; Pors, Henriksen et al. 2002; Hine 2007).   
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STS ethnographies have been, “defined in contrast with a naïve view of scientific work 
as a purely rational process of representing a nature that revealed itself in transparent 
observations” (Hess 2001:234).  Indeed, to examine the politics of evidence, researchers 
must interrogate the oft-held ideal that specialized information and knowledge can be 
uprooted and transplanted with consistent outcomes and implications.  Rather, an 
important aspect of taking a critical approach to expert knowledge, is to recognize that 
it is contextually contingent and contestable.  This perspective on science is congruent 
with the focus of ethnography on viewing phenomena as embedded within the cultures 
and politics of specific times and places.  Indeed, “the strengths of ethnography are 
found in the particular opportunities it offers for interacting and engaging with the field 
studied” (Pors, Henriksen et al. 2002:4).  Clifford and Marcus write in their seminal 
collection of ethnographies, “Writing Culture”, the authority and rhetoric of 
ethnography “have spread to many fields where ‘culture’ is a newly problematic object 
of description and critique” (1986:3).   
 
As with ethnography more generally, I approached my research as an inductive, iterative 
exercise.  I took, as Maxwell calls it, an interactive approach (2005).  Thus, the research 
design was conceived as a “reflexive process operating through every stage of (the) 
project” (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995:24), rather than set in stone as a linear 
process from the beginning.  This means that prior methods and findings determined 
subsequent methods and thematic focus; ongoing work allowed for reinterpretation of 
earlier work.   
 
I designed my project as a multi-sited case study research.  Case study design is not a 
methodology so much as an overarching strategy; a ‘case study’ is not so much what a 
researcher does, as a framework for how and why a researcher approaches research the 
way she does (Hartley 2004).  Following Yin (2003), three particular aims of research 
make the case study approach suitable.  These aims, that broadly and accurately 
characterize my research puzzle, are (Yin 2003:xi): 
 
• to define research topics broadly and not narrowly;  
• to cover contextual or complex multivariate conditions and not just isolated 
variables; and,  
• to rely on multiple and not singular sources of evidence.   
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My research examines why the politics that is embedded in information and evidence 
needs to be more explicit in policy debates, and how policy processes can make these 
politics more explicit.  In light of this, I selected three case studies of environmental 
governance mechanisms within which politics is embedded, but not explicitly 
recognized.  These mechanisms were chosen because they represent the growing trend 
of using expert-led evidence as environmental decision-making support.  They also, 
however, represent an increasingly explicit emphasis on public participation in public 
policy, despite their origins in more expert-dominated, exclusionary decision-making.  
Further, they represent three increasingly prominent trends in governance, namely 
participatory conservation, participatory modelling, and inclusive processes of 
certification standards development.  The governance mechanisms explored in this 
study are:  
 
1) land classification for  conservation and rural development;  
2) land-use planning scenarios generated with a computer modelling program; 
and,  
3) the development of  global certification standards for soy production. 
 
A final note on research design addresses the scale of my research.  Appropriate scale is 
a question that has occupied the foreground in debates about methodologies in STS:  
 
Are the most useful insights about co-production to be discovered 
at the level of science, power and culture writ large?  Or is it more 
illuminating to trace in fine-grained detail how particular concepts 
for classifying or ordering social worlds… gain, or have gained, 
stability and coherence, along with equally particular expressions of 
knowledge… (Jasanoff 2004:5).   
 
The scale at which research should perform investigation, was a question famously 
addressed in the 1960’s by Merton who critiqued the polarization of social science 
research between,  
 
…over-ambitious and premature attempts to develop unified theories 
with little obvious connection to observable social experience; and a 
tendency to produce descriptive data focused on specific situations 
without providing enough conceptualization to guide future study or 
generalize to other situations (Hine 2007:654).   
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This ‘middle-range theory’ advocated by Merton has received substantial attention in 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) as a way in which STS research can:  “engage(e) 
with reality, albeit a limited aspect of it; producing theoretical accounts that engaged 
with that reality which themselves could be used to communicate with others, whether 
policy makers or scholars from other disciplines; and providing ideas for future work” 
(Wyatt and Balmer 2007:621). My research approach falls into the ‘middle-range’ 
between describing and analyzing case studies and looking to inform, and be informed, 
by broader theory about environmental governance.  Chapters 3 and 4 examine the 
theoretical potential for developing a framework towards a deliberative and critical 
approach to governance.  Chapters 5, 6 and 7 examine the empirical implications and 
lessons for this framework.    
 
2.2 Data elicitation: Participant observation, interviews, textual analysis  
As emphasized above, case study research involves multiple methods for collecting data 
from diverse sources.  Below I describe my principal means of data elicitation: 
participant observation, individual and focus group interviews, and textual analysis.   
 
2.2.1 Participant observation 
The use of participant observation was key to my fieldwork because I wanted to see 
how expert framings of environmental problems measured up to the day-to-day realities 
and various experiences of environmental problems.  To this end, an in-depth 
understanding of these diverse realities and experiences, within a specific context is 
required.  Such an understanding is best afforded by participation observation of 
everyday life, within which politics and culture are embedded (Hilhorst 2003).  Indeed, 
researchers consider participant observation the pillar of fieldwork (Rabinow 2007), as 
“a way to collect data in naturalistic settings by ethnographers who observe and/or take 
part in the common and uncommon activities of the people being studied” (DeWalt 
and DeWalt 2002:2).  Participant observation entails direct involvement with people in a 
naturalistic setting, observing ordinary and extraordinary activities, exchanges and 
gestures, talking with people and generally learning from them about their reality (Agar 
1996).  Different ways of describing the kind of methods engaged within a general 
participant observation approach include ‘table-top interviewing’ (Rothe 1993), the ‘go-
along’ (Kusenbach 2003), and ‘friendship as method’ (Tillman-Healy 2003).   
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I was in ‘the field’ for nearly 23 months over the course of four and a half years (see 
Table 2.1), primarily (not exclusively) working with the Moises Bertoni Foundation 
(FMB). The FMB (discussed in Chapter 1 and discussed further in Chapter 5) is an 
environmental NGO in Paraguay that works in the Mbaracayú on conservation and 
development interventions.  I spent most of this time in the Mbaracayú region, where I 
lived in the village of Villa Ygatimi, spending work days with FMB staff and weekends 
and holidays with them and their families in Villa Ygatimi.  This helped me to 
understand rural Paraguayan culture, and to understand Guarani – widely spoken in the 
Paraguay countryside.  Over the weeks and months, I spent most days travelling around 
to surrounding communities, working with the FMB’s rural development team.  The 
FMB employs a team of rural development technicians that works with small producers 
in the Mbaracayú region dispensing material assistance, running workshops, providing 
personalized advice and assistance and generally supporting the proliferation of 
sustainable agriculture.  On a typical day we would visit between 3 and 10 small 
producers, with whom specific discussions centred around agricultural issues such as 
agricultural production, markets and social tensions.  It was during these visits that I 
learned about small scale agricultural crops and techniques, social relations between 
various ethnic and socio-economic groups, the role of the state in agricultural extension 
and enforcement of environmental legislation, grievances with local government 
representatives, peoples’ perceptions of local conservation efforts, relations between 
local people and the FMB and other NGOs, and internal relations and politics between 
staff at the FMB.   
 
I also spent some of this time in Asuncion, working in the main FMB office and 
meeting with people from NGOs, government departments, universities and research 
organizations interested in the issues of sustainability, agriculture and development in 
rural Paraguay.  Sometimes interviews provided occasion for these meetings, but often 
our interactions were less formal, in the context of larger meetings, conferences and 
social occasions.   
 
Finally, in 2008 I attended the 3rd annual Roundtable on Responsible Soy as a 
participant and observer.  This was a three-day event that involved plenary sessions and 
small group work that contributed to the development of the responsible soy 
certification criteria.     
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Table 2.1: Fieldwork periods, 2004-2008 (Source: Author) 
 
Participant observation proved synergistic with other methods in three ways.  First, as 
others, I found that participant observation improved both the quality of data collected 
and the quality of the interpretation of the data  because it was collected in a meaningful 
context (Fetterman 1989).  By learning from participants, the fieldworker can come to 
better understand their point of view, and begin to develop a tacit understanding of 
meaning and behaviour.  Participant observation combines participation in daily life and 
careful observation (looking and listening) with recording field notes (the usefulness of 
which is contested by some researchers (Agar 1996)), and asking informal questions to 
establish a greater richness of context and meaning (informal interviews).  This brings 
us to the second synergy, which is that participant observation leads to other data 
collection methods that might not otherwise be identified.  This is most readily 
illustrated when by being a participant observer, I met new people to interview, that I 
would not have known of had I been following a more detached research schedule.  
Finally, participant observation allows for data collection with a degree of informality 
Dates of 
Field Visits 
Methods Engaged Sample Activities 
 
Case  
 
Jan 2004 (3 
weeks);   
May–Jul, 2004  
(3 months);  
Feb–Mar 2005 
(2 months) 
Participant observation; 
informal interviews;  
formal interviews  
Working with the rural 
development team in Villa 
Ygatimi; ride-alongs, 
introductions in 
communities 
Working with coordination 
in Asuncion 
Case 1 - 
landscape 
classification; 
environment 
and 
development 
interventions 
Aug-Dec, 2005  
(5 months);  
Mar-May, 2006  
(3 months);  
Sep-Dec, 2006  
(2 months);  
Mar-Jun, 2007 
(4 months) 
Participant observation;  
Focus groups;  
Technical training  
Community-based indicators 
focus groups; work with 
FMB on establishing 
indicators; locating data 
sources for ALCES inputs;  
Present the baseline data and 
first round results from work 
with ALCES to community 
and FMB groups. 
GIS training 
ALCES training  
Case 2 -  
modelling for 
sustainable 
land-use 
planning 
Apr–Jun, 2008 
(3 months) 
Participant observation;  
Textual analysis 
 Buenos Aires, attended 3rd 
annual RTRS conference 
and counter conference; 
Analyzed presentation from 
1st, 2nd, and 3rd RTRS 
meetings 
Case 3 -  
certification 
standards for 
sustainable 
commodities 
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not enabled by more unembedded, scheduled methods.  Informality, particularly in the 
context of sensitive topics (such as the relationship between small-scale farmers and 
NGOs from which they receive some benefit), can help respondents to more freely 
express their opinions on matters that might otherwise be constrained by their ‘official 
line’.  Because of this potential for reduced constraints in responding, informal data 
collection techniques (ie: informal interviews) can produce higher data validity than 
more formal methods (Kvale 1996).   
 
Trotter and Schensul (1998) describe participant observation as a ‘starting point’, and 
indeed, the ‘foundation method’ for ethnographic research.  Participant observation 
shapes subsequent data collection, and the specificity of methods increases as fieldwork 
proceeds (Fetterman 1989; Agar 1996).  This certainly resonates with my approach, as 
all of the empirical case studies examined in this research drew on this foundational 
participant observation.  Subsequent methods including individual and focus group 
interviews and textual analysis supplement, and build upon, the findings and questions 
raised in participant observation (See Figure 2.1).   
 
Figure 2.1: Interactions between data collection methodologies (Source: 
Author) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.2 Individual and focus group interviews 
Interviews are perhaps the most widely used qualitative research technique (Gaskell 
2000), allowing for greater exploration of issues that arise from other data collection 
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methods.  However, it is not just depth that is achieved through interviews, but also 
diverse perspectives.  They serve to “classify and organize and individual’s perception of 
reality” (Fetterman 1989:50).  The importance of interviews (not unlike other qualitative 
methodologies) is that the social world is “actively constructed by people in their 
everyday life, but not under conditions of their own making.  It is assumed that these 
constructions form people’s paramount reality, their life world” (Gaskell 2000:39).    
 
Following Gaskell (2000), I identified ‘natural’ groups that share a ‘social milieu’.  While 
it is certainly not the case that individuals within a social milieu will necessarily share the 
same thinking on a subject, these groups are loosely defined as individuals who “interact 
together; they may share a common past, or have a common future project.  They may 
also read the same media and have broadly similar concerns and values” (Gaskell 
2000:42) .  Examples of actor groups sharing a social milieu in my research include 
small producers, large producers, environmentalists, and ecologists.  In some respects, 
these labels homogenize these groups when in reality they are highly diverse and 
certainly do not represent consensus on environmental and sustainability issues.  They 
do, in important ways however, represent a shared ‘social milieu’ as defined by Gaskell, 
in the context of this research.    
 
I chose to use semi-structured and informal interviews, given that the purpose of the 
interviews was to explore the range of perspectives and representations of research 
themes (Gaskell 2000).  More structured interviews are generally considered less helpful 
in exploring complex political themes, often used to enumerate opinions, or to count 
responses. Structured interviews are often criticized as bearing closer resemblance to 
surveys than interviews, because of their rigidity and sometimes even their quantitative 
bent (Rothe 1993).  In line with the interviewing methodology outlined by Rothe 
(1993), my semi-structured interviews consisted of lead questions, but invited the 
participant to take different directions and raise points that he/she considered relevant 
– even if these directions were not explicitly solicited by the me as the interviewer.  I 
conducted a number of formal, semi-structured interviews, when I needed to speak 
with someone with whom I would not otherwise have had contact.  These included 
people in Asuncion from the university, NGOs, international organizations, and 
government departments.  In Canindeyu, these included people from local government 
departments and large landowners.   
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I made frequent use of informal interviewing.  Following Kvale (1996), my informal 
interviews resembled conversation, and were most often unscheduled, and impromptu, 
undertaken in the ‘heat of the moment’.  Such interviews took place with a degree of 
informality and would be well described as an element of participant observation.  Many 
of these informal interviews, however, became semi-structured.  This happened easily 
over a meal, over the course of a long drive, over a beer in the evening, during a walk in 
a farmer’s field, or during a wait or delay.  These kinds of opportunities arose often, 
with small producers, members of the FMB rural development team and sometimes 
local authorities in Canindeyu.  Within the course of an interview, unanticipated themes, 
metaphors and explanations can emerge; this is the key strength of this methodology.  
Thus, interviews can take research in new directions, and make it more grounded in 
local realities.   
 
Focus group interviews are considered the methodological middle-ground between 
individual interviews and participant observation, by producing “an opportunity to 
collect data from groups discussion topics of interest to the researcher” (Morgan 
1997:16).   share many advantages of individual interviews.  They allow for greater in-
depth exploration of issues and reveal different perspectives on the research.  Focus 
groups, however, are fundamentally different from individual interviews in several 
respects (Gaskell 2000:47):  
 
• a synergy emerges out of the social interaction: in other words, the group is 
more than the sum of its parts; 
• it is possible to observe the group process, the dynamics of attitude and opinion 
change and opinion leadership; and, 
• in a group there can be a level of emotional involvement which is seldom seen 
in one-to-one interviews.  
 
I conducted focus groups in the context of the second case, the ALCES models for 
sustainable land-use planning.  Two general rounds of focus groups were conducted: 
one before the land-use planning scenarios were modelled; one after the scenarios had 
been modelled.  The first was to discuss and establish locally based indicators of 
sustainability, in 8 different communities in the CARJ and with the FMB rural 
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development and administrative teams, in Villa Ygatimi and Asuncion respectively.  
These focus groups began with a 15 minute presentation about land-use models and the 
role of indicators in models.  Participants were then asked to develop locally relevant 
and significant indicators.  These groups lasted between 1 and 2 hours.  These focus 
groups were tremendously useful in generating data on different perspectives of social 
and environmental issues.  As will be discussed further in Chapter 6, these groups 
offered insights into how particular dimensions of more mundane indicators are 
relevant to different stakeholders.  For example, forest cover was a sustainability 
indicator of interest to both the FMB and local communities.  However, while for the 
FMB staff, the primary importance of forest cover was as wildlife habitat, for local 
people the importance of forest cover was as a source of livelihood resources. Thus, it 
was not only forest cover per se that was an important indicator of sustainability, but 
level and type of access to forest resources that made the forest cover relevant to 
sustainability.       
 
The second type of focus groups was meant to elicit discussion about the ALCES 
models of land-use scenarios to different groups.  These focus groups lasted for 
between two and four hours.  They began with a half hour-long presentation of the 
ALCES scenarios developed by the modeller and then invited questions, discussion and 
feedback regarding participants’ views of the scenarios. These focus groups generated 
important and relevant insights into the underlying assumptions of the models, the 
complexity of setting goals and assessing trade-offs, the appropriateness and adequacy 
of the indicators chosen in the models, and sufficiency of the data requirements of the 
indicators.   
 
I also used focus groups, because the impact of group dynamics on discussion was 
particularly important for my research.  This is because governance is not typically an 
individual affair, but involves groups (or coalitions) vying for rights to decision-making.  
Indeed, deliberation – a key concept in this research – has at its heart discussion and 
debate in a group setting.  Gaskell even suggests that focus groups ‘might be 
characterized’ as an approximation of Habermas’ public sphere: “The debate is an 
exchange of views, ideas and experiences, however emotionally and illogically expressed, 
but without privileging particular individuals or positions” (Gaskell 2000:49).   
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2.2.3 Textual analysis 
Textual analysis was performed at various stages of the research, but was most 
important in the context of the third case: the development of certification standards 
for sustainable soy.  Text was used as data, based on the assumption that “a text corpus 
is the representation and expression of a community that writes” (Bauer 2000:133).  I 
analyzed two principal bodies of text: newspaper articles and presentations delivered 
during the RTRS meetings. For each body of text, I used a different analytical strategy, 
as posited by Krippendorff (1994): the first examines texts for trends and patterns; the 
second compares texts to detect differences and contrast.   
 
The FMB librarian scans four Paraguayan newspapers daily for articles related to the 
environment, and she clips these articles and puts them in binders.  From these binders, 
I extracted articles related to soy and used them to identify shifting emphases and 
clusters in relation to a given topic (Krippendorff 1994) namely, the environmental and 
social impacts of soy production and expansion.  This analysis enabled me to get an 
impression of attitudes towards soy production and expansion among the Paraguayan 
public, and also to get details of some of the specific controversies surrounding soy 
production.  The analysis of these trends, patterns and events were important in 
contextualizing the attempts to legitimate soy production made by the RTRS process.  
Secondly, I compared and contrasted the presentations and documentation from the 
RTRS meetings (made publicly available on the RTRS website) with letters, essays and 
news releases published by the movement opposed to the RTRS.  Through this analysis, 
a characterization of the RTRS discourse and the counter-RTRS discourse was made 
possible.   
 
2.3 Critical discourse analysis: Interpretive and critical 
The fieldwork and data collection methods produced a large amount of different kinds 
of data, including observations, field notes, interview recordings and texts.  The 
overarching analytical framework for analyzing these different data is discourse analysis.  
The increasing popularity of discourse analysis as an analytical tool in the social sciences 
is owed to the ‘linguistic turn’ (Fairclough 1992; Fischer and Forester 1993; Yanow and 
Schwartz-Shea 2006), or the recognition that “changes in language use are linked to 
wider social and cultural processes” (Fairclough 1992:1).  The idea of  language as 
transparent and descriptive has been largely overturned in favour of a view of language 
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as a social practice; language is not only constituted by the social world, but is 
constitutive of the social world (Fairclough 1992).  Discourse analysis is interpretive 
because it bears implicit recognition that the same social phenomena are viewed in 
different ways by different social actors.   
 
The space given to interpretation in discourse analysis is what also makes it potentially 
critical.  This is because different ways of interpreting environmental problems and their 
solutions do not carry equal weight in the social world; they influence the emergent 
social order in disparate ways and to different extents.   While discourse analysis takes 
many forms, it is critical discourse analysis, pioneered by Fairclough and Wodak, that is 
most relevant to this research.  The principal objective of critical discourse analysis is to 
analyze “opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, 
discrimination, power and control as manifested in language” (Wodak 1995:204).  As 
put by Fairclough, critical discourse analysis “aims to show non-obvious ways in which 
language is involved in social relations of power and domination” (Fairclough 
2001:229).  The influence of discourse on the social world is not down to an inherent 
superiority of some perspectives over others, but is a product of power relations.   
 
Concepts and social practices surrounding evidence, participation and sustainability, among 
others that feature in this work, are fertile ground for examining the nexus between 
language, social practice and social structure.  The aim of this work is not simply 
analytical, though it is projected to contribute to a better understanding of 
environmental governance in developing areas.  But, congruent with the tenets of 
critical discourse analysis, the aim is also transformative:   
 
It is not enough to lay bare the social dimensions of language use.  
These dimensions are the object of moral and political evaluation and 
analyzing them should have effects in society: empowering the 
powerless, giving voices to the voiceless, exposing power abuse, and 
mobilizing people to remedy social wrongs.  CDA advocates 
interventionism in the social practices it critically investigates 
(Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000:449).   
 
2.4 Positionality, challenges and ethics in research 
I came across a number of challenges throughout my research process: some logistical 
and some ethical.  The biggest challenge is somewhat predictable – the issue of 
language.  Paraguay has been dubbed South America’s most bi-lingual country, because 
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in addition to being officially bilingual, upwards of 95% of the population speaks both 
Spanish and Guarani.  For the majority of my interactions in Asuncion, and with 
government departments and NGOs in the countryside, Spanish was perfectly 
adequate.  Among rural people in areas such as Canindeyu, however, Guarani (albeit 
peppered with Spanish words and phrases) is clearly dominant; people prefer to speak 
Guarani and have a higher level of comfort with it.  Indeed, during my time in Paraguay 
I came to develop a basic understanding of Guarani from listening to the discussions of 
my co-workers, who for the most part, spoke in Guarani.  However, my ability in 
Guarani did not reach a level which afforded me to use it, or to trust my ability to 
understand it.  During such  interviews, I typically spoke in Spanish, and my 
respondents answered with linguistic mixture.  Thus, during my work with small 
producers particularly, I depended quite heavily on a field assistant, who spoke both 
languages fluently, to translate.   
 
Many authors have called attention to the importance of social relations  within research 
(as opposed to only researched social relations) as worthy of attention (Arendell 1997; 
Herod 2005).  Difference between the researcher and researched, based on gender 
(Herod 2005), social status, ethnicity or power (McCorkel and Myers 2003) holds 
potential challenges.  Indeed, the mixture of difference that characterized my difference 
from those I worked with and interviewed provided a bricolage of advantage and 
disadvantage.  As a woman, and moreover a foreign woman, I was often not taken 
seriously in my work with the rural development team.  For example, sometimes I 
would be left behind or be begrudgingly taken along on field visits.  I was also 
recognized, however, as someone with access to resources and not subject to the same 
power structures within the NGO management as the rest of the rural development 
team.  At times, my colleagues appreciated the ways in which I could help them because 
of this.  In some respects the disadvantages of my positionality in the field were worn 
down over time, as I proved myself interested and able in terms of the work.  In other 
respects, gender biases disallowed me access to the inner circle of the rural development 
team.   
 
Perhaps less discussed and acknowledged in qualitative, case study research are the 
ethical challenges involved, that often provide occasion for consideration and reflection.  
In her work on NGOs in the Cordillera of the Phillipines, Dorothea Hilhorst writes an 
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epilogue about the politics of research.  I would like to echo one of her thoughts.  The 
first regards the relationship between this work and the production of truth.  As 
Hilhorst says:  
 
“This book provides a narrative on Cordillera NGOs.  This means that it 
presents an interpretation of events and processes.  It hopes to be 
plausible and convincing, but it does not attempt to claim the hegemony 
of truth…the narrative simply hopes to provide readers with some 
alternative ways of looking at familiar things” (2003:230).  
 
 This is not only the claim of one researcher, but a more generalized tenet of 
interpretive work.  Indeed, as Gill comments, “Discourse analysts tend to be quite 
humble people who dislike overblown claims and would never argue  that their way is 
the only way of reading a text.  In the final analysis, a discourse analysis is an 
interpretation, warranted by detailed argument and attention to the material being 
studied” (Gill 2000:188).   
 
Though I faced these challenges, I also experienced some distinct advantages due to my 
particular position in the field.  In 2004 I began working with the department of 
‘sustainable ecosystems’ at a research organization called the Alberta Research Council, 
based in Alberta, Canada.  Having had recently embarked on pursuing international 
development projects and funding, the ARC hired me to work with a multi-disciplinary 
team including a sociologist/forester, an economist, an ecologist and a landscape 
modeller; my role in this team was ‘community planner’.  Our team won a contract 
from the Canadian International Development Agency to implement a 3 year project 
called “Capacity Enhancement for Community and Ecologically-Based Management in 
the Bosque Mbaracayú Biosphere Reserve”.  Working on this project afforded me 
several of what might be considered luxuries in the context of doctoral research.  First, 
the ARC-FMB project, in large part, offered the subject of my study.  The project was 
my first point of contact with the FMB and the Mbaracayú region more generally.  
Furthermore, the computer modelling that comprises my second case study (described 
in Chapter 1), was undertaken as an integral part of the ARC-FMB project.  Secondly, 
project work necessitated that I make several distinct trips to the field, rather than 
undertaking fieldwork all at once (see Table 2.1).  This allowed me to punctuate my 
time in the field with prolonged periods of doing reading, library research and 
discussing with my peers and supervisor.  It enabled my work to become truly iterative 
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in that the theoretical and empirical aspects informed each other at various, multiple 
stages during the research.   
 
While assuming the concurrent positions of researcher and project worker provided 
these distinct advantages, it also provided additional challenges, or potential challenges, 
in terms of research ethics. Among these challenges, is the extent to which the 
researcher’s involvement in the project can affect the outcomes that then become 
objects of research.  Does the researcher unwittingly produce the project outcomes that 
correspond with research goals?  Can the researcher behave in ways that are in the 
interests of project and research goals simultaneously?  Can the researcher act as an 
interested actor in terms of project objectives, but disinterested in terms of research 
bias?   
 
I considered these issues carefully and repeatedly throughout my simultaneous 
involvement with the CIDA-funded ARC project, on the one hand, and my doctoral 
research on the other.  I took some measures that were explicit from the outset of the 
work; others cropped up along the way of the research trajectory.  First, I took care to 
be open about my research intentions and obtain authorization from project 
management and my PhD supervisor.  My doctoral aspirations and research intentions 
were openly expressed and discussed with ARC management when I applied to for the 
position of project officer.  All of the senior staff involved with the project supported 
this, expressly welcoming the possibility of me conducting doctoral research at the same 
time as working with the project.  Signaling this support, the ARC offered to provide 
funding for my tuition costs, on the condition that I return for a set period, after 
graduation (an offer I ultimately declined).  Furthermore, the management of the FMB, 
ARC’s partner organization in Paraguay was consulted on the issue at the outset of the 
project, and they also agreed that my dual involvement could be of benefit.  The staff of 
the FMB, including the people with whom which I worked closely in the field, also 
knew that I was conducting research for my PhD and that this was technically separate 
from my project work.  
 
Secondly, I took several measures to physically separate my project work from my 
doctoral research.  Throughout the years of my fieldwork, I scheduled particular weeks 
in which I assumed the distinct role of researcher, as opposed to ARC/FMB 
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employee.  During these weeks I was not remunerated with project funding, and indeed, 
personally remunerated my own research assistant.  During these periods, any support 
granted me by the FMB (housing, for example) was directly granted to me, rather than 
as ‘in kind’ project support.   These measures formally separated my project work from 
my research.  
 
Ultimately, of the three case studies examined in this dissertation, only the subject 
matter of the second, the cumulative effects simulation program, was directly related to 
my project work.  Indeed, much of my professional responsibility involved the 
dissemination and solicitation of local feedback and assessments of the scenarios and 
related policy recommendations. The transformative potential of my project work, for 
the nature of the interventions, and my research outcomes, was most pronounced in 
this land-use planning case study.   
 
Despite these measures to separate project work from doctoral research, I do not wish 
to overestimate the extent to which these can be completely distinct endeavors, 
particularly when undertaken by the same person, in the same place, treating similar 
themes.  A researcher cannot simply turn a blind eye to what she observes because she 
is not in research ‘mode’.  This would be ludicrous to suggest, and perhaps more 
ludicrous to attempt.  Certainly, my work on the project was bound to have some 
impact on my research approach, assumptions and ultimately, findings.  But then, I 
would question the extent to which this is something that should be viewed in a 
negative light.  
  
2.5 Conclusion 
Although not all of the information that emerged from these data collection methods is 
explicitly used in this thesis, each method and the data generated by it, has contributed 
to my understanding and analysis of the politics of evidence and participation in 
environmental policy in Paraguay and beyond.  The forthcoming work aims to combine 
different theoretical insights with empirical rigour to address the research question.  As 
an iterative contribution to middle range theory, it aims to add to so-called ‘grand 
theories’ about deliberative governance, but also to understanding the politics of 
evidence in relation to the governance mechanisms studied.  In line with these aims, 
Chapters 3 and 4 turn to an examination of deliberative theory and critical theories of 
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knowledge respectively, with the aim of improving the theoretical basis for inclusive 
environmental governance.  Chapters 5, 6 and 6 analyze the three case studies to see 
why such theoretical development are necessary, and how they might be 
operationalized. 
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Chapter 3 
Deliberating sustainability: Better environmental governance 
through deepening democracy? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 looked at two proposals within contemporary policy studies, for addressing 
the problems of capture in environmental policy, to improve environmental and 
democratic outcomes.  The first was to increase and improve public participation in 
decision-making.  This would ensure that policy attends to the interests of the general 
population, rather than serving elite interests.  The second was to increase the role of 
‘evidence’ in decision-making.  Chapters 3 and 4 will examine how combined, the 
critiques of each of these positions can provide insight into improving environmental 
governance through the framework I proposed at the end of Chapter 1, of critical 
deliberative governance.  This framework will be elaborated in greater detail at the end 
of Chapter 4.  
 
This chapter argues that contemporary deliberative theory improves upon the more 
conventional approaches that emphasize participation and evidence, but itself needs to 
be improved because of insufficient engagement with knowledge.  This insufficient 
engagement leads to a potential for unexamined and uncritical acceptance of norms as 
legitimate and representative, and facts as authoritative and credible.  Contemporary 
deliberative theory improves upon the more conventional approaches that emphasize 
participation and evidence in two ways.  First, embedded in the deliberative call for 
‘democratizing democracy’ is a profound critique of participation as it is often 
understood and implemented in environment and development interventions – a means 
toward efficiency and effectiveness in policy implementation.  Deliberative theorists 
have made broad based inclusion in public policy debate (as opposed to solely 
implementation) a key principle, even pre-requisite for achieving ‘good’, ‘fair’ and 
‘effective’ policy and environmental sustainability.  In deliberative terms, inclusive, 
authentic debate and dialogue is essential to create the very basis of rational policy.  
Secondly, deliberative politics contains a cautionary critique of evidence-based policy, 
insofar as it entails the dominance of expertise and elitist knowledge in policy processes 
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and illegitimates explicitly normative bases for policy3.  In particular deliberative theory 
takes aim at instrumental rationality, relegating it to a secondary concern, incidental, 
even antithetical to aspirations of democracy, and ultimately sustainability.  Each of 
these two improvements has created a more critical intellectual environment for 
environmental policy by highlighting and legitimizing the role of normative debate to 
environmental sustainability.   
 
Deliberative environmental governance, however, invites a new cautionary critique, if 
we are to make improvements over past iterations of deliberative theory and practice.  
Processes bearing the deliberative label have been co-opted by pre-determined facts and 
norms that have limited, rather than facilitated, dialogue and public inclusion in 
decision-making.  Foremost, is that it leaves the factual basis of norms (i.e.: 
conservation should take priority because of the existence of a global environmental 
crisis), somewhat unexplored.  While deliberative theorists reject the dominance of 
instrumental approaches to policy problems, they do not typically go far enough in the 
critique of the constituent knowledge claims.  This has two implications for the ultimate 
potential for deliberation.  The first is that this unexamined knowledge can invoke a 
preference for norms that are neither legitimate nor representative, but powerful and 
influential politically and socially.  Secondly is that knowledge uncritically understood as 
authoritative and credible can eclipse debate altogether (resolving these problems is the 
main task of Chapter 4). 
 
This chapter is organized into three sections.  The first explores deliberation as a ‘new’ 
mode of environmental governance.  Indeed, scholars have been talking about 
deliberation for four decades, and contemporary deliberation both continues with, and 
departs from this history.  Therefore, section one will discuss what has changed, and 
what has stayed the same from past to present in deliberative theoretical debates.  The 
second section analyzes the ways in which deliberation provides both a critique and 
improvement upon two orthodox approaches to policy.  The pragmatic, logistic 
emphasis of participation and evidence-based policy are overridden by the deliberative 
argument for normative bases for policy. Section three tempers the optimism for 
deliberation by issuing yet another critique – that deliberation avoids more critical 
engagement with norms and facts.  Without this critical engagement, so-called 
                                               
3 In the next chapter we will look at how this reflects a misunderstanding regarding the (lack of) 
normative influence in the production of evidence.   
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deliberative processes can privilege norms that are not necessarily legitimate nor 
representative and facts that are assumed to be beyond contestation.  This can mask 
non-deliberative effects within supposedly deliberative processes.  
 
3.2 ‘New’ modes of governance: Habermas to the deliberative turn  
The deliberative turn in democratic theory gained ground in the 1990’s (Dryzek 1990; 
Bohman and Rehg 1997; Elster 1998) and increasingly over the course of that decade 
and into the next, was passionately received in environmental politics.  Here, 
deliberative theorists made significant contributions to thinking around public 
participation in environmental decision-making (Torgerson 1999; Smith 2003; Baber 
and Bartlett 2005; Dobson 2007) drawing largely from Habermasian ideals of 
deliberative democracy, highlighting the roles of communication and consensus.  
Deliberative democracy is set apart because of its commitment to deepening democracy 
beyond preference aggregation, by considering effective communication as key (Dryzek 
1996), thereby ‘democratizing democracy’.  Deliberative democrats emphasize the 
policy importance of iterative and multi-lateral communicative and collaborative 
processes that address all stages of policy making: how issues should be framed; various 
ways of finding solutions; and who has the moral imperative and fundamental capability 
to take responsibility for action (Innes and Booher 2003).  Deliberative approaches to 
democratic theory emphasize that, “Political decision-making is legitimate insofar as it 
follows upon a process of public discussion and debate in which citizens and their 
representatives, going beyond their mere self-interest and limited points of view, reflect 
on the public interest or common good” (Rehg and Bohman 2002:31).   
 
Backstrand et al. argue that deliberative democratic theory serves as a conceptual 
cornerstone of ‘new’ modes of environmental governance:  
 
Linked to deliberative ideals of democracy articulated by 
democracy, governance and policy scholars, the deliberative turn 
thus denotes the range of more or less explicit attempts to 
democratize environmental politics and simultaneously foster more 
effective environmental policies.  Although far from all new modes 
of environmental governance involve actual practices of 
deliberation, we suggest that they rest upon an underlying 
assumption that broad participation by public and private actors in 
collective decision-making will bring about both more legitimate 
and effective policy outcomes (2010:4).   
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The way in which deliberative politics insists on the involvement of various publics in 
environmental decision-making, addresses the conceptual difficulty, or more 
appropriately the impossibility, of pinning down what entails sustainable environmental 
governance from a technical perspective.  Thus, the prospect of deliberative 
environmental governance means that what is sustainable, must be approached from a 
normative perspective: “deliberative models of democratic legitimacy are strongly 
normative, in the sense that they are supposed to go beyond utilitarian explanations of 
the rationality of collective decision-making and their instrumental view of politics” 
(Rehg and Bohman 2002:32).  It means that normative positions should not only be 
included in environmental decision-making, but they should take precedence (Arias-
Maldonado 2000)! 
 
Despite this declared importance of norms, policy debates around sustainability are 
typically reduced to how to do sustainable development, rather than what is meant by it 
or upon which norms, values and perspectives it is based.  Governance of sustainable 
development often problematically positions issues of  how to do what works as the main 
conundrum; the “policy goal is a functional dependency on increased ‘steering 
capacity’… It is vital, therefore, that one pursues a more fundamental discourse of 
instrumental effectiveness…” (Bressers 2004:286).  According to these perspectives, 
achieving sustainable development is primarily a matter of formal politics and 
instrumental efficiency to orient and mobilize both political will and the technical way 
toward priorities that feature sustainability.  Indeed, political will, conceptual consensus 
and clarity, robust knowledge about physical phenomena, and administrative capacity 
are each important elements of environmental policy.  Yet these oft-conjured elements 
of sustainable development overlook a fundamental point: that there is virtually no 
consensus on what we even mean by sustainable development; there is no generalized 
understanding or universally held definition of sustainable development, and that the 
ambiguity of the term is its overwhelmingly strongest characteristic.  Dryzek states not 
only that “sustainable development is nowhere an accomplished fact”, but, more 
importantly that it is not “entirely clear how we would recognize it if it were” (Dryzek 
2006:17).  In fact, the past 30 years have been witness to divergence, rather than 
convergence, on issues of sustainability (Redclift 1992; Fergus and Rowney 2005).  
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The debate over environmental policy in Paraguay clearly illustrates this lack of 
consensus about what improved environmental governance might mean.  Among 
Paraguayan stakeholders there is, perhaps predictably, a high level of agreement about 
the existence and unacceptability of environmental degradation.  The notion of, and 
need for, sustainable development has been captured by many different and diverse 
representatives of Paraguayan society.  Peasant groups talk about sustainable agriculture; 
environmental organizations talk about conservation and sustainable land-use planning; 
environmental and agricultural governmental entities talk about sustainable resource 
management. Yet, this broad, superficial agreement about sustainability breaks down 
easily once the meanings and implications of sustainability are mined to any depth.  In 
fact, given the fundamental and deep divide between different Paraguayan social groups 
and interests, different perspectives of sustainability are astonishingly incompatible.  
This makes it clear that debates about sustainability treat issues far beyond some 
physical environment and its directly observable characteristics.  Indeed, as Bebbington 
has argued:  “Latin American environments are contested terrains, fought for by the 
poor and powerful alike. Any valid analysis of the relationship between environment 
and development must therefore begin by understanding struggles between these 
different interest groups” (1992:349).  As a highly agricultural country with South 
America’s highest level of inequality, this statement certainly applies to contemporary 
Paraguay.   
 
The idea that each of these perspectives has potential relevance to environmental 
governance illustrates the importance of the growing discourse around environmental 
democratization, and increasingly, deliberative environmental governance (Bäckstrand, 
Khan et al. 2010).  But deliberative governance has not always actively involved such a 
multiplicity of views.  Indeed, the precursors to more progressive deliberation were 
based on normative commitments (and factual claims) that were scarcely up for debate.  
For example, pioneers of the green political movement spoke of deliberation in 
response to environmental degradation perpetuated by state led and corporate led 
environmental governance.  Green politics emerged as a staunch critic of what was seen 
as technocratic and bureaucratic orientated thinking about environmental governance.  
Described by Torgerson as having “one foot in the green movement and the other in 
the domain of political theory” (1999:ix), green politics formalizes the consideration of 
questions of democracy in the realm of environmental decision-making.   
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But the commitment of green politics to the green movement, along with all of its 
precommitments and assumptions, meant that so-called green deliberation was curtailed 
by the pre-definition of norms as green norms, and as ‘good’ environmental outcomes 
as those defined within a limited (and privileged) purview. Despite claims that green 
politics was a movement that prioritized democratic inclusion in the environmental 
debate, little room was made for perspectives that did not conform with this narrow 
interpretation of environmentalism.  As thinking around deliberative environmental 
politics moved beyond ‘green politics’, it was recognized that being against the 
dominant establishment (i.e.: state, capitalism) is not a sufficient condition for being a 
deliberative movement.   
 
Within more progressive iterations of deliberative environmental governance, extensive 
and intensive debate exists as to how desirable environmental outcomes can be defined.  
This stands in contrast to the earlier green political schools, where environmental values 
and norms were (and continue to be) defined pre-emptively, precluding wider debate on 
the relationship between the environment and democracy, capitalism and the state.  For 
example, green debates continue about whether democratizing environmental decision-
making ultimately leads to improving environmental outcomes. Some authors see the 
two as oppositional arrangements, considering the concurrence of democratic and 
environmental outcomes as akin to “having one’s cake and eating it too” (Baber 
2004:331).  Mitchell reminds us that although some authors do not argue that radical 
authoritarianism is the ecologically rational route, “Other theorists have considered 
whether participatory or deliberative democracy is indeed compatible with 
environmental values… although deliberation clearly helps in some areas (e.g., 
transformation, self development), uncertainty exists whether environmentally friendly 
outcomes can be secured” (Mitchell 2006:461).  In fact, some point out that under the 
watch of radical forms of green thinking, democracy can be the first casualty, in favour 
of even ‘outrageous authoritarianism’ (Saward 1993).  There is no shortage of green 
proposals for coercive and authoritarian strategies to solve environmental crises.  These 
strategies are often posited as undemocratic, but necessary for the global environmental 
good, considering environmental collapse such an imminent and serious threat, that it 
could not possibly be left under democratic control (Ophuls 1977; 1997).  Less radical 
proposals urge the adoption of sustainable development or ecological modernization as 
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a governance paradigm.  But critics of these proposals have suggested that even though 
they often enlist the language of citizen participation as integral to environmental 
governance, these theories “simply prescribe business as usual with a green tint” 
(Mitchell 2006:460).   
 
On the other hand, much contemporary green thought maintains the ecological 
importance of the advancement of democratic environmental governance (Smith 2003; 
Meadowcroft 2004).  These scholars argue that environmental destruction has arisen 
because of the links between opportunistic and free-riding behaviour of economic and 
industrial interests on the one hand and the complacency, even cooperation of the 
administrative state on the other.  Challenges to the malign environmental outcomes of 
this unholy union, had to challenge established power, thus originated from a radical 
social movement.  This movement emerged as the green movement (Torgerson 1999).  
By this account, an emphasis on democracy is therefore crucial for green politics.  As 
put by Mason: “the single greatest cause of ecological degradation remains private 
investment decision, structurally bound to externalize or socialize environmental costs 
unless reined in by democratic controls” (Mason 1999:9).  In particular, the green 
deliberative democrats posit a distinct optimism about the ecological promise of 
democracy, considering deliberative democracy not merely compatible with ecological 
rationality, but a precursor to it (Baber and Bartlett 2005).  Indeed, deliberative 
democracy represents a significant strand of green politics requiring both ecological 
deliberation and deliberative environmentalism; positing a distinct optimism about the 
ecological promise of democracy, considering deliberative democracy not merely 
compatible to ecological rationality, but a precursor to it (Baber and Bartlett 2005).   
 
The problem with this brand of green political debate is that it essentializes stakeholders 
with diverse interests as well as divergent views of desirable environmental outcomes. 
For example, in more recent work the state becomes less antithetical to deliberation, 
and in fact, deliberative potential is found even within the state (Dryzek 1996).  
Moreover, claims that there is necessarily a link between capitalism and environmental 
degradation may work against poor people, dependent on natural resources, for whom 
engagement with market forces are likely to be of benefit (Forsyth 2003).  Furthermore, 
land-use change that is conventionally defined as ‘nature destroying’ (i.e.: deforestation), 
may actually be more accurately described as redistributing environmental services, 
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rather than fundamentally degrading them.  Indeed, “not all stakeholders or affected 
people may experience … supposed topics of degradation to be actually degrading to 
land-uses” (Forsyth 2003:118).  Furthermore,  
 
Elites can manipulate public opinion using arguments that invoke 
‘symbolic’ values and beliefs… The idea here is to associate one’s 
preferred outcomes with popular symbols (such as freedom) and 
undesired outcomes with unpopular symbols (e.g., communism or 
terrorism).  The effect is to privilege particular norms invoked by 
symbolic arguments over others, so that normative meta-consensus 
is manipulated (Dryzek 2010:111). 
 
It was the Critical Theory school where scholars such as Habermas (1970; 1987) and 
Marcuse (1964) developed much of the theoretical basis that has intellectually fed green 
politics and more progressive deliberative approaches.  Habermas saw deliberation as 
key to overcoming the problems of modernity, an overriding dependence on the 
technocratic management exercised by the state, and a problematic hyper-reliance on 
instrumental rationality – a product of modernity, but one that had to be overcome in 
order to finish the yet ‘unfinished business’ of the modernist project.  His work 
addressed the potential for democracy in the policy sciences to summon the tensions 
between democracy and rationality.  He, and others argue that these tensions should not 
be interpreted as inherent or ‘natural’.  In fact, these tensions are directly related to 
particular views of rationality, namely that “mainstream policy analysis can conceive of 
rationality only in instrumental technocratic terms” (Dryzek 1989:104).   
 
But for Habermas salvaging the relationship between democracy and rationality 
depended on two assertions.  First, that we can “still, in our time, provide a rational 
justification for universal normative standards” (Bernstein 1985:4, emphasis added).  
Secondly, that we are not uniquely “faced with relativism, decisionisms, or emotivism 
which hold that ultimate norms are arbitrary and beyond rational warrantability” (Bernstein 
1985:4, emphasis added).  In other words, that while drawing on contested and 
uncertain understandings of what is rational, it remains that rationality is a requirement 
for participation in policy debates and thus effective governance.  Just because 
rationality can be based on more than instrumental reasoning, does not mean that any 
claim can be justified as valid – and we must explore a more expanded version of what 
this means.  Communicative rationality is a product of such expansion.   
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Communicative rationality offers a basis for policy that sacrifices neither greater public 
inclusion, nor a rational basis.  While instrumental action has become the protagonist in 
mainstream understandings of rationality, incarnations of Weberian ‘ideal types’ of 
rationality plainly reject the notion that the instrumental variety is dominant, much less 
unique, in guiding human sense making.  For Habermas, rationality is determined by 
communication and the terms by which it creates an understanding between citizens.  The 
intersubjective nature of rationality is emphasized: “the grounding of normative claims 
requires an actual dialogue rather than an argumentative process run hypothetically 
through a single mind” (Baber and Bartlett 2005:86).  The dialectical must be developed 
through dialogue, between autonomous, free and equal participants (Habermas 1990), 
who are “required to take the perspective of everyone else (who becomes) capable of 
understandings of self and the world of all others” (Habermas 1995:117, found in Baber 
and Bartlett, 2005).  Thus, following Habermas, deliberative democrats argue that in 
order to reconcile democracy with rationality, a more complete understanding of 
rationality is required (Benhabib 1996).  This is communicative rationality.   
 
While the system is seen as a necessary and positive force in the social world, Habermas 
argues that social upheaval occurs when the system is not controlled and is permitted to 
‘colonize’ the lifeworld, resulting in disintegration of social bonds, human alienation, 
demoralization, social instability and a breakdown of common understandings (anomie) 
(Finlayson 2005:57).  Habermas identifies the ‘modernity’ project, as a collection of 
processes by which the lifeworld, driven by religious traditions and tribal relationships 
are replaced by deepening and increasingly specialized knowledge within the three ‘value 
spheres’:  scientific/ technological, moral/legal, and aesthetic/expressive.  Ultimately, 
this results in alienation from the human world via a separation of ‘what we know’ from 
‘how we live’, partially mediated through the mechanism of irrelevant and impotent 
public policy.  In Habermas’ words: “Modernity brings about a vast increase in the 
amount and depth of specialized knowledge, but this knowledge becomes, in the same 
process, detached from its moorings in everyday life, and floats free from ‘the stream of 
tradition which naturally progresses in the hermeneutic of everyday life’ (Habermas 
1992:43).  The increasing fetishization and idolization of that which is considered to be 
‘knowledge’ and its increasing alienation from daily life and human experience is not 
only deeply troubling, but signifies a social problem writ large.   
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Habermas proposes that the expansion and advance of instrumental rationality has 
given way to a process of the ‘scientization of politics’ that ultimately gives rise to an 
interpretation of social and environmental problems as technical problems.  This in turn 
leads to the dominance of expert administrators that devise and deploy technical 
solutions in making decisions for, and controlling society.  Increasingly complex 
technologies and particularized knowledges are delineated as prerequisities to fulfilling 
the various functions of society.  This ultimately takes the place of an informed, 
intelligent public, multi-laterally engaged in problem solving dialogue.  As put by 
Habermas, modernity, epitomized by instrumental rationality, had come to dominate 
decision-making, and thus resulted anti-democratic tendencies in society and 
environmental degradation.  It is in the public sphere, with the generation of high 
quality, participatory discourse, that the dominance of the lifeworld could be re-
emphasized, and society could be salvaged from the colonization of the system.   
 
Critical theory and green politics have provided a basis for more progressive 
deliberative theory.  However, increasing attention is being paid to how these ideas were 
counterproductive deliberatively speaking, by predefining norms and precluding others.  
Thus, increasingly, deliberative theorists are surrendering any die hard, essentialist 
oppositions to instrumental rationality, capitalism, state led governance.  Even Dryzek 
asks, “can we envisage a more ecologically benign modernity, or is modernity 
ecologically irredeemable?” (1995:231).  Indeed, it seems that contemporary analyses are 
more willing to walk the line between deliberation and instrumentalism.  For example, 
associated with less hierarchical and ‘softer’ forms of steering:  
 
…new modes of environmental governance also harbour a 
normative agenda to open up politics and make environmental 
decision-making more inclusive, transparent, accountable and 
reflexive, while at the same time effective and performance-oriented.  
(Bäckstrand, Khan et al. 2010:4, emphasis added). 
 
Post-positivism represents a new deliberative turn with emphasis shifted away from flat 
out rejection of modern artefacts such as state bureaucracies and capitalism, toward a 
new emphasis on discourse, argumentation, interpretation and politics as policy inputs4 
(i.e.: Healey (1997), Paehlke and Torgerson (2005), Dryzek (2006), and Forester and 
Fischer (1993)).  The rise of post-positivism has occurred as a response to the 
                                               
4 The post-positivist turn in policy analysis was pioneered by diverse authors but many of these are 
intellectually located within deliberative politics.   
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inadequacies of more orthodox approaches in understanding policy issues (deLeon 
1994) that have taken positivism, particularly the positivist emphasis on objectivity, as 
the gold standard in policy making.  While representing many different approaches and 
even opposing views (some of which will be discussed in the next chapter), these works 
are characterized by an important thread.  Post-positivists suggest that so-called ‘strong’ 
empiricism is rather ‘naïve’ empiricism for the understanding that observation is a 
sufficient foundation for understanding social or natural processes.  Generally, post-
positivists position knowledge as only one policy input (and not even the most 
important) alongside discourse, argumentation, interpretation and politics.  
Consequently, they reject the positivist implication that the most significant policy 
inputs are characterized by instrumental rationality.  Beyond questioning the desirability 
of positivism in public policy, post-positivism has drawn increasing attention to the 
dubiousness of its possibility.  Dryzek comments, “No policy analysis has ever actually 
measured up to the canons of the logical positivism as philosophy of science and 
practice” (2002:32).  Thus, “Many (but not all) post-positivists are interested in a more 
authentic democratization of the policy process” (Dryzek 2002:32).   
 
3.3 Deliberative critique of orthodox policy approaches: participation and 
evidence-based policy 
While at first glance it might seem that deliberation advances an uncritical, wholehearted 
promotion of participation in development processes, closer inspection suggests that it 
actually provides a critique of participation.  Deliberative democracy offers a departure 
from the way in which ‘participation’ is actually conceived of in many contexts – a fix 
for an inherently inefficient bureaucracy “due to the absence of the incentives and 
sanctions of the market and due to the self-interest of professionals, administrators and 
politicians” (Sanderson 1999:327).  The virtues of participation are often cited as 
promoting public ‘buy in’ to policies, enlisting public support and assistance, rallying 
public resources, boosting public education and awareness, bypassing cumbersome 
bureaucracy, and other such advantages that merely expedite the policy process.  
Deliberative democracy goes beyond efficiency and effectiveness arguments for 
participation by offering a different rationale - a communicative rationale - that 
emphasizes the importance of a normative, yet rational basis for public decision-
making. Communication as the basis for rationality provides substantive grounds for 
thinking that participation is essential for achieving rationality – the basic fundamental 
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of good policy!  The notion that communication generates rationality, rather than being 
peripheral to it, puts diverse public subjectivities at the centre of governance.  Where 
participation has failed to empower citizens with control over the policies by which they 
are governed (Cooke and Kothari 2001) deliberation, in particular the concept of 
communicative rationality, puts public, normative debate at the centre of defining 
rational policy (Baber and Bartlett 2005).   
 
The deliberative critique of evidence is more explicit.  The deliberative, normative 
approach to environmental governance stands in direct contrast with the more 
modernist governance ideal of a strong administrative state directed by instrumental 
know-how.  For those who associate more authoritarian decision-making with better 
environmental outcomes, it follows that a sizeable bureaucracy is required to implement 
suitable environmental policy, which is achieved by applying established principles and 
reaping the corresponding ‘good’ outcomes.  For example, Lafferty and the constituent 
authors of his 2004 edited volume, Governance for Sustainable Development, 
encourage policy makers to practice the idea of ‘form following function’.  This phrase 
is significant as the veritable doctrine of modernist architecture5, stressing the 
relationship between the design of a given structure, and its intended purpose.  Applied 
to policy, it surely means the same: the structure being administrative and the intended 
purpose, sustainable outcomes.  A functional form houses a “process that can, to a 
reasonable degree, be ‘steered’ by governing procedures and institutions; and one must 
assume that governments committed to sustainable development are willing to alter 
existing governing systems in order to better achieve SD goals” (Lafferty 2004:4-5).   
 
However, the powerful and able state bureaucracy that Lafferty implies is necessary for 
implementing environmental policy, is the same bureaucracy, that in Togerson and 
Paehlke’s account, cannot be depended upon to know about, let alone act upon, 
society’s best interests.  This rejection is based on what these authors see as an 
inherently antagonistic relationship between evidence-based policy and democratization, 
particularly insofar as the relationship is mediated by the bureaucratic state.  Indeed, 
evidence-based policy does not implement itself, but requires a sizeable and powerful 
bureaucracy dedicated to its generation and implementation.  Hobbes described this 
bureaucracy as Leviathan - a necessarily strong and legitimate state, that would keep the 
                                               
5 Ultimately, the idea that form should follow function in architecture came under criticism as an 
incomplete and inadequate design principle.   
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peace and serve the welfare of its citizens (Schmitt 1996).  The Leviathan of more 
contemporary policy studies however, is less benign, and its existence is described by 
some as at once comforting and unsettling.  It is comforting in that the increasing 
complexity of social problems is “deemed to require a concentration of knowledge and 
power in centralized hierarchies” (Torgerson and Paehlke 1990:7); unsettling in that this 
management “necessarily extracts sacrifices from democracy” (Torgerson and Paehlke 
1990:7).   
 
The state, however, is not necessarily a legitimate entity in and of itself, and must pursue 
strategies which the public can endorse.  Legitimate decision-making entails taking 
action that effects the public good, and that is not politically committed.  In other 
words, legitimacy is associated with neutrality.  Thus, the increasing acceptance of the 
evidence-based paradigm which has led to a focus on policy processes based on ideas 
such as ‘best practices’ and ‘results-based management’.  These discourses became more 
pervasive as public scrutiny intensifies along with demands for transparency, 
accountability and efficiency.  Rydin elaborates:  
 
The justification for public-sector activity is that outcomes should be 
better than in its absence.  And a key element in producing better 
outcomes is having a better process for getting to those outcomes.  
Hence the rationality of the policy process itself is seen as legitimating the 
activities of the public sector.  The belief in the ability of bureaucracies to 
pursue strategies and routines that are imbued with rationality, resulting in 
optimal outcomes, has its roots in the very establishment of bureaucracies 
as a superior form for the state (2003:78).   
 
The evidential basis for policy (over which a normative basis is strongly favoured by 
deliberative democrats), is underpinned by a combination of positivism and 
instrumental rationality (Sanderson 1999; 2006).  Positivism is the belief that, through 
objective observation and unbiased application of the scientific method, causal 
relationships in nature and society can be known.  Positivism upholds the research ideal 
that because truth is contained in observable subjects and data, methodologies can be 
precise enough to be replicable and consistent.  Through this strong empiricism, 
objective knowledge is established through strictly empirical means.  Instrumental 
rationality in policy internalizes positivism, and embodies the belief that particular policy 
interventions (inputs) will consistently correspond with predictable social, economic and 
environmental outcomes (outputs).   
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A contemporary form of this rational policy process is evidence-based policy - largely 
seen as bringing instrumental rationality to bear on public matters (Sanderson 2002).  
Evidence-based policy is a way of making public policy more efficient and legitimate; 
driven by the facts, and not by human intervention.  Employing the rationality of 
instrumentalism is a means of ‘a-socializing’ knowledge, thereby releasing it from its 
social moorings so that it can be applied in society without bias or pretension.  Indeed, 
within the positivist penchant, scientific sophistication and technological advance are 
understood as allowing for greater understanding, with greater certainty and predictive 
capacity, the workings of the public, thus objective, natural world.  Proponents of 
evidence-based policy advocate for decision-making based on instrumental rationality to 
project the most effective and efficient pathways of decision-making.  Indeed, this push 
is typically embedded in utilitarian discourses of cost effectiveness, and improved 
research ‘uptake’ in practice, to streamline policy inputs and outcomes.  A type of 
utopia, the high-modernist society exudes “… a strong, one might even say muscle-
bound, version of the self confidence about scientific and technical progress… the 
rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of 
natural laws” (Scott 1998:4).   
 
Deliberative theorists have typically had little patience for this brand of modernist 
hubris.  This is made apparent by the indictment of instrumentalism into the green 
assessment of the democratic deficit and environmental degradation:  “A diverse group 
of philosophers, who might agree on little else, have adopted the view that the 
Enlightenment has actually been too successful, often to the detriment of both 
democracy and the natural environment” (Baber and Bartlett 2005:225).  Indeed, the 
enlightenment-inspired ways in which instrumentalism has been idealized in state led 
policy making, have been central to the concerns of green deliberative politics, in two 
main ways.   
 
The first is a concern with recapturing the ‘local’ in policy making, in terms of 
knowledge, perspectives and politics.  In contrast to those who celebrate the notion of a 
strong, capable state to implement environmental policy, the deliberative strand of 
green politics evokes a preference for a ‘localist basis of organisation’ (Sanderson 1999), 
and a normative rather than technocratic basis for decision-making .  While this 
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evocation is perhaps best described in a general sense, rather than in terms of iron clad 
principles, these preferences are captured by well known green maxims such as ’think 
globally, act locally’, or ‘small is beautiful’.  This localism is generally defined by its 
position well outside the state, and its conceptual, even philosophical opposition to the 
state.  Indeed, as the issue of capture (discussed in Chapter 1) reminds, proximity to the 
state is feared to put at risk, the capacity for critical reflection.   
 
The second is that in emphasizing the normative concerns of policy making, 
instrumental rationality must not be considered a main driver of policy, but relegated to 
a secondary concern. Part of what makes a governing philosophy based on instrumental 
rationality so appealing is not only the prospect of more efficient policy, based on the 
right kind and the right amount of knowledge, but its democratic promise.  But 
arguments within deliberative politics fundamentally challenge the notion that policies 
based on instrumental rationality (i.e.: evidence-based policies) are inherently rational, 
unsullied by bias or agenda, and thus, politically neutral. So-called rational discourse, in 
an orthodox instrumental incarnation, is objectionable to those committed to wider 
participation in policy debates:  
 
Deliberative democratic theorists also often complain that the 
liberal emphasis on the authority of certain kinds of reason restricts 
the agenda of public discussion.  Resting on an overly narrow 
conception of rationality, largely influenced by the dominance of 
scientific reason, what can count as legitimate political 
argumentation is problematically defined in advance.  Often 
neglected are the distinctive viewpoints of groups at the margins of 
the dominant culture, in particular those who employ other modes 
of reason and expression. (Fischer 2009:79).   
 
Fischer goes on to point out that the assumed neutrality of this ‘overly narrow 
conception of rationality’ quickly breaks down once exposed to different critiques.  For 
the feminist, mainstream rationality is represented by patriarchy, for the indigenous by 
the colonizer and for the religious minority by secular society.  Similarly, Backstrand 
illustrates how sub-movements within green politics critique the rise of “environmental 
governance is emerging as an increasingly scientised and technocratic domain”:   
 
Eco-feminism links the rise of technocratic science to an overall 
critique of modernity, rationality and patriarchy. Eco-modernism 
aims at re-configuring scientific rationality in terms of reflexive 
modernisation, and a stronger participatory dimension of civil 
society. In the postmodern green critique, the ascendancy of 
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regulatory science marks the influence of biopower or green 
governmentality (Bäckstrand 2004:695).   
 
An important criticism of the ‘democratic potential’ of instrumental rationality is 
represented by John Dryzek’s 1990 project, “Discursive Democracy”, which took aim 
squarely at instrumental rationality as a basis for governance.  Among his complaints is 
that instrumental rationality is ineffective, inappropriate, and insufficient in dealing with 
policy problems, in addition to being inherently antidemocratic and repressive (See Box 
3.1).  Dryzek criticizes what he calls the “complete guide for the would-be rational 
individual”: “Instrumental rationality and objectivism go hand in hand.  The former 
governs rational behaviour, the latter rational belief and morality” (Dryzek 1990:4).  He 
continues, “Together, instrumental rationality and objectivism conjure up a clean and 
orderly world where modern science, technology, and economics flourish”6 (Dryzek 
1990:4) .   
 
Though the respective commentaries from Dryzek and Fischer above suggest that 
instrumental rationality itself is the mortal enemy of deliberation, this is not an 
altogether accurate description of the relationship.  The contention, rather, is the role of 
instrumental rationality in policy debates and decision-making; the ways in which it is 
often awarded precedence over other dimensions of environmental problems.  Fischer 
explains the deliberative perspective, that “There is, in short, no epistemological road 
                                               
6 This clean and orderly world evokes the Scott’s account of ‘metis’ and its demise by the hand of the 
state’s legibility project.   
 
 
Box 3.1.  Six counts against instrumental rationality (Dryzek 1990):  
 
Dryzek begins the 1990 work, ‘Discursive Democracy’ by taking aim squarely at instrumental 
rationalist, and calling for the democratization of rationality.  This, he claims, is the cure for 
the world’s present political ills which spring from “the decline of once confident and still 
pervasive forms of rationality” (p.3).  The following are his ‘six counts against this kind of 
rationality.  
 
1. Instrumental rationality destroys more congenial spontaneous, egalitarian, and 
intrinsically meaningful aspects of human association. 
2. Instrumental rationality is antidemocratic. 
3. Instrumental rationality represses individuals.   
4. Instrumental rationality – and the political institutions in which it is manifested – is 
ineffective when confronted with complex social problems.  
5. Instrumental rationality makes effective and appropriate policy analysis impossible.  
6. Instrumental rationality informs inappropriate and unfruitful social science 
instruments and methods.  
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over which expertise can directly travel from one domain to the other” (Fischer 
2009:144):   
 
In the public realm the crucial questions are generally not about the 
technical findings.  Rather they are about political policymaking 
which raises a different set of concerns.  In the domain of public 
policy the issue is seldom about the technical characteristic of the 
phenomenon per se.  Fundamentally, it is about the relations of 
technical phenomenon to society.  It is the normative question of 
what should be done (Fischer 2009:145).   
 
Fischer’s complaint is not about the knowledge per se, nor the sources of knowledge, 
but with the way in which knowledge about physical phenomena plays into policy 
processes.  In short, he claims, it does not play a very big role.  This is because policy 
questions are focused less on changes that happen in society and more on changes that 
happen to society.  His approach is a diversion from classic policy-related questions 
about the nature of knowledge and the cognitive quality of evidence.  He divorces 
policy analysis from the necessity of commenting on the veracity of knowledge.  He 
argues that to put technical knowledge at the centre of policy inquiry is to 
fundamentally misunderstand policy processes; “the consequence of an inappropriate 
overextension of scientific rationality in a realm governed by a different logic” (Fischer 
2009:145).   
 
Fischer’s comment echoes Habermas’ troubled observations of modernity.  Habermas 
conceives of two main experiential realms, including the ‘system’ and the ‘lifeworld’7.  
The system is composed of the mechanisms for the material reproduction of society 
including economic systems, power relations and state bureaucracies.  Within this 
sphere, instrumental rationality8 is applied in order to achieve material goals, in a de-
politicized and a-ethical context.  Thus, Habermas does not suggest that instrumental 
rationality be entirely abandoned in favour of moral and communicative rationality.  To 
the contrary, he is in full favour of managing mundane, everyday material needs using 
instrumentally rational approaches.  In the ideal Habermasian society, however, the 
authority of instrumental rationality is restricted to the system, and is subverted by the 
                                               
7 Habermas’ development of and (over)dependence on the lifeworld has been duly criticized by a number 
of authors (i.e.: Schnadelbach, H. (1991). The Transformation of Critical Theory. Communicative Action: 
Essays on Jurgen Habermas' the Theory of Communicative Action. Cambridge, UK, Polity Press: 7-22. ).  This 
is significant because the lifeworld is the basis for the normative premises of Habermas’ social theory.   
8 Instrumental rationality is argued by Baber and Bartlett to encompass both narrow technical and wider 
economic forms of rationality Baber, W. and R. V. Bartlett (2005). Deliberative Environmental Politics: 
Democracy and Ecological Rationality. Cambridge and London, The MIT Press. 
 75 
communicative rationality that mediates the lifeworld.  Extra-instrumental forms of 
rationality – those that relate to the lifeworld - are indispensable, and ultimately 
supercede the importance of instrumental rationality:   
 
He (Habermas) claims that in terms of evolutionary theory the 
communicative action approach (as the complementary gestalt of the 
concept of lifeworld) must be granted an overriding validity vis-à-vis 
the systems-theoretic model of society… Only the systems-functional 
replacement also of communicative action, the medium adequate to 
modern symbolic reproduction, could be subjected to a realistic 
criticism (Kruger 1991:142).   
 
The lifeworld, on the other hand, consists of the mechanisms that enable the symbolic 
and cultural reproduction of society via the creation of common understanding and 
agreed-upon terms for communication.  The lifeworld includes the informal and 
unmarketized domains of life; it encapsulates the concepts of the everyday.   
Scholars have used the concept of communicative rationality to highlight the 
importance of discourse and normativity in policy debates.  The potential for, and 
promise of communicative rationality has enabled the issue of communication and 
deliberation as serious alternatives to technocratic environmental management or to 
democracy as an aggregation of interests, with several advantages.  The first is that 
deliberation is associated with social learning in environmental policy; it is not simply a 
prescriptive exercise, but potentially transformative.  As the debate proceeds, individuals 
come to know and understand the arguments of others, and thus are given 
opportunities to consider hitherto unknown positions and perspectives.  Participants do 
not enter into debate simply to ‘convert’ others to their position; they also enter into 
debate to hear, consider, and be influenced by others.  Thus, communication does not 
mechanically transmit knowledge or uncover some independent, existing rationality.  
Rather communication actually generates knowledge, and thus transforms reality rather 
than merely reflecting it. Secondly, with communication as a basis for rationality, 
assuming free and reasoned argument, not only will better decision-making ensue, but 
decisions will be more legitimate (Bäckstrand, Khan et al. 2010).  The next section will 
explore these deliberative claims, and preview how Chapter 4 will deal with the critiques 
of these claims further.  
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3.4 Deliberation in developing world environmental politics: insufficient 
engagement with norms and facts 
While deliberative green politics offers a critique of participation and evidence-based 
policy, it also extends some of their weaknesses, and introduces some new problems to 
debates about facts and norms in public policy.  Deliberative democracy is about public 
engagement with policy decision-making and thus draws heavily on the differences in 
the ways that different people experience environmental problems.  Though Habermas 
has been criticized for his focus on the ‘bourgeois public’, deliberation has come to be 
characterized by processes that reconcile difference, rather than overlooking difference.  
The public sphere is where this reconciliation happens through intersubjective, 
discursive interaction: where “the arguments of mixed companies could become 
authoritative bases for political action” (Calhoun 1992:1).  Much of what has been 
considered green deliberative politics, however, is characterized by two main problems.  
First, it has not been sufficiently inclusive.  Secondly, it has not been sufficiently 
empirical.  These shortcomings have been particularly pronounced in the developing 
world, where green politics can often obscure both developmental aspirations and 
power relations AND different perceptions of environmental problems.   
 
The first problem with green deliberation has been the acceptance of global 
environmental norms as legitimate and representative, in the absence of a careful and 
critical examination of the social and political forces that have influenced them.  As with 
the public-private partnerships that Forsyth writes about, the various emergent 
arrangements designed to facilitate deliberation often,  
 
… do not stand alone as new discursive arenas (or public spheres) to 
formulate new and locally representative norms about environmental 
protection and governance.  Instead, they replicate and – to some extent – 
co-opt existing norms, which are frequently communicated by networks 
of actors who are not local, such as national and international NGOs 
(Forsyth 2005:437-438).   
 
This co-option brings to bear the way in which green deliberation has largely under-
theorized the effects of power relations on how assumedly collective norms are 
established.   
 
Open access to political debates by different social groups is not always 
possible, and hence partnerships may not easily be called forms of political 
pluralism.  Poor sectors of society… were often co-opted (as predicted by 
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Hajer, 1995) to support wider political arguments from more powerful 
actors…  (Forsyth 2005:437).   
 
The dubious possibility of open access to debates applies not only in international 
contexts where deliberations are attempted between the poor and multi-national firms 
or international NGOs.  Naïve understandings of communities as homogenous, can 
mask that open access does not apply at the local level either.  Indeed “’local 
knowledge’ reflects local power” (Mosse 2001:19). 
 
Another example of how an understanding of ‘local’ ‘traditional’ or ‘indigenous’ 
knowledge and norms can be naïve, is how they can be shaped by environment and 
development encounters.  The identification of local knowledge is often framed as an 
attempt to create space for local people to contribute to, and ideally exert more control 
over projects and interventions (Berkes 1999).  Sometimes this means illustrating that 
local, indigenous knowledge was indeed compatible, even complimentary, to expert 
diagnoses and prescriptions. But authors have shown that rather than impacting on 
development discourse and practice – as is the intent of deliberative practices – often 
what is understood as ‘local’ knowledge is actually shaped by these discourses and 
practices.  This can happen as a result of strategic action, as is the case when subjects of 
interventions learn how to manage perceptions of what are local norms in order to 
maximize their benefits in light of what an agency is seen to be able to deliver (Mosse 
2001).  Similarly, it can also happen when people are eager to adopt knowledge and 
norms that seemingly represent modernity and progress.   
   
Despite the deliberative emphasis on difference (and thus, the need for deliberation), 
green politics has been slow to account for difference with sophistication, rather relying 
on essentialist categories of stakeholders in environmental governance.  Green thinking 
that links democracy with ecological rationality is borne out in feminist, indigenous and 
development studies literatures.  Feminist researchers have drawn direct links between 
the marginalization of groups such as women from decision-making, and environmental 
degradation (Agarwal 1992).  Likewise, environmental degradation has been attributed 
to the lack of consideration of the traditional knowledge of indigenous people (Berkes 
1999).  The environmental justice movement is concerned with the relationship 
between poverty and racism and environmental degradation in (mostly) urban 
environments (Brown 1995).  Much of the early work in these areas has been criticized 
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for oversimplifying and romanticizing the relationships between different groups to 
nature, and for imposing essentialist categories on groups of people and overstating or 
mis-stating the separation of interests and understandings between groups such as men/ 
women and indigenous/non-indigenous.  Being critical of this essentialism, however, is 
not to disregard that much of this work brought/brings to light the political dimension 
of environmental issues, highlighting ethnic, gendered and class-based stratification, 
pertaining to control over governing the environment, and access to resources.   
 
The second problem of green politics is an insufficient attention to empiricism.  At first 
glance this criticism does not hold up, because it is precisely the caution about 
empirically based policy that gives much of deliberative politics its drive.  In fact, more 
than caution, some authors doubt that strong empiricism has much to do with policy 
analysis at all:  “more than just an epistemological alternative, the post-empiricist 
approach is offered as a better description of what social scientists actually do in 
practice” (Fischer 2003:209).  However, despite a fervent opposition to dependence (at 
least overdependence) on environmental facts as cues for policy, norms (in this case 
green norms) are established on the basis of truth claims – often unexamined truth 
claims.  For example, much of the green political movement revolves around the 
assertion of a global environmental crisis based on notions of equilibrium ecology and 
balance of nature.  While these notions are compelling, they have been criticized for not 
accounting for ecosystem variance over time and space (Forsyth 2003).  Furthermore, 
simplistic assumptions about global ecological crisis often overlook the ways in which 
degradation is assessed and understood in different societies and cultures (Adger, 
Benjaminsen et al. 2001), or ways in which science and globalization have been 
contested as frameworks for interpreting environmental problems (Taylor and Buttel 
1992).  Furthermore, as has been pointed out previously in this chapter, the truth claims 
involved in the establishment of these relationships is often unhelpful to poor people 
who are trying to maintain or expand livelihoods through access to resources.   
 
3.5  Conclusion  
This chapter has argued that deliberative political theory goes some distance in 
addressing the shortcomings of orthodox approaches to both participation and 
evidence-based policy.  First, while maintaining that deeper participation is vital for 
good policy, deliberative theory provides a critique of how participation is actually 
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implemented or initiated.  It does this by emphasizing environmental policy making and 
analysis as a normative undertaking based on communication, rather than a means of 
implementation or local ‘buy in’ to pre-designed policies.  Secondly, deliberative theory 
contains a critique of modernist confidence in evidence-based policy insofar as it is a 
practical, policy-based manifestation of instrumental rationality.  The evidence-based 
perspective argues that good decision-making is based on sound knowledge about 
causal processes.  In other words, particular outcomes can be expected to flow from 
particular inputs.  But this causal explanation for policy making explains nothing of the 
ways in which society’s actual decisions are the products of argumentation, discourse 
and politics.  Deliberative theorists charge that these influences have little to do with 
instrumental rationality.  Rather, the minutiae of instrumental rationality, if given 
priority in decision-making, comes to obscure, or colonize the human sphere in which 
meaning is created and solidarities are established.   
 
But, the theoretical assessment of environmental governance cannot end with the 
discussion of deliberation in this chapter.  This is because critiques of deliberative 
democracy as an emergent policy framework, have in turn, raised several important 
concerns.  These concerns have two main centres of gravity.  The first is a staple 
critique of Habermasian deliberative approaches: how relations of power remain, if not 
unrecognized, largely unaddressed.  The assumption that politics can become explicit 
and transparent for the purposes of sincere and open debate, that under conditions of 
deliberation discourse is unconstrained, non-coerced, sincere and legitimate, has been 
branded as naïve by some and ‘dangerously utopian’ by others.  Indeed, these critiques 
need to be taken seriously, particularly in the developing world, where inequalities in the 
developed world are often dwarfed in comparison.   
 
The second extends the first in that power relations exist beyond the contextual 
interactions of the debate, and are contained in the knowledge claims that are used in 
debate.  Indeed, deliberative norms emerge in the context of knowledge claims – but 
these claims remain largely unexamined.  As we have seen, corporatism, capitalism and 
an overconfident and excessively bureaucratic state are seen within green politics to 
have given rise to a global environmental crisis.  But the causal relationships here 
remain somewhat over-simplified and stereotypical.  Furthermore, the crisis itself is 
seen as a generalized problem based on consensus, rather than a phenomenon 
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perceived and experienced to different extents and in different ways.  However, 
“Habermas’s critique cannot go beyond a policy of containment.  It protects politics 
from the presumed rationalizing and dehumanizing forces of science and technology, 
but it never engages the creation of scientific knowledge or technical artifacts 
themselves” (Brown 2009:87).   
 
So-called ‘new modes of governance’ that highlight deliberation are not that 
theoretically new.  Deliberative democracy represents an oeuvre established over the last 
3 decades or more; participation has been a key theme in development planning and 
policy since the 1980’s.  There has been a recent upsurge, however, in interest in 
deliberation as an environmental policy input, illustrated by contemporary work such as 
Fischer’s Democracy and Expertise (2009), and Backstrand et al.’s Environmental 
Politics and Deliberative Democracy (2010).  Earlier approaches to deliberative 
governance of and governance by norms gave rise to a decidedly limited idea of what it 
is to be an environmentalist; to be ‘green’.  In contrast, progressive approaches seek to 
reestablish the spirit of deliberation through which the normative framework for 
environmental governance is debated, not predetermined.  But of course, this is not as 
straightforward as it might first seem.  It requires more than just a commitment to a 
normative basis for policy.  It also requires conceptual tools to analyze the factual basis 
of emergent norms.   
Chapter 4 argues that a theory of democratic engagement with citizens, on issues of 
public concern, is incomplete without reflexive analyses of knowledge.  These analyses 
will address how and why knowledge becomes expertise: how it gains authority and 
legitimacy among policy makers and the public; and, how it is deployed in policy 
debates and ultimately in governance.  It will provide insight into why citizens should be 
able to, and how they may have access to, the critical understanding to allow them to 
assess and judge the factual and normative basis of relevant scientific and technical 
arguments. 
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Chapter 4 
Expanding deliberative limits: Politics of evidence in sustainable 
development policy 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 examined the deliberative response to the tensions between different 
mainstream proposals of participation and evidence for improving environmental 
governance.  In response to calls for more participation, deliberative theory points the 
importance of deepening of democratic decision-making about the environment.  In 
response to calls for more evidence-based policy, it cautions against policies that depend 
on instrumentalism and the corresponding claims to neutrality and non-partisanship.  
Deliberative processes, it is asserted, should centre around normativity in debate, rather 
than be sidetracked or colonized by technical issues of science and expertise. Experts 
participate in policy debates, but their contributions are not privileged over any 
contribution, and remain subject to the same scrutiny as any other submission.   
 
But experts wielding evidence in policy debates are not on equal footing with other 
participants.  They often enjoy privileged access to credibility and authority through 
mechanisms that delineate expert knowledge apart from lay knowledge.  Appropriate 
and rigorous method (such as the scientific method) is such a mechanism, often 
depicted as reflecting rather than interpreting nature, through which the expert has 
special access to knowledge about natural processes.  However, substantial scholarly 
effort has shown that indeed, these mechanisms do not simply reflect nature, but that 
they are also subject to socially embedded endorsement.  Thus, it is increasingly 
accepted in the social and policy sciences, that expert knowledge itself must become 
central to the work of analysts.  It suffices neither to treat expertise with blind 
acceptance or with exclusionary disdain; nor will it do to treat experts as ‘just another 
participant’ in policy deliberations.  Rather full engagement with knowledge, including 
its social and political commitments, must be the policy order of the day.   
 
Approaches to environmental governance that take deliberation as a fulcrum, have 
largely avoided critical engagement with expert policy advice (Brown 2009).  This 
critique has come from Foucauldian-influenced approaches to knowledge and 
governance, found within the diverse thinking loosely regarded as Science and 
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Technology Studies (STS).  Like deliberative green politics, much support for the 
democratization of environmental governance can be found within STS.  However, the 
reasons for the importance of this democratization, and means to achieve greater citizen 
participation in environmental decision-making, take a radical departure from the 
Habermasian inspired green politics.  This departure (or more aptly these departures) is 
the subject of this chapter.   
 
This chapter argues for a framework to improve deliberation in environmental 
governance by addressing its weaknesses while building on its strengths.  As I proposed 
in Chapter 1, this framework, which I call critical deliberative governance, satisfies two 
criteria.  The first is that it provides a critical perspective on policy relevant knowledge, 
to make more explicit the politics that lie under the surface of technocratic ways of 
‘solving’ environmental problems.  Secondly, it aims to retain that which imbues green 
deliberative politics with developmental promise - the legitimation of normative 
rationality in approaches to environmental governance.   
 
This two-tier task begins by examining debates about what kinds of information can be 
trusted as evidence.  Realism embodies a commitment to the methods and Mertonian 
norms of science to produce objective knowledge.  But this has been challenged by 
more recent thinking on the social and political norms that influence the production of 
knowledge, not least of all knowledge subject to the rigors of science and quantification, 
and the acceptance of its authority and credibility in public decision-making.  It 
proceeds by analyzing different approaches to using evidence in policy.  Here we look at 
the ‘information model’ of policy – an orthodox assumption that more knowledge is 
better for reducing uncertainty and improving consensus around decision-making.  This 
model has been challenged, for example, by work on scientific controversies.  Thirdly 
this chapter argues that despite the common presentation of evidence as an instrument 
of neutrality and objectivity in policy, evidence – in a variety of discursive forms - is 
often deployed as a part of wider power relationships within governance structures.  
Fourthly, I present co-production as a conceptual and practical framework for 
improving the use of facts in policy.  Within this framework, facts are considered to be 
coproduced with norms; discourse allows analysts to view these facts and norms as 
essentially political and contestable.  Finally, I present my argument for critical 
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deliberative governance framework as an improvement over existing ways of 
conceptualizing environmental governance. 
 
 
4.2 Evidence and expertise: from natural facts to social influence 
Questions regarding the relationship between nature, and human knowledge of it, have 
given rise to rich intellectual debate over the past decades and have been central to 
debates within science studies and engagements with its critics.  At the heart of this 
debate, is what counts as trusted information, and why it should count as such.  What is 
the position of evidence among knowledge and why evidence has such a unique status 
among ways of understanding the world?  What is it, in conventional understanding, 
that separates evidence from the epistemological masses? Indeed, the concept of 
evidence evokes a kind of intellectual reverence owing to that which separates it from 
anecdote, opinion or emotion.   
 
Much of what this separation has conventionally come down to are issues of method 
and culture.  First, achieving objective evidence is understood to be made possible 
through the application of a positivist methodology.  This class of methodology is 
understood as specific and precise enough to be replicable and consistent, and rigorous 
enough to yield accurate, true findings, above all, producing objectivity.   
 
Objective knowledge, or fact, is widely understood as being independent of human 
interpretation and perception.  Taken as self-evident and apparent, an objective fact is 
not open to interpretation because it autonomously speaks for itself.  Indeed the litmus 
test for objectivity is the techniques and methods through which it was achieved – and 
in particular, the particular sets of rules that govern these techniques and methods.   
 
Second, it is the culture of science that enables objectivity and transparency.  Robert 
Merton, widely considered the father of modern sociology of science, believed 
knowledge to be deeply influenced by the social context from which it emerges, and 
thus articulated four institutional principles to characterize the context of scientific 
practice (Merton and Zuckerman 1973).  These ‘Mertonian norms’ include: universalism 
(that scientific findings should indicate universal truths); communism (whereby 
researchers freely share their findings and thus gain the recognition and approval of 
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their peers); disinterestedness (the commitment to leaving the burden of proof to 
evidence); and organized scepticism (realized by the questioning and challenging that are 
meant to cleanse science of personal opinion and vested interests).  These norms, 
claimed Merton, could ensure the production of truth, as opposed to “partial or 
distorted knowledge” (David 2005:12), and thus, imbue it with credibility.  Preoccupied 
by what he saw as a ‘dangerous’ attack on the credibility of science, Merton believed 
that these principles reinforced its claims – those claims that were considered to make it 
valuable and unique among different forms of knowledge.   
 
Because of these methodological and social contextual/cultural requirements for 
generating evidence, the task is predominantly managed by experts.  In this respect, 
experts are certified members of scientific communities who both receive and grant 
credibility to established and agreed upon methods for achieving facts and separating 
those facts from perception.  Experts are unique, because “… expert knowledge is 
almost by definition possessed by only a few, and no such art is ever reduced to a 
handful of rules that can be looked up and mastered by anyone with a textbook.  Thus, 
the intuition or judgment of specialists continues to command a degree of respect” 
(Porter 1995:7).  Yet, evidence is not judgement.  Trust in this kind of assessment is 
fickle – open to potential criticisms of arbitrariness and bias (Porter 1995:8).  It remains 
“Better to apply an instrument, to take a culture, to produce some evidence” (Porter 
1995:7).  Thus, when the stakes are high, even the expert is not valued for her ability to 
make an informed judgement; but for her ability to command the methodology required 
to collect and amass evidence.  Indeed, individuals endowed with the correct training 
and the correct tools, come to know the secrets of the objective world.  “Ideally, 
expertise should be mechanized and objectified.  It should be grounded in specific 
techniques sanctioned by a body of specialists.  Then mere judgment, with all its gaps 
and idiosyncrasies, seems almost to disappear” (Porter 1995:7).    
 
Questioning evidence rings of ignorance at best, or heresy at worst – or perhaps, worse 
yet, relativism.  In all but the most radical of circles, however, the realist-relativist divide 
as a mutually exclusive, discrete dichotomy is largely rejected and at least some credence 
is granted to both the realist and constructivist perspectives.  Furthermore, 
constructivist perspectives in no sense represent some unified view or agreement.  They 
exist, rather, on a continuum between this dichotomy.  The manners and extents to 
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which authors have characterized the divide between physical and social realities reflect 
a “range of  possible ‘commitments’ to the constructivist position…” (Robbins 
2004:113).  The ends of this range are referred to as ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ (or ‘radical) 
respectively, and despite being both considered constructivist, embody very different 
epistemological and ontological understandings of reality.   
 
Many of the representatives of the ‘softer side’ of this middle ground argue for nature as 
ontologically real but epistemologically constructed (Castree 1995).  This means that 
knowledge represents objects and underlies the structures that give rise to what we 
experience as objects, but is not to be conflated with the objects themselves.  Physical 
‘things’ exist independently of society, but carry different meanings and implications in 
society.  Searle recognizes this differentiation as the implication of brute and 
institutional facts (Searle 1995).  Take a forest: “A forest, for example, is an assembly of 
brute facts which can be variously described down to the molecular level, but the very 
notion of a forest is a social construct and the same physical collection of molecules can 
be construed in a variety of ways” (Vogler 2003:28).  This classification of facts as brute 
or institutional accounts for the ways in which physical phenomena are socially 
constructed, while avoiding “ the postmodern trap of claiming that ‘everything is 
socially constructed’ and that the physical world is essentially unknowable or distorted 
by partisan science” (Vogler 2003:29).   
 
Proponents of this realist-constructivist middle-ground recognize social influences in 
the ways in which the physical world takes on social meaning, and the ways that this 
meaning comes to be conflated with exclusive and immutable reflections of reality itself.  
For example, Berger and Luckmann suggest that it is the habitualization and, ultimately 
the institutionalization of actions, performed by actors in society (Berger and Luckmann 
1972; Berger and Luckmann 2002).  Over time, regularized patterns of actions emerge 
and enlist particular individuals in roles that correspond to different aspects of these 
actions.  These become so familiar that they acquire the appearance of always having 
been that way, and thus, natural and inherent – their origin in social processes becomes 
buried and forgotten.  In other words, “because social constructs are so much a part of 
our way of life, it is often difficult to recognize them as constructions” (Fischer 
2003:53).   
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Each of these approaches leaves the realist-constructivist dichotomy in tact.  Facts 
remain facts, uninhibited and uncoloured by social influences, rooted unshakeably in the 
natural world.  Human interpretation and institutionalisation convert these facts into 
usable, understandable, and meaningful knowledge, imbued with societal norms and 
values.  In stark contrast, the notion of symmetry embodies a more complete rejection of 
the realist-relativist divide, not to mention a more profound understanding of the 
politics of knowledge.  Contemporary symmetrists reject the realist-constructivist  
dichotomy altogether, dismissing the idea that epistemological and ontological questions 
need be limited to some sliding scale representing the extent to which one believes in a 
naturally existing reality outside of social construction.  Politics, they say, is not pitted 
against knowledge, but coproduced with knowledge!  Values do not exist in spite of 
facts, they are coproduced with them! 
 
The concept of symmetry was developed within science studies by the Strong 
Programme.  The Strong Programme concerned itself with illustrating the social basis 
for all scientific claims, both those rejected and accepted.  Prior, social explanations 
were given for why those theories of science that were ultimately shown to be false, 
were nonetheless adopted by scientists.  Explanations for the success of scientific 
theories, were rooted in the natural world.  The Strong Programme: 
 
… showed how interest, ideology, and other factors apparently 
external to science play a role in both the acceptance and rejection of 
scientific claims.  If one wants to explain how something becomes 
accepted as true, the strong program argued, its truth cannot figure as 
part of the explanation.  Truth is no less social, and no more natural 
than falsity. (Brown 2009:164).     
 
The symmetry of the Strong Programme reflects a strong constructivist approach, 
which views reality as human creation, rejecting any role for non-humans.  The Strong 
Programme thus elicited a strong reaction, in particular from followers of Bruno Latour 
and actor network theory, who indeed, accord no small role for non-humans in shaping 
knowledge.  The Strong Programme, Latour claims, subscribes to what is simply a 
mirror image of the realism which it criticizes.  Far from being a radical departure from 
realism, it simply replaces scientific realism with social realism (Brown 2009).   
 
Latour sees the compartmentalization of the objective and social worlds (as apparent in 
the separation of brute from institutional facts, for example) as a misnomer.  Far from 
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being ideal, he considers impossible, the separation of life into the natural, objective on 
the one hand and the subjective, political, on the other.  The call for the ‘end of nature’ 
is a staunch but eloquent criticism of society’s obsession with the separation of public 
life into ‘two houses’: the house of science, and the house of politics.  The tension, even 
conundrum, that is evoked by the debate between universalism of nature and relativism 
of culture is characterized beautifully by Latour: 
 
The solution of mononaturalism stabilizes nature at the risk of 
emptying the notion of culture of all substance and reducing it to 
mere representations; the solution of multiculturalism stabilizes the 
notion of culture at the risk of endangering the universality of nature 
and reducing it to an illusion.  And it is this cockeyed arrangement 
that passes for good sense! (2004:48).   
 
This work builds on important earlier writings by Latour, in particular We Have Never 
Been Modern (1993) where he explores and critiques the modernist assumption of a 
clear separation between the human sphere (culture, society, politics) and the sphere of 
non-humans (the natural world: physical, asocial and apolitical).  Rejecting the notion 
that this separation is based on anything inherent in either sphere, he explains the 
separation as a process rather than a property.  This process is purification, and it 
creates “two entirely distinct ontological zones”  (Latour 1993:10), resulting in an overly 
simplistic, inaccurate dualism.   
 
But Latour also talks about another process, through which hybrids of the purified 
duality emerge.  This process is translation and involves analyzing “the creation of 
networks between social and natural objects – as the means to identify how we have 
experienced “nature” in specific ways” (Forsyth 2003:87).  While translation and 
purification are two separate undertakings, they are fundamentally connected: “Without 
the first set, the practices of purification would be fruitless or pointless.  Without the 
second, the work of translation would be slowed down, limited, or even ruled out” 
(Latour 1993:10-11).  The preoccupation with translation and purification implies a 
diminished importance of what nature is or means, and instead, an emphasis on how it 
means (Wagner 1981; Sykes 2005).   
 
It is in his 1987 work, Science in Action, that Latour introduced the term co-production 
(Lynch 2004).  It has since become an idiom for work spanning disciplines and subject 
matters, and linking this work to science studies (Jasanoff 2004).  Jasanoff describes the 
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symmetry of co-production: “the production of order in nature and society has to be 
discussed in an idiom that does not, even accidentally and without intent, give primacy 
to either.  The term co-production reflects this self-conscious desire to avoid both 
social and technoscientific determinism in S&TS accounts of the world” (Jasanoff 
2004:20).  Rejecting both scientific and social realism: “Co-production can therefore be 
seen as a critique of the realist ideology that persistently separates the domains of 
nature, facts, objectivity, reason and policy from those of culture, values, subjectivity, 
emotion and politics” (Jasanoff 2004:3).   
 
Despite this challenge to the dominant role of knowledge in policy, analysts must still 
contend with the fact that “the strategy of presenting oneself, or one’s expertise, as 
purely instrumental can be an effective one” (Turner 2003:38).  However, much 
attention has shifted away from how it objectively and neutrally reflects reality, towards 
“how scientific knowledge assumes authority in the public domain” (Jasanoff and 
Wynne 1998:5).  If claims of veracity and accuracy are not adequate to explain the 
acceptance of evidence, how is it that knowledge assumes authority?  What kinds of 
social processes are involved in differentiating between credible and non-credible work, 
and purifying categories to dispose of ambiguity?  Important mechanisms for these 
claims to credibility and authority are boundaries that enable the establishment, 
maintenance and ongoing differentiation of expert knowledge from other forms of 
knowledge (Gieryn 1999)9.  Managing these boundaries, or undertaking boundary work, 
is the means by which individuals demarcate what does and does not comprise a certain 
entity or phenomenon, what fits within given conceptual parameters.  Boundaries 
establish authentic sources of knowledge as distinct in particular ways from ‘poachers 
and imposters’ (Gieryn 1999).   
 
Developed primarily around scientific knowledge, Gieryn’s work shows that the 
definition of what constitutes science are socially constructed.  This, despite that 
“essentialism as a theory of scientific authority would argue that the conditions necessary 
for the production of valid and reliable knowledge are sufficient to explain why science 
                                               
9 While Gieryn comments little on governance and democracy per se – his analysis clearly relates to 
power and the role of knowledge in power relationships.  Power is contended for, and won, in veritable 
‘credibility contests’, whereby knowledge goes head to head against knowledge and whomsoever should 
come out on top is determined not so much by the measure of their truths as by the skill with which they 
perform boundary work and the permeability of the boundaries in question.   
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has emerged historically as the so often preferred chronicler of nature” (Gieryn 
1999:26-27, italics original).  In other words, that science is revered and accepted 
because positivist inquiry unlocks the secrets of nature.  Rather, he claims, that “To 
miss the interpretative work that creates contexts for decisions about who to trust with 
reality is to lose the sociological handle on what is happening” (1999:27).  The aim of 
Gieryn’s work is not to dismiss the findings and evidence established by science or 
other privileged forms of knowledge.  Rather it is to show that they enjoy epistemic 
authority because of close attention to the boundaries by which they are demarcated, 
not because they necessarily unleash greater truths than other forms of knowing.    
 
Boundary work is used to make conceptual distinctions, such as those used to separate 
science from non-science; science from politics; or scientists from non-scientists 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz 2001).  Indeed, the information model takes as its departure the 
assumption that science and policy belong to separate spheres, occupying respective 
domains.  STS scholars (particularly Latour), however, problematize the differentiation 
and characterization of each sphere, and examine the separation as an outcome of social 
processes and dynamics rather than of their inherent differences.  The consideration of 
boundary work reveals that far from being hermetically sealed from the world of policy 
and politics, science is contingent, contested and context-dependent.  The rather 
exclusive authority of scientists to maintain exclusive rights to examine knowledge by 
posting ‘keep out signs’, is a social reality, not a natural reality.   
 
Turnhout et al. illustrate how boundary work impacted on the development and use of 
ecological indicators to monitor ecological quality of water systems in the Netherlands 
(Turnhout, Hisschemöller et al. 2007; Turnhout 2009).  The use of indicators was 
expected to help policy makers “make rational choices concerning sustainable 
development” (Turnhout, Hisschemöller et al. 2007:219).  Ultimately, the indicators 
came under fire, because of disagreement about “the choice of the ecological reference 
and the fixed quantitative reference values, the selection and limited number of 
parameters and the use of biotic parameters on the impact level…” (2007:219)219.  The 
study concludes that “scientific arguments about uncertainties and complexity of 
ecosystems and arguments about what nature is and/or should be are used to criticize 
ecological indicators” (2007:219).   
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Gieryn´s account of how boundary work is purposefully engaged by actors, to specific 
and predetermined ends, suggests a high level of agency; it is a strategic tool, kept 
sharpened and poised, ready for the moment that it will be called to action.  Boundary 
work is configured as ‘strategic, practical action’ calculatedly devised and enlisted in the 
pursuit of ‘immediate goals and interests’ (Gieryn 1999) and to manipulate credibility 
vis-à-vis specific situations.  Others, in contrast, view boundary work as an outcome of 
a structured establishment.  Knorr-Cetina (1981) speaks of the ‘habitual selection of a 
strategy’ to indicate the lack of calculation and reflection involved in establishing and 
maintaining boundaries.  Kinchy and Kleinman speak of ‘historically resonant 
discourses’ (2003) which refer to those which have been in use so long, they become 
taken for granted, and become part of ‘routine boundary work’ rather than of some 
novel or unique form of boundary work.  These discourses can be both enabling and 
constraining in that they enable the harnessing of powerful arguments as means to an 
end, but also that because they are widely ‘taken for granted’ to simply reflect the nature 
of things or how things are, they restrict or constrain alternative argumentation.  
According to these authors, boundary work is a product of embedded and habitual ways 
of understanding the world:  
 
Scientists and others who construct boundaries between science and 
values may not calculate the risks and benefits of that boundary-work 
and decide on the best strategy to suit their interests.  Instead, they 
may, relatively unreflectively, adopt widely used models of behaviour 
and organization… understanding boundary-work as self-conscious 
and strategic often does not provide an adequate understanding of 
how the credibility of science is maintained (Kinchy and Kleinman 
2003:871).   
 
Thus, under mundane circumstances, boundary work often goes unrecognized and the 
boundaries themselves go unnoticed., along with the social and political forces at work 
in the demarcation and articulation of knowledge about the natural world.  Thus, 
expertise is tacitly authoritative, in a goes-without-saying kind of way.   
 
This section has illustrated very different modes of thinking around the extent to which, 
and way in which, social and political influences are manifest in the production of 
evidence.  Mertonian norms suggest that the social context of science ensure honesty, 
rigor and universalism.  But the increasing recognition that social norms not only affect 
the methodology by which evidence is gathered, but also the content of evidence 
changes the approach for handling evidence within policy circles.  Indeed, that 
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knowledge creation involves both factual and normative social and political influence, 
and that these are inseparable because they are coproduced, suggests that what is 
classically understood as evidence is insufficient.  The next section will continue this 
analysis by looking at the role of knowledge in policy processes.  
 
4.3 Using evidence in policy 
In the case of disagreement or ambiguity, such as is to be expected in debates around 
so-called ‘ill-formed’ problems, conventional wisdom promotes the use of more and 
better information (Turner 2003).  On this basis, which conforms to the ‘information 
model’ of public decision-making, evidence-based policy is often heralded as the gold 
standard in public decision-making.  The information model “treats all factual assertions 
as bits of data, and all disagreements as resolvable on the basis of more information” 
(Turner 2003:48). This particular brand of policy problem is characterized by an elusive 
and complex solution to an even more elusive and complex problem, where there may 
be little agreement even on the very facts that are of relevance (Turner 2003:54).  In 
contemporary policy making, “ill-formedness is the norm… Problems of this sort 
typically involve different kinds of expertise, with different standard, and different 
controlling considerations” (Turner 2003:54).  Sustainable development, with its varied 
interpretations, priorities and normal frames, is a clear example of an ‘ill-formed’ policy 
problem, or what some call a ‘wicked’ policy problem.   
 
The evidence-based policy framework uses the structured information which arises out 
of positivist research as evidence, to determine the pathways of decision-making.  This 
responds to pragmatic concerns of policy, which centre around effectiveness and 
efficiency.  Indeed, the push for evidence-based policy is typically embedded in 
utilitarian discourses of cost effectiveness, research ‘uptake’ in practice.  These 
discourses became more pervasive as public scrutiny intensifies along with demands for 
transparency, and budget cuts: 
 
The justification for public-sector activity is that outcomes should be 
better than in its absence.  And a key element in producing better 
outcomes is having a better process for getting to those outcomes.  
Hence the rationality of the policy process itself is seen as 
legitimating the activities of the public sector.  The belief in the 
ability of bureaucracies to pursue strategies and routines that are 
imbued with rationality, resulting in optimal outcomes, has its roots 
in the very establishment of bureaucracies as a superior form for the 
state (Rydin 2003:78). 
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Several authors rule out even the possibility of an administration that acts in the interests 
of pure instrumental pragmatism (Turner 2003:38).  Fischer for example challenges that, 
“in the ‘real world’ of public policy there is no such thing as a purely technical decision” 
(2000:43).  He adds, “…there is, in fact, no linear bridge which connects the hard 
sciences to the public domain sciences.  There is, in short, no epistemological road over 
which expertise can directly travel from one domain to the other” (Fischer 2009:144).  
More and assumedly better information does not increase levels of consensus or 
provide more effective pathways to problem solving.  And in fact, often ‘races to the 
truth’ are headed down completely separate pathways.  I argued in Chapter 3, that this is 
because policy making is principally a normative exercise (Fischer 2009).  But it is also 
because “it often does not work to add more information.  Sometimes, when new facts 
are introduced, instead of resolving disagreements, the new facts become subject to 
divergent interpretations, often of more or less the same kind as the divergence that the 
new information was supposed to resolve” (Turner 2003:48).   
 
It very often turns out to be the case, that rather than contributing to reduced 
uncertainty and improved consensus, science is wracked with lack of closure, by 
controversy and a distinct shortfall in terms of consensus among experts.  Disagreement 
(or more simply lack of agreement) and uncertainty can be powerful mechanisms for 
influencing policy as they challenge the evidence in which evidence-based policies are 
supposedly rooted.  Edwards reminds us that this uncertainty can be used for different 
means:  
 
Policy makers who want to delay precautionary action ally with high-
proof scientists, holding out for very high degrees of empirical 
confirmation.  Proponents of near-term action can … argue that 
precisely because uncertainties can never be entirely eliminated, the 
choice of how much empirical confirmation is enough is ultimately a 
value choice most appropriately decided in the political arena (1999).   
 
Jasanoff notes that it is because “Objective scientific expertise is generally valued more 
highly than other grounds for decision-making… (that) attacks on the scientific 
competence of regulatory agencies is a standard device for undermining their political 
legitimacy” (2000:73).  Similarly, Taylor and Buttel observe that “people trying to make 
or influence policy often find the lack of scientific closure a potent weapon” (Taylor 
and Buttel 1992:406, quoting Jasanoff, 1992).   
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Indeed, this has scarcely been so clearly illustrated as in the 2009 scandal surrounding 
leaked details of the scientific evidence behind climate change at the renowned 
University of East Anglia's Climatic Research Unit.  Dubbed ‘climategate’ the scandal 
raised questions about whether research data had been manipulated to serve the 
purposes of opposing views in the climate change debate.  It has thus fuelled the fire of 
non-cooperation in climate change negotiations.  Beyond the climate change debate, 
however, it is raising further questions about the role of science in public policy (Hulme 
and Ravetz 2009).  On the heels of ‘climategate’ came ‘glaciergate’ (admittedly, an 
overuse of the historical reference).  This incident involved an IPCC claim that 
‘Himalayan glaciers could melt by 2035’.  It was admitted in January, 2010 that the 
claim, stated in “one paragraph, buried in 3,000 pages of reports and published almost 
three years (prior)” (Pearce 2010) was unsubstantiated.  The seemingly minor detail 
however, has in some respects cast doubt on the overall trustworthiness of the IPCC.  
To add insult to injury, the IPCC head found himself apologizing to the Environment 
Minister of India, for his accusations that the Minister was relying on ‘voodoo science’ 
when suggesting that the Himalayan claim was somewhat ‘alarmist’ (Pearce 2010).   
 
The notion that ‘bad science’ is rejected while ‘good science’ is accepted is at best an 
oversimplification and at worst a misnomer in terms of how truth claims come to be 
validated within professional and popular realms  (the main tenet of the Strong 
Program).  Using the scientific debate about the effectiveness of vitamin C in fighting 
cancer, the subject of Richard’s classic account of the political dimensions of scientific 
controversy (Richards 1991), Martin and Richards (1995) suggest four ‘ideal types’ of 
approaches to analysing scientific controversy.  These include three in addition to the 
positivist orthodoxy, which evaluates controversy through the availability of scientific 
evidence.  First, is the group politics approach, within which science is considered part 
of a ‘resource mobilization’ strategy used by contending political groups.  Secondly, the 
constructivist approach which treats scientific knowledge as an outcome of the 
interpretations and practices of the scientist rather than as a reflection of reality.  Finally, 
the social structural approach treats scientific knowledge as a tool of oppression by 
maintaining hegemonic authority.  The main point here is that in three of the four 
approaches to controversy analysis, the main reason for closure of debate around 
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scientific controversies has nothing to do with scientific knowledge as ‘superior’ (Martin 
and Richards 1995).   
 
While a rather voracious acceptance of the usefulness of science to policy is clearly the 
orthodoxy, some claim that this usefulness is based solely on a ‘myth’ (Collingridge and 
Reeve 1986).  They claim that rather than contributing to the creation of consensus, by 
narrowing the debate through presenting scientific evidence, the use of science actually 
expands debate by continuously adding to the number of technical matters under 
question.  Collingridge and Reeve (1986) suggest that regardless of whether analyses are 
overly or under critical, acceptance of scientific knowledge only occurs when it is 
congruent with the subjects’ opinions and interests.  Others support this skepticism of 
the importance of the link between science and policy, reiterating that “truth or falsity 
of the science is rarely sufficient to account for its acceptance” (Taylor and Buttel 
1992:406).  These perspectives explicitly reject the ‘information model’.   
 
4.4 Evidence as a part of wider power relations in governance structures 
What makes evidence-based policy so appealing is not only the prospect of more 
efficient policy, based on the right kind and the right amount of knowledge, but its 
democratic promise: the escape from politics is arguably the most grandiose promise of 
evidence-based policy, though many observers propose this is based more on ‘illusion’ 
than reality (Ezrahi 1994).  Just as evidence itself is assumed to be objective and 
unbiased knowledge about the state of things, the application of that knowledge to 
public issues is expected to produce the same unbiased and objective results in society.  
Objectivity is not only a technical matter, but also a deeply political matter.  “Objectivity 
means the rule of law, not of men.  It implies the subordination of personal interests 
and prejudice to public standards” (Porter 1995:74).  That which is ultimately 
considered evidence is assumed to harbour no social or political commitments.   
 
However, as the first section argued that the creation of expertise is imbued with social 
and political influence, here I argue that the deployment of expertise within governance 
regimes is also thus influenced.  This despite the ‘technical rendering’ of ‘benevolent 
and stubborn’ attempts to engineer human improvement; the translation of what Li 
calls ‘the will to improve’, into practice (Li 2007:7).  This engineering is made possible, 
“by inscribing a boundary that separates those who claim to know how others should 
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live from those whose conduct is to be conducted” (Li 2007:281-282).  Thus, another 
problem that expertise poses to democracy, is that expertise bestows the right to make 
decisions, to call the shots, or more simply, to govern.  This is particularly problematic in 
conjunction with the view that making decisions about how society should be run, 
making decisions about the ends and not just the means (though the next section 
questions the viability of separating the means from the ends at all), is a deeply 
normative endeavour.  This decision-making sometimes comes in the form of grand 
hubristic plans for the good of society, carried out in the name of principles such as 
‘modernity’ (Scott 1998; Mitchell 2002), development (Ferguson 1990), improvement 
(Li 2007) or sustainability (Brosius 1999; Summerville, Adkins et al. 2008).   
 
Governing is not just about changing conditions in society, but also manipulating and 
shaping citizen behaviour through the conduct of conduct, or governmentality 
(Foucault 1991).  This definition draws on two meanings of ‘conduct’ (Dean 1999): the 
first is the verb to conduct, to actively drive, guide or propel; the second is the noun 
conduct, meaning actions or more generally behaviour.  Thus, governmentality, or the 
conduct of conduct, refers to the way in which behaviour is guided (gently put) or 
(more aggressively) driven; “human conduct is conceived as something that can be 
regulated, controlled, shaped and turned to specific ends” (Dean 1999:18).  Enacting 
governmentality, however, is not simply to “order people about or to move things 
around” (Dean 1999:18).  Rather, it involves, as a chief mechanism, self-regulation on 
behalf of the subject of governmentality. Corbridge et al. see this self-regulation as 
emerging from “the internalization of norms” (2005:16).  Rose puts it more strongly by 
suggesting that self regulation is owed to “the emergence of particular ‘regimes of truth’ 
concerning the conduct of conduct, ways of speaking truth, persons authorized to speak 
truths, ways of enacting truths and the costs of doing so” (2009:19).  He continues:  
 
  How did it become possible to make truths about persons, their 
conduct, the means of action upon this and the reasons for such 
action?  How did it become possible to make these truths in these 
ways and in this geographical, temporal and existential space?  How 
were these truths enacted and by whom, in what torsions and 
tensions with other truths, through what contests, struggles, 
alliances, briberies, blackmails, promises and threats?  What 
relations of seduction, domination, subordination, allegiance and 
distinction were thus made possible? (Rose 2009).  
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The practice of government, explicit in expertise, has also been used to explain the 
more covert outcomes of public participation in decision-making.  Fischer, for one, asks 
whether the contemporary tolerance, even encouragement, of participatory 
methodologies in policy development is a state strategy of achieving pre-established 
interests and goals (Fischer 2009:2).  Even though devolution of decision-making is 
typically understood as a way of inviting more participation and thus, including more 
diversity into governance, the concept of governmentality prompts questions about the 
extent to which citizen participation and ‘partnerships’ in governance is more a 
“technology of rule” than a technology of inclusion.  It is often charged, that even when 
decision-making and policy debate is extended more generally in society, power (and 
particularly state power) persists through these technologies (Taylor 2007).  For 
example, Agrawal explains the creation of environmental ‘subjects’ as the outcome of  
changing approaches to conservation efforts in Kumaon and elsewhere (Agrawal 2005).  
He argues that increasing the role of local leaders in forest management through 
decentralization efforts, actually manifests as effective technologies of rule.  In the 
Kumaon example the state faced the dilemma of how to control rampant forest fires – 
set in protest against the colonial management and control of forests.  The moves 
toward decentralization transformed popular protest, and engendered forest 
conservation and protection, thereby implementing the will of the state to halt the fires.   
 
Summerville et al. (2008) analyze the governmentality prospects of sustainable 
development policy in its global, national and regional incarnations.  Globally 
represented by Agenda 21, they illustrate how the participatory discourse of inclusion, 
local knowledge, and empowerment and capacity building translate into community 
‘rights and responsibilities’ and how these notions “work in concert as techniques of 
government” (Summerville, Adkins et al. 2008:5).  They explain:  
 
In this case, community’s right to participate, no doubt understood 
as inherently positive, is moderated by the ultimate responsibility to 
participate in a manner that contributes to achieving predefined 
sustainability objectives such as environmental conservation, water-
use efficiency, behaviour change, and sustainable farming… the 
right of groups (at risk of exclusion) to be included in decision-
making processes translates into a responsibility to become active 
agents in the pursuit for sustainability” (2008:6).   
 
The effects of governmentality are evident in the way that local participation in 
decision-making is often utterly shaped by discourses of rationality and ultimately, by 
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power within assymetrical power relationships.  This is illustrated by Brosius’ coverage 
of sustainable development discourse in Malaysia (Brosius 1999).  He offers an account 
of how Malaysia’s forestry industry came under threat once international ENGOs 
established rapid deforestation as reaching critical levels in Sarawak.  As a result 
international corporations threatened to levy sanctions against Malaysian timber.  In 
response to these threats, officials began using rhetoric of sustainable forest 
management, resulting in the substitution of an economic focus on timber yields with 
“the softer, greener discursive contours of post-Brundtland ‘sustainability’” (Brosius 
1999:45).   
 
From a distance, this discourse seemed unproblematic, and was more or less accepted 
as proof that Malaysia had always operated according to the principles of ‘sustainability’.  
From within the country, however, the meaning of sustainability remained deeply 
contested; there was certainly no consensus on how it might be achieved.  While for 
some sustainability implied the long-term viability of the forest industry in Malaysia, for 
others environmental quality was the fulcrum.  Others yet viewed indigenous land rights 
and culture as prominent themes in sustainability.  Despite the deeply political nature of 
sustainable forest management in Malaysia, to observers worldwide, the government 
promoted a delineated set of ‘sustainable’ forestry practices.  Clearly a limited and 
shallow interpretation of sustainable, it was indeed sufficiently accepted to avoid 
sanctions that would compromise the performance of the timber industry.  Brosius 
concludes:  
 
The issue, then, is not whether sustainable forest management or 
timber certification is desirable. Rather, it is the potential for such 
efforts to become part of an elaborate public relations scheme, 
designed to obscure a highly destructive system of resource 
extraction and to assuage consumer and government concerns, that 
makes them problematic. The larger message being conveyed is 
that the problems of rain forest destruction and indigenous rights 
can be solved by some combination of technically grounded 
institutional interventions (1999:49). 
 
It is the focus on technical interventions that is key in shaping the ways in which 
environmental problems are governed – not only by the actions of the state – but by the 
conditioned actions of the citizenry.  Brosius calls ‘projects of domestication’, attempts 
to “seduce or to compel… actors to participate in statist projects of environmental 
governmentality” (1999:50).  He explains the not unintended consequence of this:  
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“often today we see environmental institutions describe sites of struggle in terms of (or 
rather reduced to) the affectless, faux-inclusive language of “participation,” in which a 
range of “stakeholders” are brought together to work toward the resolution of some 
environmental concern” (Brosius 1999:50).   
 
In studies of governmentality, one of the key criticisms of so-called ‘technical’ policy 
solutions, is that “Questions that are rendered technical are simultaneously rendered 
non-political.  For the most part, experts tasked with improvement exclude the 
structure of political-economic relations from their diagnoses and prescriptions” (Li 
2007:7).  This antipolitics, even if exercised with the benign intention of improvement, 
as Li calls the development interventions,  provides an insidious mask for the fact that 
often technical problems turn out to be intensely political.  For example, in Ferguson’s 
famous account of the anti-politics machine at work in the construction of Lesotho as 
an object of development intervention, the country becomes, “a nation of farmers, not 
wage laborers; a country with a geography, but no history; with people, but no classes; 
values, but no structures; administrators, but no rulers; bureaucracy, but not politics” 
(Ferguson 1990:66).  Thus, technical expertise enables the creation of the problem (lack 
of roads, training, knowledge, etc.) in the image of the apolitical solution (technical 
expertise and intervention) (Ferguson 1990).  However, antipolitical discourses – aimed 
at justifying technical, pragmatic, outcome-related strategies – are not chance 
happenings, nor are they the results of the most progressive research and thinking.  
Furthermore, in no way do they reflect general consensus about how problems should 
be addressed.  Rather, they become powerful because they both are embedded in, and 
embed, powerful social regimes.  They reinforce and are reinforced by the structures of 
power in society.   
 
The focus on discourse in environmental governance has been considered by some a 
distraction from important, material issues (Bryant and Bailey 1997).  Others argue, 
however, that the dismissal of language as an important site of research “overlook(s) the 
relationship between discourse, and the cogeneration of so-called ‘facts’ and ‘norms,’ 
which underlies much philosophical analysis of political and scientific debate” (Forsyth 
2003:14).  Discourse is not some inconsequential system of beliefs, divorced from 
physical, political and material outcomes.  Rather, how discourse takes shape is a key 
determinant in how knowledge, power and thus material consequence is manifest.   
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In his seminal work, Hajer examines how discourses come to be dominant through 
their association with power (1995).  He shows how and why the discourse of ecological 
modernization became, and failed to become dominant in the acid rain politics in the 
Netherlands and Britain respectively during the 1980’s and 1990’s.  In the Netherlands, 
proponents managed to frame the policy debate in the terms of ecological 
modernization.  In Britain however, there was little success in efforts to replace a 
traditional-pragmatic discourse - supported by the existing political order with its 
knowledge, experts and institutions - with ecological modernization.  This study showed 
that language and politics are central to environmental debates, as opposed to the 
physical state of the environment.   
 
Litfin’s study of the processes which gave rise to the international ozone regime 
emphasizes the role of ‘ozone discourses’ (1994), rather than the role of scientific 
knowledge and consensus about the need to reduce emissions of ozone-depleting 
substances.  She argues that scientific claims in the negotiations were mediated in two 
ways.  The first was through ‘knowledge brokers’, who, “due to their ability to structure 
and interpret scientific knowledge… are particularly influential where there is 
considerable scientific uncertainty, as is often true for environmental problems” 
(Michaels 2009:996).  Consequently, Litfin’s usage of the term ‘knowledge broker’ 
emphasizes the political and discursive qualities of their contributions to policy 
processes. The second way in which scientific claims were mediated was the ‘rendering’ 
of questions of value as questions of fact: “with exogenous factors shaping the political 
salience of various modes of interpreting that knowledge” (Litfin 1994:46) notably, “the 
discovery of an ozone hole over the Antarctic that helped to empower the subordinate 
regulatory discourse” (Fischer 2003:82).      
 
Litfin’s critics argue the establishment of international agreement around the ozone 
problem was simply a case of political action responding to the reality of ozone 
depletion.  For example, Wirtz, Professor of Strategic Studies contends that the ‘clear 
and pervasive threat’ of the ozone hole to humanity was sufficient to spur on the 
international (re)actions deemed  necessary by the scientific community.  In fact, Wirtz 
claims, “Ozone depletion might constitute a ‘least critical test’ for any theory of 
international cooperation” (1995:626).  This critique suggests that knowledge is the 
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means of achieving power in policy negotiations.  In striking contrast to this 
interpretation, Litfin illustrates a distinct lack of scientific consensus created by 
computer models and assessments.  The analysis illustrates how “knowledge can only be 
used by those who have the ability – technical and political – to use it” (Harrison 
1996:146).  
 
The discourse coalition framework, however, illustrates how power is also maintained 
through association with discourse.  Discourse coalitions are positioned in stark 
contrast with more orthodox paradigms within which to imagine policy networks.  
These more orthodox paradigms, namely the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier 
1987) depend too heavily on the role of cognitive beliefs and knowledge in policy 
debates.  Furthermore, they overemphasize the stability and static nature of policy 
actors in terms of their knowledge, their alliances and their policy positions.  In 
contrast, Hajer suggests that the most significant tie that binds policy coalitions is not 
knowledge and belief systems, but rather overarching storylines, or discourses,  that are 
simplified and appealing for different reasons to different actors.  Storylines are the 
“discursive cement that keeps a discourse-coalition together” (Hajer 1995:65).  The 
discourse coalition framework avoids the conflation of knowledge and power into a one 
dimensional, uni-directional relationship (i.e.: knowledge leading to power, as in the 
evidence-based policy framework).  Rather the relationship between discourse and 
power is coproduced.   
 
The discourse coalition framework urges the study of overarching policy processes, 
rather than of the micro-relationship between policy input and outcome.  “Focusing on 
the intersubjective moment might… obscure the understanding of the real power 
relationships” (Hajer 1995:58).  The desirability of a broader approach to policy 
processes is elaborated by Fischer: 
 
What people in an environmental discourse coalition support is an 
interpretation of threat or crisis, not a core set of facts and values 
that can be teased out through content or factor analysis.  Rather 
than a stable core of cognitive commitments and beliefs, they share 
storylines that often tend to be vague on particular points and, at 
times, contradictory on others (2003:103).   
 
Discourse coalitions create conditions under which even unlikely alliances can be 
formed, imbuing particular ways of framing problems, and their solutions, with greater 
 101 
(and potentially increasing) power and resilience vis-à-vis alternatives. This is because 
while, “the search for policy relevant facts is not unimportant… it takes a back seat to 
storylines that offer social orientation, reassurance, or guidance” (Fischer 2003:103). 
Storylines are compelling, but often vague.  They are created through interaction, 
interpretation, and are therefore products of broader processes of social learning as 
opposed to comparatively narrow processes of cognitive learning (Hajer 1995).  Thus, 
diverse political actors, characterised by different interests and belief in different sets of 
‘facts’ related to public matters, can come together in discourse coalitions to influence 
decision-making around policy.  Notwithstanding this potential for common ground, 
there typically exist some “everlasting controversies” (Bostrom 2003:174 endnote 12).  
Furthermore, that ‘facts’ are a secondary concern, implies a much broader potential for 
challenges to policy ideas.  As Fischer comments, while “different groups seek first to 
protect the core components of their belief systems by deflecting challenges to 
argumentation at peripheral levels, it is not the case that such challenges, or even 
effective challenges, occur only at this level” (2003:99).  However, the disagreements to 
which these controversies give rise do not necessitate the rupture of a discourse 
coalition so long as the overarching narrative remains permissible.  Without this 
common language or agreement on the overarching narrative – such as those provided 
by the sustainable development discourse - there is no possibility for negotiation. 
 
Sustainable development is a prominent example of how a discursive shift has enabled 
such an unlikely alliance between those espousing the ‘limits to growth’ philosophy on 
the one hand and corporate and environmental interests on the other.  The emergence 
of sustainable development discourse not only enabled, but necessitated the 
cooperation of these conventionally antagonistic positions by introducing, legitimizing 
and institutionalizing the language of environmentalism into existing administrative 
structures (Torgerson 1999).  The case studies analyzed in later chapters illustrate how 
the discourse of ‘sustainable agriculture’ has brought divergent interests, namely 
environmental NGOs and international agribusiness, to work together, even when 
cooperation would have been previously unthinkable.  However, the merger of 
environmentalism and developmentalism did not leave the respective discourses 
unchanged: “the institutionalization of environmental concern meant an entry of 
environmentalism into the world of administration, but entry into this world also meant 
adaptation to it” (1999:54).  More explicitly, “the advent of sustainable development has 
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heralded the ascent of a reform strategy involving deliberate accommodation with 
established institutions… the concern (of radical environmentalists) is that sustainable 
development may end up as little more than a dishonest platitude” (Torgerson 1999:63).  
The language of sustainable development made environmentalism tolerable and even 
palatable within conservative structures and institutions, but ultimately, environmental 
agendas were seen by many to have been profoundly compromised while the agendas of 
more powerful interests were accommodated.     
 
Recognizing the role of norms in the production of facts and evidence, scholars in 
science studies have questioned the possibility of objectivity, positivism and neutrality in 
knowledge creation.  This challenge is particularly important in the creation of 
knowledge pertaining to ill-formed policy problems.  At the same time, the ways in 
which expert-driven evidence poses a problem for democracy is a longstanding concern 
in policy studies (Dewey 1927; Lasswell 1941; Laswell 1951); one increasingly addressed 
by scholars in public policy (Fischer 2005; Fischer 2009) and science and technology 
studies (Jasanoff 1990; Jasanoff 1992; Turner 2003).  Albeit through different means, 
these authors have all questioned and problematized the increasing acceptance and 
dominance of expert and professional approaches to public policy analysis.  Each, in 
some way, have asked: In societies where increasingly specialized knowledge is 
understood as necessary for addressing growing complexity in policy problems, what 
becomes of disparate public understandings of the ‘good society’, of popular 
perspectives on policy debates and so-called ‘lay’ knowledge about problem solving?  
This issue is further pronounced as globalized expertise eclipses the even greater 
diversity of perspectives in developing countries.   
 
4.5 Challenging boundaries in environmental governance: The co-production 
of rational policy 
The ‘add knowledge and stir’ approach to policy, is not bound to lead to better policy, 
more consensus, or less controversy about policy.  There is more to evidence than facts 
(i.e.: norms); despite claims to the contrary, evidence doesn’t easily translate into 
universally acceptable and appropriate policy implications; and, even attempts to 
develop benign public policy with evidence, may serve as a handmaiden (willing or 
otherwise) to maintaining power relations (be they just or unjust).  Despite these critical 
perspectives on evidence-based policy, it is widely understood as a credible and 
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authoritative policy input.  Thus, policy analysts can’t (and shouldn’t necessarily aim to) 
eliminate expertise from policy debates.  Based on these considerations, we must 
incorporate into policy analysis:  a better understanding of the social and political 
commitments of this evidence; and, the origins of this credibility and authority.  The 
framework of co-production can provide a powerful means of analyzing the production 
and deployment of facts and norms in decision-making, thereby basing policy analysis 
on improved deliberation and evidence.   
 
To say that environmental knowledge is co-produced means that particular ways of 
knowing about and understanding environmental problems are inseparable from the 
way in which individuals and organizations attempt to order and control environmental 
problems.  This is because “knowledge and its material embodiments are at once 
products of social work and constitutive of forms of social life; society cannot function 
without knowledge any more than knowledge can exist without appropriate social 
supports” (Jasanoff 2004:2-3).  Put another way, “society is an organized embodiment 
of knowledge; science, in turn, works with the support of societal institutions” (Fischer 
2009:183).  Drawing from earlier work by Jasanoff, Forsyth adds, “Social order” does 
not necessarily refer to a state of apparent political stability, but can also describe the 
struggle for order, or conditions of enforced order” (2003:104).   
  
If knowledge is coproduced with the social world, then it cannot but reflect the 
characteristics of the social world.  This includes ways in which structural power is 
manifest in differential access to resources and decision-making authority.  Indeed, co-
production can explain why certain ways of reading and relating environmental 
problems (and solutions) gain authority and credibility, while others are marginalized or 
even silenced altogether.  Jasanoff indicates the relevance of this co-production to issues 
of governance: “co-production offers new ways of thinking about power, highlighting 
the often invisible role of knowledges, expertise, technical practices and material objects 
in shaping, sustaining, subverting or transforming relations of authority” (Jasanoff 
2004:4).   
 
If politics can be likened to a game (Antoniades 2003), then the dominant players both 
create the rules and benefit from them.  Once particular actors have widely recognized 
and supported claims to a supremely legitimate understanding of environmental 
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problems (the rules), then they are able to legitimately claim the right and responsibility 
to take control of the problems according to the rules dictated by this understanding.  
Once particular ways have been branded as logical, natural, unbiased, and above all, 
rational,  even alternatives that are considered reasonable in their own right, are not 
likely to be prioritized within a wider policy context.  There are political implications of 
what is considered rational: “The question that is raised is how the burdens and benefits 
of environmental planning fall on different groups within society and how such 
legitimation may hide the distributive pattern” (Rydin 2003:3).  Citing Flyvberg (1998) 
Rydin continues with a response to this question: “The rationality of the policy process 
is shown to be an illusion, a cloak for the operation of power” (2003:4).   
 
Co-production, however, casts light on the ways that power relations are embedded in 
ways of knowing how sustainability is defined and achieved.  Power relations thus 
illuminated, there is the potential to redress the distributions of power over decision-
making that are enabled by the dominance of certain ways of knowing.   
 
Latour abandons both the notion of nature as an independent entity 
obeying its own laws and the privileged authority of scientists and 
experts to represent this entity.  He claims that the presentation of 
nature as an external object, understandable only for the experts, has 
served as a dogma, thereby limiting the options for human action.  In 
the new postmodern metaphysics that Latour pleads for, facts and 
values, morality and reality, science and politics should be seen as 
inseparable.  Nature would then become an essentially negotiable 
concept, that can be represented not only by scientists, but also by 
poets, architects, farmers and laymen  (Hajer and Versteeg 2005:178). 
 
Miller illustrates the role of co-production in the emergence of  the global 
environmental political order, in particular, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) (Miller 2004).  He shows how the emergence of the global 
environmental political order, in the form of the IPCC has been made possible, even 
conceivable, by the shift in understanding of the climate problematic.  This shift was the 
recasting of once ‘localized’ weather patterns, as ‘global climate’.  This shift is a part of 
the way science and technology, in the form of formal modelling, etc. have been applied 
to climate.  Furthermore, and illustrating the symmetry between knowledge and power 
within the IPCC, Miller points out how there has been a heavy dependence on political 
institutions to develop credibility and legitimacy around climate science.  
Notwithstanding  challenges, this co-production of the IPCC has been sufficiently 
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successful as to give rise to the ‘greening’ of sovereignty – a substantial decline in 
national sovereignty in matters of environmental governance (Litfin 1998, in Miller, 
2004).  This shows clearly, “how science and politics co-evolve dynamically, in order to 
understand how… political factors lead to the evolution of hegemonic environmental 
explanations” (Forsyth 2003:104).   
 
All this being said, co-production must not be mistaken as a project that inherently or 
“necessarily strengthens the weaker party, ‘the side with less scientific credibility or 
cognitive authority” (Jasanoff 1996:398).  Co-productionist research is not naturally 
drawn to support the ‘losers’ as opposed to the ‘winners’; which party is defined as 
which is contingent on factors such as timing and the wider socio-political context of 
the research vis-à-vis the issues under study (Jasanoff 1996).  The objective of co-
production is not to ‘defame’ those that use evidence to support their policy positions; 
to “resist an adversary’s claims to scientific credibility”… (or to) deprive them of 
‘science’ itself as a political resource” (Jasanoff 1996:399).  But often, co-production 
“facilitate(s) not only  interpretation but also critique” (Jasanoff 2004:278).  In this 
sense, in addition to being relativist, co-productionist research is also deeply normative.  
Jasanoff elaborates:  
 
By adopting a relativizing pose with respect to particular claims of 
scientific knowledge, science studies does not abandon the 
commitment to be explanatory and normative; instead, it adds to the 
repertoire of possible explanations, and illuminates new pathways for 
intervening in the production of both knowledge and power.  SSK’s 
relativistic position cannot be neutral if only because it is always 
oppositional to other accounts that exist in parallel, often in widely 
accepted versions, in the academic literature or in life (Jasanoff 
1996:412) 
 
 
So how can the co-production framework help to improve deliberation in 
environmental governance?  Revealing the role of political factors, can ‘destabilize’ these 
hegemonic explanations: “To destabilize the dominant stories, as science studies often 
does, is a political enterprise, whether or not the new account is designed explicitly to 
advance a well-defined political agenda or set of interests” (Jasanoff 1996:412).  
Illustrating that the factual basis of policy is inseparable from norms, puts alternative 
facts and norms in better stead to compete, or at least challenge what would otherwise 
be seen as uncontestable.  Analyzing evidence for its normative commitments at once 
challenges the ultimate Mertonian authority of the facts, and legitimizes a normative 
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basis for policy.  This destabilization of evidence-based policy opens the floor to all 
kinds of potentially new contributions to policy debate! 
 
4.6 Critical Deliberative Governance: Examining knowledge and improving 
deliberative approaches to environmental governance 
Critical deliberative governance is the name I have given to the environmental 
governance framework that Chapters 2 and 3 have worked toward developing.  There 
are certain tensions between Habermasian-inspired deliberative approaches to 
environmental governance and a more Foucauldian co-productionist basis for 
understanding the knowledge-governance nexus.  These tensions have been made 
famous by debates (or perhaps lack of debate)10 between Habermas and Foucault 
themselves, despite the fact that the production of a ‘counter-modernity’ was at the 
heart of the work of these two prolific social critics.  Within these sometimes fierce and 
cutting debates, however, there were threads of commonality – a common ground that 
would lead even the famous protagonists to acquiesce that there appeared to be a 
“strange case of non-penetration between two very similar types of thinking” (Foucault 
1983:200, found in Love, 1983) that grounded their basic, driving questions.  Indeed, 
the characteristic tensions between these two types of thinking do not automatically 
make them irreconcilable, but together paint a more complete picture of issues that 
present themselves to environmental governance.  It is useful to view each position as 
an ideal type with ample terrain between for the intellectual and practical imagination. 
 
Several authors have suggested moderating the approaches of the critical theorists and 
the post-structuralists, respectively, and a handful have suggested reconciling the two in 
order to produce some form of middle ground to guide social theory.  Connolly for 
example, rejects that “we must either give up any aspiration to a society in which 
democracy flourishes or reject this entire archaeology of disciplinary society” (Connolly 
1983:333), or that we are limited to being “democrats or nihilists; we can criticize the 
present from the perspective of alternative ideals or join Foucault in repudiating every 
ideal imaginable today as the tyrannical extension of “our participation in the present 
system” (Foucault cited in Connolly 1983:333).  On its own, each theory of discourse 
                                               
10 Love suggests that many of their comments show that Habermas and Foucault tended to ‘talk past each 
other’, and thus frequently missed opportunities to create more meaningful dialogue between critical 
theory and post structuralism. Love, N. S. (1989). "Foucault and Habermas on Discourse and 
Democracy." Polity 22(2): 269-293. 
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and society is insufficient to improve environmental governance.  A framework 
representing elements of both theories, however, can accomplish both the tasks of 
explanation and prescription for improvement.   
 
Foucault concludes that a society without power-relations can exist only as an 
abstraction (Foucault 1982; Love 1989:287), and that these power relations that are 
inherent to society are embodied by discourse11.  On the other hand, Habermas believes 
that the lifeworld is virtually sustained by communication between free and equal 
participants (Habermas, 1995).  Taking these divergent political perspectives into 
consideration, Habermas can be criticized for divorcing knowledge and discourse from 
interests (for example, Giddens 1985).  Foucault can be criticized for not 
acknowledging human capacity for critical reflection and the potential this holds for at 
once exposing and challenging power: “Foucault’s genealogies embody a critique of the 
ideal of self-consciousness or reflexivity that had governed critical thought in the 
modern age… it is sometimes claimed against Foucault that his opposition to reflexivity 
at one level is contradicted by his contribution to it at another” (Connolly 1983:334) 
 
Communication is a key feature of both deliberative and deconstructionist theories.  
Deliberation demands undistorted, non-coercive communication between relatively 
equal actors in the public sphere.  If power differentials exist between actors, they need 
to be minimized, at best muted, in order for meaningful pragamatic, symbolic, political 
exchange to occur.  This is the essence of deliberative governance, where 
communication is limited by reason rather than power, and where participants in 
dialogue must be able and willing to (temporarily) take up the positions of others.  All 
positions are subjected to criticism, with no position ever achieving the status of being 
unquestionable or taken for granted.  Habermas himself says that, “the more cultural 
traditions predecide which validity claims, when, where, for what, from whom, and to 
whom must be accepted, the less the participants themselves have the possibility of 
making explicit and examining the potential grounds on which their yes/no positions 
are based” (Habermas 1987 Vol 1: 70).   
 
                                               
11 Love suggests that the assertions of Foucault’s analysis of power relations, despite his objections, 
“makes power relations… virtually synonymous with social relations” ibid., pg 289-290. 
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Through deliberation, under conditions free of distortion and coercion, novel 
perspectives can emerge.  That is, novel in the sense that they represent new ideas that 
are not lodged in old conceptual orders or repackaged versions of them; new ideas can 
be the product of agency.  These emergent perspectives can issue challenges to power 
and introduce radically new policy positions into debates.  Torgerson suggests that the 
emergence of ‘green discourse’ is an example:  
 
What environmentalism has most significantly created in the 
prevailing political context is a manner of speaking about the 
environment that was not previously possible – a range of 
discursive practices, expressive of green concerns, that allows 
environmental problems to be recognized, defined, and discussed 
in meaningful ways.  The green movement continues to construct a 
green discourse and to shape a forum for communication, a green 
public sphere.  Even with its many internal differences and 
disagreements, the emerging green public sphere poses a challenge 
to the once comfortable framework of industrialist discourse  
(1999:xi). 
 
In contrast, the post-structuralist tradition approaches communication in a different 
way.  As opposed to ridding language and sources of language of distortion and 
coercion as the ideal goal for communication, language is understood as inherently 
biased and ideally coercive!  Communication does not convey some naturally apparent 
meaning of things, but rather, historically and politically situated meanings.  
Perspectives might be mistaken for novel when these historical and political roots go 
unrecognized and unidentified.  Rather than as a product of agency, communication 
takes place in organized and strategic ways; positions are defined and delimited.  Most 
importantly, relations of power are ultimately expressed (albeit covertly) in discourse, 
and determine which discourses are given prominence in policy debates.   
 
Within a critical deliberative governance framework, reflection is a possible, but not an 
automatic feature of public engagement with discourse. This is because discourse is a 
manifestation of, a product of, and a producer of power.  ‘Expert’ discourses are treated 
as political mechanisms, that even when used with benign intentions, have the potential 
to curtail the possibility of dialogue in some strategic conceptual arenas, and to 
(inadvertently or not) maintain power relations in society.  The main objective of 
discourse analysis is to make explicit, the co-production of policy-relevant knowledge 
and power, thus providing greater potential for a redress of these power relations. A 
discourse analysis which exposes embedded power relations and political interests 
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(Foucauldian style) may be just what is required to bring deliberation to bear in debates 
and increase society’s potential to engage in communicative action (á la Habermas).  
This is a necessary (while not sufficient) step towards improving governance over 
resources. Perhaps this amounts to advocating for the use of a “loosely Foucauldian 
conception of discourses, while recognizing that reflective choice across discourses is 
indeed possible” (Dryzek 2001:658).   
 
This framework is useful to examine environmental governance for two overarching 
reasons that can be generally characterized as explanatory and prescriptive.  First, this 
framework can help us to understand how expertise, based on certain forms of 
rationality, is used to develop environmental policy, in ways that severely limit prospects 
for a more broadly-based, participatory, deliberative governance.  There are several 
dimensions of expert discourses that do not conform to the conditions under which 
deliberation can be achieved.  They are not open to the scrutiny of non-experts. They 
often position themselves as being an exclusive source of information about an 
objective reality that is non-reliant on social forces.  They often eschew complex 
political factors for behavioural and bio-physical factors.  The latter may not be 
simplistic, but expert knowledge attempts to explain them in relatively straightforward 
causal factors.   
 
Secondly, this framework can help inform analyses of this expertise that can ultimately 
chart out distinct perspectives on how governance can be improved and why improved 
governance is a desirable political outcome.  Deconstructing expert discourses can allow 
alternative discourses, and particularly normative discourses, once inadmissible because of 
their incompatibility with expert knowledge, to enter debates about what comprises 
sustainability and how it might be achieved.  This can be understood as enhancing 
‘communicative power’ (Fischer, 2003:42) and thus ‘capacity-giving’ (Litfin, 1994:15-23, 
found in Fischer, 2003) for marginalized people. 
 
Habermas explored, as vital to the concept of rationality, how different claims come to be 
recognized as rational within society.  The ultimate content of communicative rationality, 
is secondary to the procedure by which it is established12.  The grounding of validity 
                                               
12 This principle of procedure over content is revisited in relation to critical theory, where once again, the 
ways in which positions are debated and decisions are reached are of greater concern than the content of 
the outcomes.   
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claims happens through dialogue, or public discourse.  These claims are never fixed but 
always subject to scrutiny:  “communicative rationality implies a conception of 
communication that does not allow for any validity claims to be exempt in principle 
from possible critical examination” (Baber and Bartlett 2005:87-88).  Thus, the 
establishment of communicative rationality depends on the ‘democratization of public 
discourse’, through which individuals have access to, are able to contribute to, and able 
to challenge validity claims.  It is this dialectical (intersubjective; between individuals and 
not in the mind of one) and participatory nature, that makes communicative rationality 
“not a technical discourse based in specific expertise, but a politico-legal discourse 
based in the philosophy of rights” (Rydin 2003:109).   
 
In practice, communicative rationality is embodied in what Innes and Booher call 
‘authentic dialogue’ (2003).  Working towards greater deliberation in policy governance 
necessarily brings together high levels of both diversity and interdependence of 
stakeholder interests and ultimately replaces rhetoric and ritual with ‘authentic 
dialogue’ (Innes and Booher 2003).  Ideally, authentic dialogue is one in which each 
‘speaker’ truly represents the interests of which she speaks, and in which arguments are 
articulated in a manner that is comprehensible by all participants.  Furthermore, 
authentic dialogue is not “artificially constrained by rules about what can be discussed 
or what cannot be changed” (Innes and Booher 2003:38).  Creating an environment 
for authentic dialogue, and thus for deliberative governance, involves challenging 
assumptions and engaging explicitly in policy discourse (as opposed to policy analysis), 
“clearly locating both analysts and citizens in a communicative context… not to 
eliminate important differences – even divergent understandings – but… to abandon 
sterile abstractions and invidious distinctions” (Torgerson 2003:120).   
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Often developed through positivist science and corresponding technological 
applications, policy preferences invoke references to ‘evidence’ rather than ‘politics’, 
tending to leave expertise, and thus power relations, intact. These preferences tend to 
avoid difficult, often dangerous issues of overt political nature.  Often that which is 
presented as a reflection rather than an interpretation of reality, is a result of discursively 
creating, maintaining and defending boundaries between expertise and non-expertise.  
Through increasingly powerful coalitions, discourse and social order are co-produced to 
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the exclusion of outsiders for whom the stakes of policy outcomes are high.  This 
chapter argues for a more realistic view of how politics is an inextricable part of 
evidence-making, by advancing a reorientation of environmental policy, away from 
´evidence´ towards discourse.   
 
This insight has led to not only a critique of knowledge itself, but also of how it is 
unleashed in society with varied implications.  Transforming the status of such 
knowledge from ultimate and unquestioned truth to socially constructed interpretations 
of reality, does two things.  First, it opens such knowledge and its ramifications for 
policy, to debate and critique.  Secondly, it creates an epistemological basis for the 
serious consideration of alternative perspectives, that are more openly and explicitly 
accepted as socially and political grounded.  Policy ceases to be the exclusive domain of 
expert-managed evidence or of instrumentally rational logic.  Access to policy 
formation, analysis and critique is opened to knowledge based on experience, history, 
and context that come to be potentially credible and authoritative ways of knowing.  
Further supporting a greater range of participation in policy debates is a closer look at 
how knowledge is linked to policy.  Some post-positivist analysts see knowledge as 
ultimately having little role in policy outcomes.  Knowledge, rather, is an accessory to 
normative concerns, which ultimately guide policy making.  
 
While communicative action depicts a potential model for the realization of deliberative 
democracy, many discourses that circulate among policy makers are not accounted for 
by the rules of communicative rationality.  For example, some are elevated beyond 
debate, not only because they may be enacted by powerful actors, but because they 
replicate the very power structures of society through processes of co-production.  Such 
discourses can manifest themselves as serious obstacles to deliberative governance, by 
limiting the possibilities of challenging particular, and often particularly powerful, 
perspectives.   
 
The convergence of these frameworks is necessary because without communicative 
action, a participatory or deliberative governance is not possible: the governance game is 
over before it even begins.  However, without the notion of co-production the role of 
power in deciding which discourses dominate policy and why, is seriously 
underrepresented.  While evidence-based decision-making is still taken as the ‘gold 
 112 
standard’ of policy making by many, Chapter 3 discusses the existence of legitimate 
discourses outside of those found to be dominant; implicating the need for expanded 
participation and deliberation.  This,  as we will see in forthcoming chapters, has been 
acknowledged and even put into practice within the interventions under study.  
However, constructivism also illustrates the need for a critical analysis of dominant 
discourses.  This critical analysis or deconstruction, makes way for alternatives that, 
while potentially legitimate in their own right, are not congruent with dominant ways of 
seeing the world.  Without critical analysis, participation remains tenuous and authentic 
meaningful deliberation is not achieved.   
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Chapter 5: 
Constructing conservation landscapes:  The politics of land 
classification in the Mbaracayú Biosphere Reserve 
 
In Chapters 3 & 4 of this thesis I developed a theoretical framework that facilitates two 
shifts away from conventional approaches to evidence and participation in 
environmental governance.  The first is a shift from participation to deliberation, 
necessary in order to recognize the legitimacy of normative bases for rational decision-
making, and thus to harness the developmental potential of inclusive decision-making 
arrangements.  The second shift involves a critical approach to evidence and expertise.  
This critical approach is one that questions the objective authority of evidence by 
analyzing policy-relevant knowledge claims, for their factual and normative content.  
This is not about proving science wrong, but rather it is about recognizing that often 
factual claims are contingent upon social and political influences.  These influences 
must be made explicit if the democratization of public decision-making is to be 
deepened.  The emergent policy framework that these two shifts give rise to, is critical 
deliberative governance.  It is a framework that takes as its starting point, the strengths 
of both orthodox, evidence-based approaches and post-positivist, participatory 
approaches, while accounting for and addressing the important criticisms of each.   
 
After this rather intensive exercise in building the theoretical framework for critical 
deliberative governance, the second half of this thesis tests the potential of this 
framework to improve environmental governance, returning to the principal research 
questions.  Again, these questions are:  
 
• How and why might public participation challenge evidence-based policy 
implications for environmental policy?  
• What is considered to be evidence in environmental policy and why is it often 
privileged in policy debates?   
• To what extent is evidence influenced by social and political factors?   
 
The next three chapters explore these questions through three empirical cases of the 
politics of evidence: the politics of land classification; the politics of land-use modelling; 
and the politics of developing certification standards.  Each case is a governance 
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mechanism that generates evidence for decision-making support, and promotes public 
participation in policy debates.  The following empirical chapters interrogate the three 
governance mechanisms in question for their hidden politics and examine the 
implications for participation.   
 
The present chapter begins the empirical voyage by looking at the first of three 
interventions aimed at improving the environmental and democratic outcomes of 
environmental governance.  This intervention is land classification and the 
implementation of conservation-with-development in the Mbaracayú13 Biosphere 
Reserve, an area of declared ‘high ecological importance’.  Conservation with 
development approaches have been held up as an example of how environmental 
decision-making can be subject to both: the conservationist concern about declining 
forest cover and the need for restricted access forests; and, local livelihoods and 
participation in sustainable development.  The design of conservation with development 
approaches, however, is often based on global, standardized interventions rather than 
explicitly on localized versions of participation and sustainability.  Such approaches, and 
the rationales that support them, are co-produced with the conservation values of 
international environmental organizations that have pioneered and continue to promote 
them.  
 
This chapter argues two things.  First, landscapes requiring such intervention 
(‘intervention landscapes’) are often presented as matter of fact given a high degree of 
environmental value – based on characteristics such as biodiversity and carbon storage, 
combined with a population that is poor in both access to resources and environmental 
education.  On closer inspection, however, the creation of conservation landscapes 
based on the ‘fact’ of ecological significance, disregards other contextual factors that 
may make conservation problematic in social and political terms.  Secondly, many 
conservation with development approaches emphasize participation only after decisions 
have been made regarding protection such as the creation of delineated parks.  
Participation is often considered a practical step towards logistical support, fostering 
public support and compliant attitudes, and generalized ‘buy in’ for forest protection.  
However, more deliberative ideals about how and why participation is an important 
policy input are overlooked, or more actively rejected.  As a result, intervention 
                                               
13 My field site, introduced and described in Chapter 1. 
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landscapes are constructed in a way that is compatible with a familiar set of 
interventions, rather than in a locally inclusive, or contextually appropriate way.   
 
5.1 Introduction  
Help us save the last piece of forest.  This is the plea of a short video produced by the 
Fundación Moises Bertoni (FMB), a Paraguayan environmental NGO.  The forest they 
are talking about is the Upper Parana Atlantic Forest and the piece is the Mbaracayú 
Forest Nature Reserve (RNBM) in northeastern Paraguay.  The RNBM is one of the 
largest of the few remaining remnants of the Atlantic Forest, which as recently as sixty 
years ago, is shown by satellite imagery to have covered most of Eastern Paraguay.  
The 64,500 hectare RNBM, along with the inhabited surroundings make up the Upper 
Jejui River Watershed14 (CARJ) spanning 340,000 hectares in total.  The CARJ, 
declared in 2000 as a UNESCO Man and Biosphere (MAB) Reserve, has been 
described as representing “some of the highest opportunity in Paraguay to conserve 
Atlantic Forest” (Di Bitetti, Placci et al. 2003; Carlson 2006:1). USAID’s Environment 
program has identified the conservation of “remaining ‘core’ forest fragments” of the 
Atlantic Forest as the “highest priority” (Aggarwal, Bullen et al. 2004:8).   
 
The Mbaracayú region is too easily and too simply described and classified in the 
familiar physical and social terms of a developing world conservation landscape.  Thus, 
people who participate in the FMB conservation and rural development programs, do 
so in the context of standardized and, following Robbins, (2003) the portable terms of 
the landscape.  Despite the promotion of participatory governance in the watershed, 
participation is highly structured by the FMB approaches to sustainability; protection 
through ownership on the one hand, and development through sustainable agriculture 
and alternative crops on the other.  Yet, several issues suggest that a more nuanced 
approach to classifying the landscape, one that allows for a more pluralistic 
understanding, may question the appropriateness and sufficiency of these sustainability 
interventions.   
 
                                               
14 The FMB follows a “watershed approach”, which means their interventions and administrative role 
corresponds to a geographical space delineated by hydro-resources, rather than political boundaries 
(Ebrahim, 2005:23).   
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For example, land owned by the FMB provides opportunities for conservation and 
ecological research in the Mbaracayú.  However at the same time, this ownership 
underlines the dramatic inequality in land distribution and exacerbates longstanding 
tensions around foreign ownership in Paraguay.  Likewise, extension activities carried 
out by the FMB’s rural development team disseminate ‘sustainable agricultural 
practices’ (for example, the use of organic compost, crop rotation and crop 
association) and promote the adoption of alternative crops that require fewer 
pesticides, have better yields, and attract higher market prices, than conventional crops.  
But new agricultural techniques require time and resources to master, and unfamiliar 
crops introduce new dimensions of risk to the peasant livelihood.  A closer 
examination of these approaches to sustainability suggests that they may better serve 
the purposes of the NGO than the recipients of their services in the watershed.   
 
I begin with a general discussion about the ways in which despite increasing demands 
for both evidence and participation in environmental management, conservation 
landscapes don’t exist a priori, but are constructed, standardized and mobilized.  Next, 
I provide a detailed account of how conservation and rural development have been 
operationalized in the practices of the FMB in the Mbaracayú.  In the third section, I 
analyze the ways in which these approaches have been appropriate given the portable 
conservation landscape classifications presented widely in the literature, and by the 
UNESCO MAB program itself.  Once a more contextualized and historically informed 
picture of the Mbaracayú region is presented, however, a much more critical version of 
the FMB practices emerges.  This chapter concludes with a discussion of how this 
analysis can improve prospects for critical deliberative governance in the Mbaracayú. 
 
In sum, this chapter makes the following arguments in turn:  
 
• Classification of conservation landscapes often reflect NGO norms, priorities 
and standardized interventions rather than the objectively defined ‘best’ 
approach to environmental and human needs.   
• Conservation-with-development approaches emphasize evidence and 
participation, but participation is encouraged only within the parameters set by 
standardized landscape classification.  Key interventions are not subject to 
inclusive debate, shutting down deliberation. 
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• Conservation and rural development fall short of making contributions to 
environmental and human outcomes because of contextual factors overlooked 
by portable landscape classifications. 
• The range of environmental values, judgements and preferences is not fully 
captured by landscape classification because of different livelihood patterns, 
resource dependencies and social identities. 
 
5.2 Social and political influences in the construction of conservation 
landscapes 
The idea that nature speaks for itself, and that conservation aims only to preserve its 
voice is highly contested.  Contexutalized research repeatedly illustrates that political 
and social factors are built into the very landscapes where conservation and 
development take place (Brown 1998; Robbins and Fraser 2003), but these influences 
often become hidden, and mistaken for ‘natural’ landscape characteristics.  Sluyter 
notes that this sometimes results in clashes between modernist conservation and 
landscapes in developing countries,: “they are premodern, habitually get nature and 
society mixed up, and thus remain locked in the grip of myths that naturalize social 
processes and socialize natural processes” (Sluyter 2003:221, drawing on Latour, 1993).  
Much of what is modern conservation and development practice seeks to straighten 
this out by perceiving and analyzing society and nature as separate entities. However, a 
growing body of research in the domain of political ecology has pointed out ways in 
which this separation is problematic (West 2006; West and Brockington 2006).  These 
authors show how conservation and development landscapes are shaped, even 
constructed, by the social and political commitments of interventionists.   
 
The separation of nature and society remains clear today, in what Zimmerer calls the 
“growing prevalence of nature-society couplings that characterize the new 
conservation areas” (2000:356).  Management schemes, he adds, are increasingly 
labelled to clearly indicate such couplings: parks-with-people, man-and-biosphere, 
conservation-with-development and sustainable development, for example (Zimmerer 
2000).  The two part nature of these ‘hybrids’, as Zimmerer calls them, indicates a 
union of sorts, but with an emphasis on the continued separation of nature and 
society, and the need to deal with each in a separate, but ideally complimentary 
manner.  The Man and Biosphere reserve model, for example, clearly delineates a core 
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area at the centre (where nature is tended and monitored) and the transition and buffer 
zones, where controlled human settlements are permitted and education, training and 
tourism are undertaken (where the social and economic are tended to) (see Figure 5.1).  
Such maps, and the classifications they embody, become ‘portable landscapes’ 
(Robbins 2003) or ‘immutable mobiles’ (Latour 1987), meaning they are “socially 
identified objects, representations, or processes that are considered the same in 
different locations or cultural settings” (Forsyth 2003:177).  These classifications 
matter because they determine rights and control; a change in classification can mean a 
major shift in access to resources (Tsing 2005).  Imposing typology means new 
inclusions and exclusions (Tsing 2005; Epstein 2007) that are likely to be incompatible 
and conflictive with pre-existing or alternative classifications (Wong, Delang et al. 
2007). 
 
Figure 5.1: MAB landscape classification (Source: UNESCO, at:   
http://portal.unesco.org/geography/en/files/8763/1210238795131MAB.jpg/31MAB.j
pg, retrieved January 30, 2011.) 
 
 
 
In contrast with the natural-social hybrid depicted by conservation-with-development 
models such as the MAB model above, authors have shown how so-called natural 
landscapes are very much constructed artefacts in a material, physical sense, laden with 
social and political influence.  In this sense, conservation landscapes do not only have 
implications for social and political outcomes, but socio-political influences have 
implications for landscapes: “the imagined forest becomes the real one and vice versa” 
(Robbins 2004:110).  Perhaps colonialism is one of the most obvious and, over time 
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most resilient pathways for the embedding of socio-political forces into physical 
landscapes.  The geopolitics and ethnocentrism of colonialism in Africa and Latin 
America provide poignant examples of how the imagination, manifest in assumptions, 
stereotypes and visions, often serves as the inspiration for conservation and can shape 
physical landscapes. In his discussion of the making of the Serengeti National Park, 
Neumann illustrates how “The idea of nature as a pristine empty African wilderness 
was largely mythical and was made concrete only by relocating thousands of Africans 
and denying millennia of human agency in shaping the landscape” (Neumann 
2003:240).    
 
Analyses of more recent interventions have also shown how social and political 
influences can create so-called ‘natural’ landscapes.  In her work on the Maya 
Biosphere Reserve in Guatemala, Sundberg describes how the landscape has become 
‘balkanized’ by the unique and sometimes conflicting agendas of the NGOs working in 
it.  The resultant landscape was not just an outcome of lazy misinterpretations or 
chance misunderstandings of local ways on behalf of donors.  Rather it was an active 
construction, reflecting the interests and approaches of various NGOs:  “This 
territorialism molds space and society according to distinct development philosophies, 
management techniques, and priorities” (Sundberg 1998:404).  NGO tastes, priorities 
and preferences, rather than local realities, determine conservation landscapes:  
 
Projects are driven by the desires of each NGO’s constituency, which 
comprises donors and members, not local people.  As a result, projects 
are designed before they reach local communities, satisfying donor 
requirements and/or membership tastes.  Although NGOs claim to 
engage the most current theories on community participation in their 
relationships with people, most projects are announced to, not 
negotiated with “target” populations (Sundberg 1998:404).   
 
Science itself, which has been understood in an orthodox sense as a means of ‘reading’ 
and ‘decoding’ the environment is often understood in the political ecology literature 
as a means of constructing the environment.  Science does not reflect nature.  But nor 
does it merely provide one interpretation of nature.  Authors such as Sivaramakrishnan 
(1999) and Scott (1998) have shown how science has created new landscapes that 
would be scarcely recognizable as their former selves .  Furthermore, constructions of 
the environment are rarely neutral.  Rather they are tied to the world orders of their 
creators:  “the failure (of conservation professionals) to recognize that their apparently 
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neutral and science-based vision of conservation is a culturally embedded one, and that 
they are ‘power actors’ in the international system lies at the heart of the problem” 
(Duffy 2010:8).   
 
5.3 Conservation and rural development in the Mbaracayú: Evidence and 
participation 
Conservation-with-development approaches emphasize evidence and participation, but 
participation is encouraged only within the parameters set by the evidence about 
protected areas and sustainable agriculture.  The key interventions, such as the creation 
and maintenance of a protected park area and the promotion of sustainable agriculture, 
are not subject to inclusive debate.   
 
Like many environmental NGOs working in conservation landscapes, the FMB pursues 
sustainability in the Mbaracayú region through a combination of approaches.  First, the 
FMB administers the privately owned reserve, purchased with the help of Conservation 
International, an international organization widely known for its practice of purchasing 
and protecting land for the purposes of nature conservation.  The FMB itself was 
formed for the purpose of creating and managing the RNBM (this will be described in 
greater detail in the next subsection).  Foreign ownership has been a controversial 
approach to conservation, but is often promoted, particularly in locations where the 
national and subnational impetus for conservation is perceived to be low, due either to 
lack of resources or lack of interest.  Secondly, the FMB promotes local participation in 
sustainability governance through a rural development program that compliments their 
protected areas programme.  Rural development aims to skew land-use toward 
sustainability to reduce pressure on the protected area, and to improve environmental 
outcomes outside the reserve.   
 
5.3.1 First intervention: ownership of protected areas  
Protection features most prominently in the FMB’s repertoire of approaches to 
addressing deforestation and sustainability.  In 1988 the organization was formed for 
the purpose of raising funds to purchase what is now known as the RNBM. The story 
of how this happened has become an important institutional historical narrative, widely 
recounted and reflected upon with a degree of reverence within the FMB.  Most FMB 
documents begin with at least an abridged version of it; it is told and retold at FMB 
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meetings and functions; its characters have nearly become folk heroes at the FMB.  It 
goes like this:  
 
In the late 1970’s, the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) lent 
money to a Paraguayan plywood mill operator who subsequently went bankrupt.  The 
land that is today the Mbaracayú Forest Reserve was seized as collateral.  In 1987 Kim 
Hill, an American Anthropologist, had been working in the area; his focus was a group 
of hunter gatherers called the Ache, and he was becoming increasingly concerned by 
the appropriation and clearing of the forest land they depended on for subsistence.  As 
recently as 40 years prior, the region was virtually uninhabited by large-scale 
agriculturalists, and its vast forests had been exploited primarily through the hunting 
and gathering of the Ache.   
 
Now up for sale, Hill wanted to purchase the land to ensure the continuation of the 
Ache livelihood.  To this end he approached Raul Gauto of Paraguay’s Conservation 
Data Centre and Alan Randall of The Nature Conservancy in the USA, to see how 
they might work together towards this objective.  Gauto and Randall approached the 
IFC to see whether or not they might be in a position to donate the land as a private 
reserve.  When this request was denied an appeal was made to the Paraguayan 
government to contribute funds to the purchase.  The appeal was also made in hopes 
that the government could help lobby the IFC for a reduction of the sale price.  They 
too, denied help.  Through the profiles and networks of Gauto and Randall, however, 
international support began to build for the idea of forming a reserve of the land.  
These early days are recounted by Alan Randall:   
 
As higher authorities became involved in the purchase of the land, it 
became more powerful, such as, the new president, the American 
Ambassador, so the environment became much more favourable.  I 
remember that the Ambassador said:  ‘I can’t talk about civil rights, I 
cant talk about … but what I can talk about is the beauty of nature and 
how it’s important to protect it.’  This was during the Stroessner years, 
you know, so he was effective.  And he had very good contacts in 
Washington because his job was to host senators that came over here to 
learn about  foreign relations and what not.  So he put us in touch with 
senators and what not that started writing letters to the World Bank, 
saying ‘wouldn’t it be nice if we could protect this land’.  So the head of 
the IFC, Sir William Ridery called me up to say come over here and 
resolve this issue.  So that was a lot of lobbying there… And we also had 
the Ambassador here pushing for it locally.  And the president of the 
republic at the time, he finally came around… Rodriguez… of course he 
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thought we wanted to keep it as a place to hunt jaguars, haha, but… 
(personal communication).   
 
In 1988 the FMB was formed to coordinate and ‘localize’ fund raising efforts to buy 
the land.  On December 6, 1991, The Nature Conservancy and the FMB struck a deal 
with the energy and infrastructure giant AES Corporation15 who donated US$500,000 
for the purchase of the RNBM land and an additional US$1.5 million to the FMB to 
provide for an endowment fund, for a total of 2 million dollars, to the Mbaracayú 
cause.  The investment served to offset emissions at the company’s Oahu power plant: 
“An agreement that “AES will invest $2 million in the Mbaracayú project to capture a 
total of 13.1 million metric tons of carbon” in the forest and soil’s biomass was made. 
The stipulated amount was of $0.153/metric ton of carbon” (Yanosky 2000:15).   
 
And then we were able to get into this carbon offset business… are you 
familiar with that.  There was an experimental program in the 1990’s, the 
AES corp. was working with WRI, and I saw this as a potential way of 
funding the Mbaracayú.  It just so happened that the head of the Nature 
Conservancy was a very good friend of the president and founder of the 
AES corporation.  So we were able to put a proposal before them, they 
gave us 2 million dollars, by saying look, if we can buy this property and 
protect it, we can keep the forest, keep the carbon sequestered in it, and 
it won’t be all cleared for soy beans.  That was the pitch we made, we 
had a job convincing people of it, but we got the money, which has been 
a real strength in our financing.  That was in 1991 or 1992.  (Randall, 
personal communication).  
 
This is not the first time the AES Corporation paid for environmental services by 
using conservation to offset their carbon emissions.  Trexler, a well known dealer in 
offsets, documented the first practical application of carbon offsets as the voluntary 
investment by the same AES Corporation, in tropical conservation projects in 
Guatemala.  This time, the investment offset emissions from a coal fired power plant 
in Conneticut (1995).  While this offset scheme has paid off in the Mbaracayú, and 
ultimately for the FMB (Yanosky 2000), critics say that “The project was extremely 
attractive as a less costly alternative to the clean air regulations in the US, and 
furthermore it allowed them to improve their public image” (Lovera, Avendaño et al. 
2005)16.   
                                               
15 The AES Corporation claims to “continue to expand into new energy and infrastructure markets 
worldwide” based on “significant global reach (and) deep local knowledge” 
(http://www.aes.com/aes/index?page=history)) 
16 El proyecto era demasiado atractivo como alternativa menos costosa que las normas sobre aire limpio 
de EE.UU., y además le permitía mejorar su imagen pública” (Lovera, 1995).   
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So, in 1991, the land was purchased from the IFC by the FMB (with the considerable 
assistance of TNC) for two million dollars, discounted from the original five million 
dollar asking price.  The surface area of the land purchased was around 60,000 
hectares.  Further fundraising and subsequent availability of adjoining lands, enabled 
the expansion of the reserve to the present day total of 64,405.76 hectares.  
Furthermore, the FMB is in a privileged position in that while most NGOs in Paraguay 
depend on their reputations and ability to solicit funds year to year, having little long 
term financial security, the FMB is the beneficiary of a large trust that generates 
interest and provides operating funds annually.  This trust was secured early in the life 
of the Mbaracayú Reserve, and is explained by Alan Randall:  
 
The money was being lined up just as we were signing the agreement 
with IFC to buy the property.  With this money and an additional 
$2,000,000 we set up a trust fund for the FMB, now worth 5 million, and 
it supports the FMB.  Around 60% of their funding comes from that 
trust fund (personal communication).    
 
Currently, the FMB undertakes protection of the RNBM through employing a force of 
armed park guards to maintain observations from 10 posts around the periphery of the 
reserve.  Furthermore, teams of the guards conduct frequent patrullajes (patrols) 
through the reserve, for three or four days at a time, to monitor activities taking place 
within its borders.  Such outright land ownership and protection as means of 
conservation have been strongly supported by some agencies.  For example, a report 
detailing recommendations for USAID’s environmental program in Paraguay, 
suggested that USAID  
 
“Consider support to NGOs as they seek funding for land purchases in 
the Atlantic Forest region, alongside other activities that partners are 
already engaged in.  Given the high deforestation rate in the region, land 
purchase provides the most immediate protection from land degradation 
due to expanding soy cultivation and poor farming practices” (Aggarwal, 
Bullen et al. 2004:10).   
 
Such aggressive approaches to protection, however, have also come under fire.  While 
conservation (and more pointedly, conservation through ownership and protection) 
remains a significant component of the work of many environmental NGOs, it is no 
longer widely considered to be a sufficient nor ethical practice on its own.  The FMB 
has attempted to make park protection more participatory, for example, by hiring local 
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people  as park guards.  Despite this, protected areas remain a classically 
‘unparticipatory’ strategy.  Rural development is seen as a way of addressing this need 
for participation in sustainability: involving people in agricultural strategies can 
improve livelihoods, reduce environmental impact and perhaps most importantly for 
the FMB, garner support for the existence of the RNBM.  Importantly, it can also be 
an important pre-requisite for continued support from international donors.  
 
5.3.2 Second intervention: rural development  
The second FMB intervention in the Mbaracayú, is the promotion of sustainable 
agriculture17.  Beyond protecting the reserve in an immediate and literal sense, it is 
understood by the FMB that the reserve cannot and should not remain an ‘island’.  
Environmental issues need to be addressed beyond its borders, if the FMB’s goals, and 
the reserve itself, are to be ensured propagation.  Poverty and resource degradation in 
the zones outside of the reserve, the FMB maintains, will drive people to seek to enter 
the reserve to exploit protected resources.  As elsewhere, poverty and campesino 
agriculture are often singled out as the main causes of environmental degradation in 
Paraguay, though blame is not always expressed in unsympathetic ways.  For example, 
one author notes, in his writings entitled, The Importance of our National Parks:  
 
One of the major conservation problems faced by Paraguay is probably 
its insufficient rural development.  In their struggle to obtain food and 
fuel, many campesinos find no alternative to clearing the vegetation 
from immense surfaces, until the soil itself leaves with the waters and 
the winds.  What the people require is training that promotes the 
sustainable use of natural resources (Clark 2005:38).   
 
The implementation of rural development in the Mbaracayú conformed with the more 
generalized response to criticisms that the engagement of environmental NGOs in 
conservation initiatives led to disregard, disadvantage and even abuse of local people.  
Initiatives focused on sustainable production (rather than conservation) involve people  
in a more broadly defined vision of sustainability, but still serve environmental 
purposes.   
 
                                               
17 At the time of my fieldwork, ARC/CIDA funding supported the continuation of an intervention that 
had already been initiated with funds from the French Development Agency.  I was not involved in 
designing the intervention, and I had no principal role in carrying out the intervention.  My research, 
however, involved ‘go-alongs’ and participant observation with the FMB’s rural development team 
which was responsible for implementing the sustainable agriculture project.   
 125 
To address these issues, the FMB has a Rural Development program through which 
agricultural extension activities are implemented, with aims of improving productivity 
(and thus incomes) and improving the adoption of sustainable agriculture.  The 
program coordinator of the FMB has emphasized that “rural development is not the 
desired end itself.  Rather, it is used as a means to ensure protection of the RNBM” 
(personal communication).  The FMB website explains that improving the quality of 
life for hundreds in the Reserve, reduces the likelihood of ‘illicit activities’ (one of these 
being marijuana cultivation) and at the same time promotes conservation in the 
RNBM:   
 
The actions implemented in this component (Rural Development) offer 
integrated production alternatives to hundreds of inhabitants of the 
communities that surround the Reserve in order to improve their quality 
of life.  This focus seeks to eliminate illicit activities and at the same time 
promote the protection of the Nature Reserve18.   
 
Thus, while conservation aims to protect some of the last remaining ‘intact’ forests of 
the Interior Atlantic Forest, rural development aims to alleviate external pressures on 
the RNBM.  This is done by improving the standard of living in surrounding 
communities (so the perceived need to impose on forest resources is decreased) and by 
improving environmental conditions so as not to leave the RNBM an isolated, forest 
‘island’.  Also, rural development helps to foster a sense of loyalty to the FMB and the 
reserve itself: “the people will know that it is because the reserve exists that they 
receive development assistance – if the reserve disappears, then the assistance 
disappears” (Palacios, personal communication, 2006).  Furthermore, in line with the 
participatory discourse of sustainability, rural development is seen as a way of 
involving people in natural resource management, and ultimately, environmental 
protection.   
 
A second rationale for the FMB’s engagement in rural development is forging and 
maintaining good relations with communities surrounding the RNBM.  Good relations 
are important in different ways, not least of all because they can facilitate 
understanding and important support on behalf of local people for the objectives and 
                                               
18 http://www.mbertoni.org.py/donde_trabajamos/MbaracayúMbaracayú/desarrollo_rural.php, retrieved 
June, 2008.  Las acciones implementadas en este componente ofrecen alternativas de producción integral 
a cientos de habitantes de las comunidades que rodean la Reserva para mejorar su calidad de vida.  Este 
enfoque busca evitar que desarrollen actividades ilícitas, y a la vez promueve la protección de la Reserva 
Natural 
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strategies of the FMB.  But good relations are also important in the matter of obtaining 
funding from outside donors.  International donors from whom FMB seeks donations 
are increasingly interested in how FMB works in the field.  Site visits by prospective 
donors are a principal tool for FMB fundraising.  If FMB programs are unsuccessful in 
local communities, and  if relations with those communities sour it is unlikely that 
FMB will be able to attract future donors to its cause (Padwe 2001:131).   
 
The FMB rural development program counts eight rural extension workers among its 
staff (this was during my fieldwork in 2006, but this number fluctuates with project 
funding).  Each of these extension workers is responsible for a cluster of communities 
in one geographical area within the Biosphere Reserve.  Together, the team works with 
over five hundred producers.  The objectives of the rural development team include 
‘the technical advancement and modernization of production’ and ‘promoting 
environmental sustainability’ (Fundación Moises Bertoni 2002).  Working toward these 
objectives, the rural development team pursues the following:  
 
• improving systems of production, incorporating agroforestry and/or pastures 
(using the same land for multiple uses);  
• improving techniques for the management of residual agricultural matter (the 
organic matter remaining after harvest);  
• improving techniques for water resources management;   
• improving levels of production through better agricultural practices; and,   
• promoting the uptake of new crops that require more sustainable techniques.    
 
Methods for doing this work include:  
 
• creating training modules to be used by producers; and,  
• disseminating information on the above themes through written materials and 
radio 
 
This work plan emphasizes educational materials, and one-on-one training.  The focus 
is on improving local awareness and knowledge of sustainable agricultural practices 
and techniques to maintain or raise the productivity of their land, and the integrity of 
resources including forest, water and soil.  This includes the promotion of new crops 
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that require less intensive cultivation practices and require fewer agricultural inputs 
than are currently used with some crops.   
 
5.4 Selective evidence and limited participation: the importance of context 
for conservation with development approaches 
The interventions described above, conservation and sustainable agriculture are, in a 
standardized universal sense, appropriate measures to both conserve biodiversity and 
promote sustainable resource use in the Mbaracyau.  Once contextual factors are 
accounted for, however, the suitability and appropriateness of these sustainable 
development interventions becomes considerably more dubious suggesting that they 
may better serve the purposes of the NGO than the recipients of their services in the 
watershed.  For example, land owned by the FMB provides opportunities for 
conservation and ecological research in the Mbaracayú.  However at the same time, 
this ownership underlines the dramatic inequality in land distribution and exacerbates 
longstanding tensions around foreign ownership in Paraguay.  Extension activities 
promote the adoption of alternative crops that require fewer pesticides, have better 
yields, and attract higher market prices, than conventional crops.  But new agricultural 
techniques require time and resources to master, and unfamiliar crops introduce new 
dimension of risk to the peasant livelihood.  This section will analyze the suitability of 
the interventions in light of three such contextual characteristics: land inequality and 
foreign ownership; the risky business of experimenting with new crops; and the 
pragmatic considerations around implementing so-called ‘sustainable techniques’.   
 
5.4.1 Land inequality and foreign ownership  
If conservation can be understood as a straightforward strategy for environmental 
protection anywhere, it certainly cannot be considered as such in Paraguay.  This is 
because of the historically embedded politics of inequality which centres on land 
ownership, and particularly foreign ownership in the country.  Indeed, the narrative of 
how the Mbaracayú Forest Reserve came into being, underlines the role of foreign 
ownership, and why many stakeholders in the Mbaracayú region, consider its existence 
problematic.   
 
The FMB has under its control, the largest tract of land by far in the Biosphere Reserve.  
This is particularly significant in Paraguay, with one of the most inequitable 
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distributions of wealth of South American countries, “where the wealthiest 20% of the 
population accounts for 62.4% of incomes, and the 10% poorest just 0.7%” (Benegas 
1999:278-279).  Much of this inequality is manifest in control over land – a key issue in 
rural politics and conflict.  Research has shown that “poverty among farm households 
in Paraguay is closely related to lack of access to land by many farmers” (López and 
Thomas 2000:257; see also, López and Valdés 2000).   
 
Land inequality, characteristic of Paraguay, is sometimes veiled as land ‘shortage’, as 
more land comes under cultivation to support a growing population.  In fact, the push 
westward of forces of land colonization toward the department of Canindeyu, is 
conventionally held as a product of land shortages in the well-established settlements 
of Paraguay’s eastern region.  High population densities and the ‘shortage’ of land in 
the east prompted the movement of people towards the uncultivated, forested and 
‘available’ areas of Canindeyu.  In charge of this movement was the Rural Welfare 
Institute (Instituto de Bienestar - IBR)19, the government department created and 
mandated to orchestrate mass migrations, and serve the needs of the rural people. 
However, as Arnold points out, data from the 1956 Agricultural Census show that this 
‘land shortage’, blamed for the tensions and conflict in the area during the 1960’s, 
appears to be much less a case of ‘lack of land’ itself, but a dramatically inequitable 
distribution of land (Arnold 1971, found in Nickson, 1981).  This inequality, and a 
growing identification of the historical forces that had led to such patterns of land 
distribution were key to the growth of the Ligas Agrarias, church led grassroots 
organizations dedicated to the social organization and political mobilization of 
campesinos, in the Eastern and Central Zones (Nickson 1981).  In fact, the IBR was 
established with the full support and encouragement of the large landholders, and 
eventually at their demand, who were looking to mitigate the threat posed by 
increasingly dissatisfied and organized (via the Ligas Agrarias) peasant population.    
 
                                               
19 The IBR was a government office that was created by Law No 852/63 in … to “promote the 
harmonious integration of the campesino population with the social and economic development of the 
country”.  One of the primary functions of the IBR was to deal with land distribution and the wider issue 
of agrarian reform.  The office was disbanded in … and The Institute for Rural Development and Land 
(Indert) was created.  Because at this time, there remained very few public lands for distribution, Indert’s 
main functions were to (and continue to be) expropriate large ‘unproductive’ estates and monitor 
irregular land transfers.  Javiera Rulli, a noted Biologist, Ecologist and Activist has recently accused Indert 
of being “more like a real estate agent inserted in the speculation of the land attractive to the soy 
producers.  And they increase their salaries with the commissions received from the soy producers” 
http://www.organicconsumers.org/btc/paraguay020606.cfm, July 10, 2007.   
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Despite these high levels of inequality, many observers note a distinct lack of 
emergence of a class consciousness.  It is commonly noted that the concerns of the 
poor are more typically articulated in terms of nationalist-oriented rather than class-
oriented ideals (Nagel 1999).  In explaining this phenomenon, author and journalist 
Roberto Paredes proposes a variety of national and international forces that have 
incubated a distinct sense of individualism into the development of the Paraguayan 
consciousness (2002).20  He suggests that a significant share of these forces were 
directed by longstanding dictator, Alfredo Stroessner and his regime, under which, “a 
persuasive mix of paternalism and ‘the club’ were employed: ‘manus militarus’ for all, 
in appropriate doses… the rules were clear and simple: rewards to those who 
cooperate, tolerance for those who don’t argue, and punishment for those who rebel” 
(Paredes 2002:30).   
 
Even in the public interpretation and understanding of peasant land occupations, 
discourses about class struggle were virtually absent (Nagel 1999).  Rather, landless 
campesinos relied heavily on Colorado and nationalist rhetoric to make their actions 
understood.  She explains that this comes as no surprise in light of the link between 
the concentration of land holdings and the Stroessner regime (most of the non-foreign 
large landholders being personal associates of Stroessner) and the  severe repression 
that a direct attack on the Stroessner regime would incur (Nagel 1999).  Populist 
policies of land redistribution, were poised to improve equity in landholdings and serve 
the purposes of justice and social welfare (Nagel 1999).  However, existing processes 
for the actualization of these policies were incongruent with this philosophy, being 
largely ineffective and cumbersome.  Consistent with other accounts, Nagel argues that 
these policies were largely a façade; rhetorical political tools with few economic and 
redistributive effects.   
 
With a heavy handed government, unsympathetic towards public dissent, much of the 
aggravation caused by unequal land distribution was expressed through a focus on 
nationalism and foreign ownership. This continues today.  Foreign ownership is not a 
new issue in the hearts of the Paraguayan public.  The “opening” of markets to foreign 
“investment” has a history that dates back to the 19th century and has never been seen 
                                               
20 In addition he goes on to discuss international forces that have further stifled the advance of a class 
consciousness, including the rise of a neo-liberalist hegemonic discourse, and globalization.   
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as a policy aimed at offering widespread opportunities, but rather as a policy co-opted 
by an elite few.   
 
The story of foreign ownership of Paraguayan lands continues today, albeit with a 
different face (Nickson 2004).  Since the 1960’s, tens of thousands of Brazilians have 
emigrated to Paraguay, amounting to what some estimate to be a staggering 10% of 
Paraguay’s total population (Zibechi 2009).  They came and continue to come to 
Paraguay, attracted by the ‘availability’ of land, cheap in comparison with Brazil, and 
skyrocketing soy prices. Tensions between Paraguayans and Brazilians that centre 
around land ownership have been epitomized over the past few years by reactions to 
the election of Fernando Lugo in August, 2008.  Lugo’s election platform placed heavy 
emphasis on land reform, raising peasants’ expectations that historic inequalities and 
injustices in land distribution would be redressed.  These expectations culminated in 
the stepping up of demands in the months following Lugo’s election.  These demands 
were manifest in the peasant occupation of large land holdings, the burning of soy 
fields, and the burning of Brazilian flags (Painter 2008).  “These rich lands now 
covered with soybeans were once a center of family agriculture, and strong peasant 
tradition, which was a base of support for the Lugo presidential campaign. Today, 
these lands are Brazilian property” (Zibechi 2009:4).   
 
The prominence of anti-Brazilian sentiment in Paraguay can be traced in part back to 
the War of the Triple Alliance in 1864-1870.  This war is widely viewed as a turning 
point in Paraguay’s history.  Despite what is widely celebrated as a noble and strong 
effort on behalf of Paraguay in the face of the formidable challenge posed by the 
Triple Alliance (Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay) the war threw Paraguay into economic 
ruin and worse, population of the country was decimated.  Estimates of this 
decimation are to the tune of 90% of the country’s entire male population as a direct 
result of battle, and indirectly by hunger and disease.   
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Another outcome of the War of the Triple Alliance is perhaps more emphasized and 
lamented in Paraguay, where the War remains a controversial and hotly debated topic 
(See Box 5.1).  This outcome is the ensuing dependence on foreign political and 
economic interests.  As the War put Paraguay into financial ruins, and for the first time 
in its history, the country was forced to open its markets (mainly to Britain) and had to 
seek outside loans in order to attempt to repay its war debts and rebuild itself.  Before 
this, Paraguay “since its birth as a Republic, was the only Latin American country that 
articulated an independent economic policy” (Laino 1989:37).  “The destructive 
economic and political impacts of the 1865 War of the Triple Alliance in Paraguay can 
still be seen today.  After the war, large transnational companies took hold, setting 
cycles of underdevelopment into motion through their rampant use of public lands 
and extraction of natural resources” (Cartes and Yanosky 2003:267). 
 
Ultimately this selling off of the country’s land to foreign interests, or the “new 
economic policy inaugurated after the war” (Laino 1989:133) is seen as a significant, if 
not the significant outcome of the war.  Whether these foreign interests were more or 
less powerful or rich is not the issue.  The important fact is that they were foreign.  
Laino emphasizes this point:  “Foreigners were made owners of the Paraguayan Chaco, 
which covers a bit more than 60% of the total national area.  These lands fell into the 
Box 5.1: Paraguayan Grievance on Film (Source: Author) 
 
Paraguay’s utter defeat in The War of the Triple Alliance, fought between 1864 and 1870, 
transformed Paraguay, South America’s first republic, from a relatively rich country, highly 
independent of Europe to a country in financial ruins.  Industrial collapse and high levels of 
post-war debt (primarily to Britain) led to the selling off of lands to foreign interests.  
Furthermore, as an outcome of the war, Argentina and Brazil divvied up 140,000 squared 
kilometres of Paraguay’s pre-war territory.   
 
A film released in 2005 that was highly popular in Paraguay retraced the events of the War of 
the Triple Alliance, and reignited some of the controversies which surrounded it.  The movie 
was titled Candido Lopez:  The Battlefields, and Director José Luis García says this about his 
film and the themes of dependence, independence and nationalism:   
 
“Most people think that Solano López, Paraguay's president at the time, was a great menace that had to be 
stopped and it wasn't exactly like that. No one remembers that Paraguay had the first metal foundry in Latin 
America and that Solano López had developed an economic policy that was not dependent on Europe. That is 
why he was seen by the European bourgeouise as someone that needed to be stopped… Solano López's principal 
motive was to be economically independent from England, which bought Paraguayan leather at a very low price 
and then made things from it and sold them back to Latin Americans at an exorbitant price. He was the only 
Latin American president of the 19th century who dared to challenge European power. That is why there was a 
triple alliance to overthrow his government” (Lopes 2005).  
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hands of large and small landowners, speculators and industry.  All the same, they 
represented foreign capital” (Laino 1989:133).   
 
Thus, it is apparent that the differences between large and small landholders are about 
much more than size of landholdings!  While the material repercussions of unequal 
land distribution are certainly vital to campesino grievance, at its heart this inequality 
embodies issues of national identity and resentment towards the strong foreign 
presence in large landownership and foreign domination that make it even more 
contentious.  This point is extremely pertinent to the context of the CARJ, as the 
majority of large land ownership, and the largest of landholdings, are in the hands of 
ambiguously Paraguayan, or non-Paraguayan interests.  The RNBM itself, by far the 
largest single landholding in the CARJ, is technically controlled by Paraguayans, but 
historically and currently, strongly linked to the interests of international conservation 
organizations.   
 
Indeed, based on global environmental rationales including biodiversity conservation 
and carbon sequestration, a kind of ‘ethical ownership’ of large amounts of land exists, 
despite acute socioeconomic inequality. The FMB’s control over a large property is not 
considered by most FMB staff as orthodox ownership, nor as cause for controversy.  
Privately owned conservation is not the exception in Paraguay – in fact private reserves 
account for the overwhelming majority of protected areas (Yanosky and Cabrera 
2003).  Rather, conservationists consider this brand of ownership as a public service, 
because under alternative circumstances, it is most likely that the conservation area 
would be cleared for agriculture.  I once posed the question to an FMB specialist in 
geographical information systems (GIS), charged with developing maps conveying 
specialized spatial information about ownership, land-use and land cover in the 
Mbaracayú: who was the largest landowner in the CARJ?  After thinking a moment, he 
named a Brazilian soy producer.  Initially slightly dismayed, he ultimately conceded to 
my suggestion that the FMB could be considered the largest landowner, with 64,500 
hectares under its control.  In contrast with other land-uses, however, conservation 
and protection are considered acts of environmental altruism, mitigating global crises 
associated with deforestation, and are not associated with ownership for other ends 
such as cattle or soy production.   
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This section has shown that even if conservation can be understood as a 
straightforward strategy for environmental protection anywhere, it certainly cannot be 
considered as such in Paraguay.  Land ownership, and particularly foreign ownership, 
is pivotal in the historically embedded politics of inequality in Paraguay.  This casts 
new light and understanding on the sensitivity around the role of foreign ownership in 
the narrative of how the Mbaracayú Forest Reserve came into being.  Understanding 
the context of foreign domination and land inquality in Paraguay makes much less 
surprising, why many stakeholders in the Mbaracayú region, consider the existence of 
privately owned conservation areas problematic.    
 
5.4.1 New Crops: Risky Business 
The introduction of new crops, though seemingly promising is also a questionable 
practice in light of the Mbaracayú context.  The introduction of alternative crops in 
small scale cultivation gained importance as a development strategy in Bolivia, Peru 
and Colombia, largely as a substitute for illicit crops such as coca and marijuana 
(United Nations General Assembly 1998).  It has more recently, gained popularity as a 
strategy that can have significant economic and environmental benefits by replacing 
selected existing species with alternatives that can be produced organically, without the 
use of pesticides and fertilizers, and that have higher yields and market prices.  This is 
expected to raise incomes and reduce dependence on ecologically harmful and costly 
agricultural inputs (Fundación Moises Bertoni 2005).    
 
While new crops hold the promise of safer cultivation and greater incomes, the 
dedication of land base, labour and other resources to experimenting with new crops is 
risky business for small producers.  The risks associated with trying new crops are 
serious and diverse but can be essentially divided into those affecting the production of 
new crops, and those affecting the selling of new crops.  The first reason for this 
riskiness has to do with experience, and the fact that each new crop comes with its 
own vulnerabilities and cultivation strategies.  Many producers feel that they lack the 
knowledge of, and to some extent, a limited capacity to learn, new methods of crop 
management.  This results in a very real fear of losing produce to disease and/or pests, 
underproduction due to mismanagement and the inability to produce and collect seeds.   
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Market security is the number one reason that producers choose to plant a crop, and 
new crops do not typically have established, tried and true markets. People generally 
have few contacts and influence for seeking out and establishing new markets for their 
produce.  Furthermore, there is virtually no access to transportation, private or public, 
for the large majority of producers in the watershed.  This leaves people with little 
possibility to sell goods that are not characterized by the system of intermediaries, 
credit and transportation, as are conventional crops.  Thus, when considering new 
crops, people are very sensitive to running the risk of being stuck with quantities of 
produce that cannot be used in the household nor sold for cash income.   
 
Past experience with development NGOs, have deepened concerns about the risks 
associated with experimenting with new crops .  While at one time, people were more 
willing to take greater risks with the support of an NGO, this support has been proven 
unreliable.  In many cases the result has been wasted labour and loss of income, deeply 
felt by producers throughout the watershed.  NGOs, for the most part, introduce new 
crops with a commitment to provide ongoing technical assistance at each stage of 
production, including planting, growing and harvesting.  This technical assistance is 
meant to mitigate at least some of the risks involved with trying new crops; it is aimed 
at helping people to deal with pests, disease, and other setbacks that might arise during 
the growing season.  Furthermore, it is unlikely that a producer will try new crops 
unless markets for that crop are guaranteed at the time of initiation.  Thus, NGOs are 
often involved in seeking out new markets for alternative crops, and will provide some 
form of backing or guarantee that the market will be available at harvest times.  
Ultimately, however, it is not uncommon for NGOs to find themselves overextended 
and under-resourced when it comes to their commitments regarding technical 
assistance and market provision, and campesino accounts of being let down by NGOs 
abound.  Far from being simply a gesture of goodwill, this support is vital in the 
transition to alternative crops and whether or not one can depend so heavily on 
tenuous support is a lesson learned quickly.   
 
Elements of this risk are clearly illustrated by one case that I became familiar with 
while visiting a family in a campesino community.  The family had been encouraged by 
an NGO to plant a promising new crop, and their efforts, they were assured, would be 
fully supported by the NGO.  The crop is burrito, a plant native to Paraguay, and  used 
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for teas and medicinal purposes.  The NGO had discovered new markets for burrito in 
Europe, and were therefore interested in helping local farmers to start production.  
The plant grows in bushes, with a thin stalk that can sprout around 50 leaves.  The 
NGOs commitment was to supply the seeds for planting, technical assistance for the 
growing and harvesting, and finally, to purchase the harvest for a set price per 
kilogram.  The dried produce was to be purchased including the stalks and the leaves, 
and the families were shown how the harvest should be completed.  The agreement 
was verbal; no signed contract was established.  After harvest time came and went, the 
family waited for the sale.  An intermediary came to buy the produce, but was 
surprised to see that the stalks had been dried and crushed in with the leaves, rather 
than being separated out.  He stated that he was only willing to buy the leaves, and for 
only half of the originally stated price.  The family soon found that to clean the stalks 
out of the produce, required an additional day’s work per sack of 5 kilos21.  The 
reduced price per kilogram of produce (reduced further because now a kilogram was 
reduced by half, due to the extraction of the stalks) was due to a market demand that 
was less than expected.  After this, the intermediary never returned and, the family is 
unsure if they should continue to work on separating out the burrito leaves from the 
stalks.  The producer told me, ‘I think that I should just burn the burrito, now, It’s worth more 
to me for firewood than it is to try to sell now.  They probably won’t be back for it anyway’. 
 
In another, similar instance, a producer was convinced to grow onions as a cash crop.  
According to the NGO personnel that brought him this idea, he could anticipate the 
support and assistance of the NGO in troubleshooting any problems that might arise 
in the growth cycle, and in finding a market for the product.  The seeds for the crop 
were given to him by the NGO, and he planted one third of his land using these seeds.  
Thankfully, this producer did not run into any unanticipated problems during the 
season, because the technicians did not return.  However, no one returned at harvest 
either, and the mountain of onions rotted for lack of markets and transportation.  This 
producer told me, “I am finished with trusting anyone who promises support or technical assistance.  
I know how to grow mandioca and cotton – and I know there will be a market.  There are never any 
surprises.  From now on, I will plant mandioca and cotton”.  Another producer put it this way: 
                                               
21 This recalls Scott’s discussion of the development of standardized weights and measures by the 
European State (1998).  Here, the way in which ‘one kilogram’ of burrito changes over time, is 
reminiscent of Scott’s assertion that “(E)very act of measurement was an act marked by the play of power 
relations,” (1998:27).   
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“If we just plant cotton and mandioca, we will never lack the markets, knowledge or technical 
assistance to make a living”.   
 
The majority of the small producers in the CARJ have long been engaged in cotton 
production as a primary cash crop, and for the large part, it is this crop for which 
NGOs are focused on finding a substitute.  For decades the Paraguayan government 
has been relentless in its promotion of cotton production and has established a multi-
faceted system, exclusively associated with cotton, that have historical significance and 
political influence.  As Turner notes:  “(T)he Paraguayan state has taken on the task of 
ensuring the accumulation of capital from the production of cotton and ensuring the 
continued survival of the peasant household as the basis for cotton production in 
Paraguay” (Turner 1993:184).  This system includes credit, market security, and 
transportation assurances.  Furthermore, after generations of cotton production, 
technical knowledge is widespread and entrenched.  The national government also sets 
a base price for cotton; the minimum price at which the producer is (theoretically) 
guaranteed to be able to sell his cotton.  Finally, it is a system that is deeply embedded 
in the psyche of the campesino, as a nationalist crop, the cultivation of which has 
almost become considered a civic responsibility.  As one technician told me, ‘the 
government puts out advertisements, they send out representatives to promote the crop face to face, and 
somehow, these manage to convince producers that cotton is a good choice this year’.   
 
So, why not proceed with cotton and avoid these risks altogether?  The Guarani word 
for cotton is mande’ ju.  When I learned what the word meant, I was told, “Que feo, tu 
primera palabra en Gurarani es mande’ ju” (How awful, your first word in Guarani is 
cotton).  For the campesinos, cotton production is a necessary evil that keeps them 
afloat, but trapped in a cycle of poverty and a dependency relationship.  This 
relationship is such that the campesinos receive seeds from the intermediary (also 
called the patron, which signals the nature of an unequal relationship) as well as the 
necessary implements such as chemical pesticides and fertilizers.  The cost of these 
inputs is recorded.  Thus, producers are able to plant regardless of whether or not they 
have the cash to invest in these inputs.  The intermediary (or acopiador) comes to visit 
throughout the season to check up on the crop and if everything is proceeding as 
expected, to hand out a bit of cash, and perhaps some food that may be desired or 
required in the interim to keep the producers afloat.  The inflated cost of any of these 
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handouts is recorded.  On special occasions such as Christmas and birthdays cash may 
be dispersed for special meals and gifts.  This is also recorded.  When the cotton is 
finally harvested, the intermediary comes to the producer to buy the produce.  While 
the price of cotton is fixed in Paraguay, the acopiador holds the power to pay a much 
lower price, as low as half as much, because of his investment and the debts owed him.  
After calculating this low price, he deducts the total of the year’s outputs, and the 
producer receives little or nothing at harvest time. However, with little capital, the 
producer is forced to take, once again, the advance of seeds and implements to replant 
the crop.     
 
Overall, a system is in place to make cotton a necessary evil.  The popularity and 
pervasiveness of cotton production in the watershed is propagated because of the 
system, and not because cotton is an inherently good or profitable crop.  The system 
involves: 
 
1. guaranteed purchase – producers are assured that they will not be stuck 
with unmarketable produce at harvest time;   
2. cash throughout the year, when it is needed, rather than a lump sum at 
harvest time; and, 
3. transportation – the intermediaries come to load up the produce and 
transport it.  There is no need to worry about securing a truck, rain and 
bad roads.   
 
These benefits are inextricably connected with the profound disadvantages of the 
system which propagate poverty and dependence through the following influences: 
 
1. undervaluing and underpayment for the produce;  
2. lack of capital to reinvest in the crop after harvest time; and,  
3. the creation of dependence on the patron for cash disbursements over 
the year and for capital investment to keep the crop going between years.  
 
The result is essentially a debt peonage system where the producer becomes dependent 
and trapped in a system where they are paying too much and earning too little.  Cotton 
production forms dependence on exploitative credit systems, expensive and damaging 
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agricultural implements and opportunistic intermediaries.  Although it is not 
particularly economically satisfying, cotton is well established with a system that serves 
needs, albeit on a short-term basis and at a minimum level.   
 
5.4.2 Sustainable Agriculture: Feasible? Sustainable? 
The promotion of ‘sustainable agriculture’ also becomes questionable in light of 
conditions in the Mbaracayú.  Despite the distinctly unparticipatory nature of 
conservation in the Mbaracayú, the FMB view their rural development and educational 
programs as the participatory leg of their efforts.  However, when the context to which 
these participatory interventions are applied is examined more closely, they seem to be 
woefully inadequate, and even inappropriate.  Rather than being designed with local 
people and reflecting local needs and priorities, rural development interventions such 
as the introduction of new crops and sustainable agricultural techniques, are instead 
standardized embodiments of global norms and understandings of sustainability.       
 
Shifting cultivation is presented as an unsustainable land-use option because it 
degrades soils, necessitates expansion of agricultural lands, and thus, culminates in 
accelerated deforestation rates22.  This relationship between shifting cultivation and 
deforestation, and a resultant assessment of shifting cultivation as one of the most, if 
not the most, potent causes of deforestation, has been recognized and reinforced by 
many observers (Fischer and Vasseur 2000; Rasul, Thapa et al. 2004; Prasad and 
Badarinath 2005).  Conventional wisdom implicates population growth, diminishing 
fallow periods, and soil degradation as mediating factors in this relationship.  “These 
land-use systems are becoming increasingly unsustainable as populations increase and 
the amount of agricultural land available declines, and are often associated with low 
crop productivity, and reduced fertility” (Fischer and Vasseur 2000:739).   
 
As a response to the crisis of unsustainable agriculture and corresponding 
deforestation, many have prescribed alternative cultivation practices that, as opposed 
                                               
22 The relationship between shifting cultivation and deforestation is a subject of fierce debate among 
researchers.  Many challenge the pre-eminence of shifting cultivation as a cause of deforestation,  
suggesting that it is not as significant a cause as is often assumed, but often draws attention away from 
other significant causes of deforestation (Lawrence et al. 1998).  Others invoke even more controversy, 
by questioning the validity of mediating factors that are regularly used to make establish the relationship, 
such as decreased fallow periods (Ickowitz 2006).  Others still have provided evidence that deforestation 
is a complete ‘misreading’ of the landscape within the context of some small scale production (Fairhead 
and Leach 1996).  
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to shifting cultivation, would be described as ‘sustainable’.  Such prescriptions have 
included agroforestry (Fischer and Vasseur 2000), horticulture (Rasul, Thapa et al. 
2004), and no-tillage cultivation (Derpsch and Moriya 1998).  No-tillage cultivation, or 
no-till is particularly relevant to Paraguay, because of the level of research that has 
been conducted on the practice in-country, and the large extent to which the Ministry 
of Agriculture has supported its promotion.  However, the recognition of no-tillage 
goes well beyond Paraguay and even South America, as the World Development 
Report claims that, “one of agriculture’s major success stories in the past two decades 
is conservation (or zero) tillage” (World Bank 2008:16), noting particularly that it “has 
worked in commercial agriculture in Latin America” (World Bank 2007:16).   
 
Tillage is typically used by farmers for purposes such as removing weeds, mixing 
agricultural inputs with the soil, and forming the earth into rows that facilitates 
irrigation and management.  Preparing the soil for planting by tilling causes soil 
erosion, reduced water infiltration, reductions in the soil quality (via chemical, physical 
and biological degradation) and thus, reduced productivity over time (Derpsch 1999).  
Based on these detrimental effects, international organizations such as the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the International Water 
Management Institute, and the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR) have vigorously promoted the use of a no-tillage system and have 
published research on its benefits (for example, Erenstein, Farooq et al. 2007; Trigo, 
Cap et al. 2009).  No-till involves green cover and direct seeding and is promoted as a 
‘sustainable’ agricultural practice reducing soil erosion, increasing water infiltration and 
enhancing soil quality, maintaining and even enhancing productivity (Riezebos and 
Loerts 1998; Derpsch 1999; Pieri, Evers et al. 2002; Erenstein, Farooq et al. 2007).  
Ultimately, this would eliminate the need for land abandonment, expansion of 
agricultural lands and continued deforestation.   
 
The Adoption of No-Till Cultivation sounds like a panacea for the impacts of shifting 
cultivation, particularly soil degradation and ultimately deforestation.  Derpsch, a GTZ 
researcher and advocate for no-till in Brazil and Paraguay, recognizes however, that 
changing cultivation methods is no easy process, but requires profound shifts in 
thinking: 
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A mental change of farmers, technicians, extensionists and 
researchers away from soil degrading tillage operations towards 
sustainable production systems like no-tillage was necessary to 
obtain changes in attitudes of farmers. As long as the head stays 
conventional it will be difficult to implement successful no-tillage in practical 
farming. Through time we have learned, that if the farmer does not 
make a radical change in his head and mind, he will never bring 
the technology to work adequately. We found that this is not only 
true for farmers but for technicians, extensionists and scientists as 
well. No-tillage is so different from conventional tillage and puts 
everything upside down, that anybody that wants to have success 
with the technology has to forget most everything he learned 
about conventional tillage systems and be prepared to learn all the 
new aspects of this new production system. We believe that a 
farmer first has to change his mind before changing his 
planter  (Derpsch 1999; Derpsch 2001:250, emphasis original). 
 
Beyond the necessary ‘attitudinal’ change required by small producers to put no-till 
cultivation into action, there are also the investments of time, labor, land base and new 
inputs that are required to make this shift.  First, the land needs to be prepared for no-
till by the planting of a crop that will ultimately serve as the green cover.  A common 
example of a crop used for this purpose is avena negra (black wheat), which is selected 
because of its relatively low cost, the ease with which it is planted and managed, its 
provision of blight control and soil shade, and its fertilizing residual effect (Derpsch 
1999).  Despite these benefits, avena negra can take more than 6 months to mature, 
before it can be cut to use for green abono verde (green cover or green manure), which 
can then be seeded directly without tillage.  Thus, not only do the avena negra seeds 
need to be purchased, but production of cash or subsistence crops must be forgone 
while it is left to grow.  The Regional Manager of the Agricultural Extension 
Department of the Ministry of Agriculture considers this to be a significant obstacle to 
many people who are interested in trying new techniques, including no-till and direct 
seeding: 
 
The problem is, that the producer will tell you, yes, I want to 
practice direct seeding and no-till, but how am I going to eat for 
the coming months, if my land is being prepared for direct seeding 
– that will take time away from planting a different crop.  Direct 
seeding, unfortunately, takes time to get going, there are these 
investments that need to be made (Maximo Heyn, personal 
communication, 2006). 
 
Another investment that needs to be made in order to get no-till production off the 
ground, is in purchasing pesticides.  Because with no-till cultivation weeding is not 
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permitted, pesticides are not optional.  In fact, “(T)he first possibility of cultivating 
crops without tillage on large scale farms occurred when 2,4-D, a broadleaf weed killer, 
was made available to farmers in the 1940s… As more, better and cheaper herbicides 
appeared on the market in the 1990s, no- tillage became easier to manage…” (Derpsch 
1998:3).  Even “Monsanto has invested more in the diffusion of no- tillage, because of 
its interest in marketing the herbicide Glyphosate” (Derpsch 1998:3).  While the 
financial investments required are one barrier to herbicide use for small producers, 
there is a less pragmatic, more symbolic and political issue at stake.  Pesticide use by 
large landowners in the CARJ are a point of contention with small producers.  Some 
insight into this discord is offered by a project field report:  
 
A major concern expressed in community meetings and interviews 
was the widespread and irresponsible use of agrochemicals such as 
pesticides and fertilizers.  This concern was particularly prominent 
in those communities that border on large landholdings (Carupera I 
and Carupera II).  These are landholdings, largely foreign owned, 
where soy is grown using intensive chemical applications.  There 
are two main issues with the chemicals used in soy farming: they 
are varied and abundant, and because of the large scale of soy 
farming, they are spread carelessly and irresponsibly (by airplane) 
and trespass into communities, causing health problems directly 
(skin and respiratory problems) and more indirectly by 
contaminating food and water sources.  There is also some concern 
that the use of chemicals may affect production over the long term 
by producing resistant strains of pests.  A very pertinent 
production concern in Carupera I is that no producer can be 
certified organic because of the infiltration of chemical agro-inputs 
into campesino land from large landholdings  (Elgert 2004). 
 
Most of the large holdings in the CARJ administer Matatodo (Round-Up is the 
commercial name in English North America), a non-selective herbicide – “meaning it 
kills anything green”, says the commercial website - to prepare the land for planting 
soy, and after planting to maintain ‘Round-Up Ready Soy’.  This is done by airplane, 
and thus, its application often extends beyond the borders of the property.  There have 
been cases where small producers with adjacent landholdings, have lost hectares of 
crops.  It is this heavy dependence of soy producers, and more importantly large 
producers, on pesticides, and the severe consequences that this can have on local 
communities, that led one small producer to declare that, “Soja es completamente contra al 
Campesino” (Soy is completely against the Campesino).  Thus, regardless of the 
potential benefits for soil quality, there are several reasons why no-till cultivation, with 
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its dependence on pesticides, might be a tough sell as a ‘sustainable’ practice in the 
CARJ.    
 
Similar to the way in which the social and political context of Paraguay puts into 
question the wisdom of enclosure-styled conservation, it also causes concern about the 
appropriateness of rural development that focuses on new crops and ‘sustainable 
agriculture’.  To open the door for environmental education, and to improve 
environmental outcomes of agriculture in the region surrounding the Mbaracayú Forest 
Reserve, sustainable crops and techniques are introduced.  The participation of small 
producers is a prerequisite for the success of these programs.  However, when the 
context to which these participatory interventions are applied is examined more closely, 
they seem to be woefully inadequate, and even inappropriate.  Rather than being 
designed with local people and reflecting local needs and priorities, rural development 
interventions such as the introduction of new crops and sustainable agricultural 
techniques, are instead standardized embodiments of global norms and understandings 
of sustainability.    
 
5.5 The shaping of things: Facts, norms and the co-production of 
conservation landscapes  
The conservation and sustainable agriculture interventions that have been 
implemented in the Mbaracayú are problematic because they have been co-produced 
with a narrow conception of sustainability and a limited understanding of what 
comprises knowledge relevant to environmental governance.  Descriptive simplicity 
and aggregation fulfil the requirements of the classification system used in the 
biosphere reserve model, drawing on familiar descriptions and categories, and 
sharpening the focus on the factual conservation landscape.  This focus makes the 
landscape ‘legible’: understandable, calculable, and predictable, particularly for 
outsiders.   
 
The disjuncture between the standardized, portable landscape classification and that 
which is more contextualized, is not a matter of a ‘lack of understanding’ or 
misinterpretation on the part of the NGO.  Indeed, many of the extension workers for 
the rural development program grew up and live in the rural villages where they work.  
Rather, it is a matter of the familiar landscape being such a powerful discourse, that 
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those characteristics that it underlines are simply seen as more ‘relevant’ than more 
nuanced views.  To improve policy approaches to conservation landscapes (and 
consequently, intervention landscapes) experts must make explicit how knowledge 
about these landscapes, and the way they are categorized, is shaped by socially 
influenced decisions such as: why and for whom is biodiversity important; which 
information is considered as evidence and which is superfluous; how important and 
significant are the challenges faced by local people to implement standardized policy 
recommendations? 
 
5.5.1 Limiting participation: Facts shaping norms 
The promotion of participation has been a part of the FMB’s programmatic priority.  
This is in part due to the demands of funders but also the viability of the FMB to work 
in the area with at least some degree of local consent23.  However, despite the emphasis 
on local participation in sustainable development, the parameters of any potential 
participation are already set by the conservation landscape imposed on the Mbaracayú.  
This is because participation and evidence are seen to contribute to the normative and 
factual basis of policy respectively.  Thus, participation is often regarded as 
supplementary to evidence in policy making.  Consequently, while conservation-with-
development approaches emphasize evidence and participation, participation is 
encouraged only within the confines set by the evidence about protected areas and 
sustainable agriculture, only after decisions have been made regarding protection.  Key 
interventions are not subject to inclusive debate, shutting down deliberation.  
Moreover, by delineating unsustainable agricultural practices as firstly, a significant part 
of the environmental problematic, and secondly as widespread due to lack of 
environmental understanding, appropriate and effective interventions are further 
determined.  Thus, more deliberative ideals about how and why participation is an 
important policy input are overlooked, or more actively rejected.      
 
There are two main problems with the idea of environmental knowledge shaping – or 
limiting – the normative arguments put forth in debate.  The first is that environmental 
knowledge is often not sufficiently interrogated empirically.  For example, biodiversity 
                                               
23 Indeed, authors remind us that while local ‘buy in’ for conservation projects may facilitate easier park 
protection, there are plenty of examples of highly successful park protection where local cooperation is 
not forthcoming Brockington, D. (2004). "Community Conservation, Inequality and Injustice: Myths of 
Power in Protected Area Management." Conservation & Society 2(2): 411-431.. 
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as a basis for conservation is often based on a handful of charismatic species that may 
have little importance to local livelihoods.  Furthermore, land-use changes (including 
deforestation) do not so much eliminate environmental services, as redistribute them.  
These examples bring us to the second (related) point:  that facts, too, bear normative 
influences, and cannot be considered apart from the context, assumptions and 
perspectives that gave rise to them.  Each of these problems indicates, and responds 
to, the need for better accounting for the shaping of facts.  
5.5.2 Better accounting for the shaping of facts 
Assessments of the Mbaracayú as an international ‘hotspot’ for biodiversity, is taken as 
evidence of the need for conservation with development interventions.  However, this 
chapter has illustrated how the process of establishing the Mbaracayú has been much 
more complex than a response to the need to protect biodiversity: catalyzed by the loss 
of Ache hunting grounds; enabled by high powered diplomatic networks and the need 
of the World Bank to counteract its ‘anti-environment’ reputation; funded by an 
offsets agreement with a large American corporation.  But these details are reserved for 
the historical narrative of how (as opposed to why) the reserve came into being, and 
figure little into explanations about why conservation persists today.  Likewise, 
sustainable development is viewed in conjunction with conservation, largely because of 
its supposed contributions to conservation. 
 
The need for conservation and development today is explained by how these 
approaches can preserve the biological diversity found in the Interior Atlantic Forest.  
However, other ‘facts’ are not considered in decision-making about the 
appropriateness of conservation – particularly that which is undertaken through 
purchase and ownership.  Examples of these unconsidered facts, that are also integral 
to the Paraguayan landscape, are the extremely unequal distribution of land and the 
problem of landlessness.  However, these highly contextual facts are overridden by a 
more standardized, global understanding of the role of conservation and sustainable 
development in addressing the global biodiversity crisis, with which the creation of the 
Mbaracayú is aligned.  This alignment has shaped the Mbaracayú, and the people who 
live around it, in a way that makes classical conservation and development 
interventions seem appropriate and effective.   
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For example, techniques of farm management vary wildly among campesinos, and so-
called ‘sustainable agricultural techniques’ are indeed used by many.  Crop rotation, 
crop association and lengthy fallow periods are widely implemented.  Composting and 
fertilizers are used by some, and some farmers even practice agro-forestry on their 
land.  Furthermore, practices are not stable and static over time.  Farmers experiment 
with different techniques, disseminate techniques among neighbours and learn new 
ways from the FMB.  Yet, campesinos are homogenized in their use of ‘unsustainable 
practices’.  Administering technical assistance has been driven by agrarian expertise 
regarding, for the most part, environmental impacts of agricultural techniques.  An 
example of such techniques is no-till cultivation, which is shown in various 
environments to have beneficial effects on soil quality, eliminating the need for shifting 
cultivation.  However, a shift to no-till cultivation entails more than meets the eye, 
including culture change and financial commitment.  Even these conditions 
withstanding, the pesticide dependence that comes with much of no-till cultivation 
confounds further, the possibility of promoting its use by campesinos.  
 
Introducing alternatives to conventional crops, such as cotton, initially seems like a 
practical strategy for improving livelihoods and reducing environmental impact.  But 
this type of intervention too, turns out to be problematic in light of a more nuanced 
understanding of context.  For example, the disadvantages of growing cotton as a cash 
crop are severe.  Conventional cultivation requires expensive pesticides, whose use is 
damaging to health and water supplies.  Slumping market prices along with an 
opportunistic system of intermediaries have dramatically suppressed the profits of 
cotton production. The logical, even intuitive response, based on this evidence is to 
promote the cultivation of crops with higher market values and perhaps organic 
alternatives to cotton, among producers.  Growing these alternatives, producers could 
earn higher incomes and reduce their dependence on expensive and health-threatening 
pesticides – policy making made easy!   
 
However, if we also consider the local significance of the physical, financial and 
cultural infrastructure built around cotton, combined with guaranteed markets and 
technical experience, it becomes easier to understand why alternative crops may bear 
more risks than benefits, and why policies to promote crop substitution may not be 
effective.  Furthermore, the risks involved with new techniques and crop alternatives 
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are significant from a local perspective, and may even dwarf the risks of not adopting 
these strategies in scope, severity and immediacy.  This has little to do with some 
inherent or universal perception of risk which often leads to a view of non-conforming 
campesinos as traditional, change-averse and backwards.  Rather, the risk is contextual, 
dependent upon factors such as local capacities to invest and adapt, and institutional 
factors that enable campesinos to access markets from remote locations.   
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how conservation landscapes provide a fruitful context to 
examine the (anti) politics of using evidence and participation as the basis for 
sustainable development policy.  The standardized vision of the conservation landscape 
has positioned sustainable development as achievable through a familiar set of 
interventions.  Conservation interventions aim to protect biodiversity and 
environmental services.  Sustainable agriculture is promoted as a means of supporting, 
and initiating public participation in conservation.  Improving livelihoods, it is reasoned, 
takes pressure off of protected areas and improves environmental outcomes in 
surrounding areas.  Conventional understanding of such landscapes makes these policy 
implications clear and logical.  But as we descend on this vision, and interrogate it 
further, it becomes apparent that the familiar set of interventions is neither appropriate, 
nor best positioned for effectiveness.  The evidence-based rationale for conservation 
with development is confounded by a deeper analysis of the context upon which it has 
been imposed.   
 
The conventional role of participation in policy debates, as the normative contribution 
that is shaped by environmental facts, is based on an understanding of conservation 
landscapes as objective, uncontested spaces where universal environmental values are 
enacted.  But an understanding of conservation landscapes as imbued with social and 
political influence, rather than as objectively defined biodiversity ‘hotspots’, at risk from 
unsustainable practices, provides a theoretical basis for deliberation in decision-making.  
Further, within such an epistemological framework, participation would not seem 
incompatible with, or supplementary to, an evidence-based approach, but 
complimentary.   
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Chapter 6 
Hard facts and software:  The politics of computer-based land-use 
planning in the Cuenca Alta del Rio Jejui 
 
In Chapter 5, we looked at the invocation of evidence and participation in the 
governance of conservation landscapes, particularly where land classifications are used as 
supposedly neutral frames for organizing evidence and participation.  I argued that 
overestimating the power of evidence as the factual basis for environmental decision-
making is problematic because:  
 
• often how and what evidence is used is more of a normative decision than meets 
the eye; and, 
• using evidence often closes down or severely limits participation in policy debate, 
thus pre-emptively delineating its normative commitments.   
 
I argued this using two main points.  The first was that the evidence for establishing land 
classifications that restrict access is partial and selective, based on such things as 
biodiversity inventories without consideration for the wider socio-political environment.  
Accounting for a history of inequality and foreign ownership may indeed make the 
appropriateness of a protected areas approach doubtful.  The second point was that 
participation, widely touted as a vital component of conservation-with-development 
initiatives, is encouraged within the strict confines of evidence-based conservation.  The 
public is expected to buy into the need for sustainable agriculture, and provide the 
logistical and operational support, but is not given the discursive space to challenge the 
programmatic basis.  Meanwhile, the generalized notion of sustainable agriculture itself 
was shown to be problematic in the Mbaracayú.  Sustainable agricultural techniques 
require an investment of capital that small producers don’t have, and judgements about 
what qualifies as sustainable (i.e.: intensive pesticide use, for example) are highly varied.   
 
This chapter extends this argument with the case of another approach to environmental 
governance - the use of models to facilitate participatory land-use planning.  Using 
modelling exercises in participatory planning has been held up as an example of how 
environmental decision-making can be subject to both: 1) expertise about natural 
processes that lead to environmental degradation; and, 2) local perspectives on how 
 148 
planning processes can incorporate normative concerns about land-use and land-use 
outcomes.  Moreover, like land classifications, models also ‘travel’ as terms of reference. 
This chapter, however, shows that planners and policy makers should not be so quick to 
see models as  first providing the evidence for what then becomes normative decision-
making. This is because the evidence portrays not the objective assessment of land-uses 
and their outcomes, but a highly particular assessment, deeply influenced by social 
factors and political choices and limitations. Thus, while models are often taken as 
immutable fact, they are more rightly taken as contestable and contingent. This revised 
understanding does not invalidate the use of models in participatory planning.  But it 
does open up considerable space for stakeholders in deliberative contexts to question 
and challenge the evidence-based policy implications of modelling exercises.   
 
6.1 Introduction 
Computer modelling programs have been used in environmental planning for a number 
of years, and are favoured for what some understand as their ability to objectively 
incorporate multiple variables into land-use planning (Randolph 2004).  This, some 
claim, enables decision-making to overcome bias and more closely reflect the complexity 
of environmental problems than decision-making without models.  Furthermore, models 
are increasingly seen as a viable tool for more participatory forms of planning.  Models 
can incorporate public values by setting the stage for debates about planning goals and 
objectives, and stakeholders can use models as bases for debate around more normative 
aspects of land-use.  However, despite increasing recognition that the evidence presented 
in models is shaped by the priorities and preferences of those creating the model, 
simulations and predictions continue to be presented as a matter of fact.  As fact, the 
analyses of simulations and the policy recommendations that these analyses support, are 
effectively cut off from normative appraisal and human judgement. 
 
This chapter examines a model developed for use in participatory planning in the 
Mbaracayú, and argues that the simulations of future land-uses and respective outcomes 
are in fact, much less factual than is suggested by modellers.  The simulations provided 
evidence that campesinos’ failure to adopt ‘sustainable agricultural practices’ would 
mean ecological and social ruin.  Soils would become fruitless forcing producers into 
new frontiers with forested land and ultimately, land scarcity would cause deepening 
poverty, irreparable environmental degradation, conflict and upheaval.  Averting 
 149 
ecological and social disaster in the Mbaracayú Biosphere Reserve over the 50 years to 
come, would require the adoption of ‘sustainable agriculture’.  However, the modelling 
exercise has failed to fully inform a widely acceptable version of sustainable land-use 
planning for those living in the CARJ.   
 
I begin with a general discussion about the social influences evident within models.  
Recognition of these social influences promote an understanding of models as an 
interpretation, rather than a reflection of planning reality.  Next, I provide a detailed 
account of how the model in the case is used to develop simulations of outcomes of 
future land-use choices.  This process integrates participatory planning, in terms of 
defining objectives and establishing community-based indicators, with evidence such as 
causal links between unsustainable agriculture and loss of forest.  Analyzing the 
simulations led to clear and strong evidence-based policy implications: only sustainable 
agriculture can save the Mbaracayú region from destruction and destitution.  In the third 
section, I analyze the culmination of the collection of so-called hard facts (or, the model 
inputs) that contribute to the factual outcomes (the simulations) and ultimately, the 
evidence-based policy implications.  The discussion draws implications of this case for 
creating a more deliberative land-use planning context, by suggesting that evidence (in 
this case the model inputs and the simulations that predict future outcomes based on 
land-use choices) needs to be more critically engaged than is typically done.   
 
In sum, this chapter makes the following arguments in turn:  
 
• models are representations, not reflections, of real-life systems and 
circumstances;  
• participatory modelling approaches often falsely compartmentalize contributions 
to developing models: participation as contributing norms; and, evidence as 
contributing facts;  
• indicators and outcomes – commonly understood as factual inputs and outputs – 
emerge in conjunction with world view, social and political preference, 
convenience and technical necessity; and,  
• environmental values, judgements and preferences are not universal but emerge 
differently in relation to livelihood pattern, resource dependence, and social 
identity. 
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6.2 Social influence in factual models 
Models are conventionally understood as a means of ‘letting the data speak for itself’, by 
presenting relevant and integrated facts for environmental decision-making.  At the same 
time, there is increasing insistence that modelling become a participatory policy strategy, 
rather than one managed exclusively by experts and received by other stakeholders 
(Cinderby 1999; Craig, Harris et al. 2002; van der Sluijs 2002; Yearley, Cinderby et al. 
2003).  These calls often focus on how the public can become involved in decision-
making based on models, rather than on the modelling process itself, thereby separating 
the work of experts from the work of other participants.  In other words, they focus on 
how to add ‘culture’ to the ‘science’ and stir: “local systems of meaning, informed by 
culture, are posited to in contradistinction to those of state experts, informed by positivist 
science” (Robbins 2003:234, emphasis original).  This suggests that cultural, subjective 
decision-making revolves around a stable set of objective, universal facts.   
 
The commonplace delineation of culture from science in computer simulations and 
modelling leads analysts to a primary concern with how the findings of the computer 
analyses inform management options, rather than with aspects of the technology itself 
(Liu and Ashton 1999, for example).  For example, authors suggest that models can be 
useful in the role of the ‘eye opener’, to support arguments in the face of dissent, and in 
creating consensus among policy stakeholders (van Daalen, Dresen et al. 2002). Others 
address various technical aspects of the applications such as user friendliness, portability, 
appropriate spatial and temporal scales and affordably measurable input and output 
variables (Turner, Arthaud et al. 1995).  Parallel to arguments for public participation in 
more general decision-making, arguments for participation in modelling have several 
bases (Korfmacher 2001): that local knowledge makes a unique and valuable 
contribution to environmental management (substantive basis); that people are more 
likely to support decisions that they have been involved in making (pragmatic basis); and 
finally, that there is inherent value in public participation in decision-making that directly 
affects the public (democratic basis).  The latter is the focus of many proponents of 
participatory modelling; authors stress the potential of participation to address 
undemocratic ‘top down’ decision-making and planning and to increase the scope of 
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representation in the model outputs beyond “single agency solutions” (Cinderby 
1999:310).   
 
However, these calls for ‘participatory modelling’, have been largely insufficient to bring 
greater deliberative stamina to debates about environmental policy and planning.  
Furthermore, there is a growing recognition that modelling activities are not simply, nor 
best described as technical activities (that albeit need to be supplemented by social 
concerns), but that their very construction goes beyond the technical, fundamentally 
embodying social and political influences.  Indeed, the assumed objectivity and neutrality 
of modelling in land-use came under closer scrutiny in the mid-late 1990’s with 
publications such as the 1995 edited volume Ground Truth (Pickles 1995).  The works in 
this volume highlighted the role of social and political inquiry into the development and 
use of models for decision-making support, in particular GIS.   
 
Subsequent work examined the politics of computer simulations in relation to climate 
change modelling (Demeritt 2001), and the related technologies of remote sensing and 
satellite imagery (Litfin 1999) .  These authors argue that these ‘tools’ are hardly the 
neutral mechanisms for increasing knowledge and thus, making more informed 
decisions, that they are often said to be. Furthermore, the social and political influence in 
technical applications does not only appear ‘downstream’- the point at which science is 
applied to policy problems – but also ‘upstream’ – the point at which knowledge itself is 
created (Demeritt 2001).  Often the development of models is based on partial or 
simplistic assumptions, working from a ‘naïve sociology’ (Wynne 1989; Yearley 1999).  
For example, Peter Taylor (1992) analyzed the 1970’s MIT project to create a systems 
dynamics model of nomadic pastoralists, who had been exposed to a long drought.  He 
clearly illustrates that the assumptions on which the model was based, could have been 
configured completely differently in terms of how the historical data was used, how 
individuals were treated, and how potential external influences may have impacted on 
the system.  Had these assumptions been configured differently, it would have had 
important effects on the outputs and conclusions of the modelling exercise (see Table 
6.1).   
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Table 6.1:  Framing Assumptions from Taylor’s analysis of modelling sub-
Saharan African pastoralists: Actual and Alternative (Source: adapted from 
Yearley, 1999:247): 
 
Actual Alternative (could have been used as?) 
Historical data used as a long 
term supposedly stable values. 
Historical data could have been used as a 
means for understanding change. 
Individuals treated as uniform 
and aggregated. 
Individuals treated as stratified and 
differentiated. 
Group modelled as a static, self-
contained system 
Group modelled with the consideration of 
temporal and spatial variability; ‘external’ 
forces could become internalized. 
 
Discrete categories used in modelling (i.e.: land-use type, wildlife type, vegetation cover, 
etc.) are important examples of how different taxonomies and understanding of 
similarity and difference can affect modelling outcomes.  Naidoo and Hill, for example, 
call for the integration of ‘traditional ecological knowledge’ and remote sensing after 
finding a ‘knowledge gain’ from using traditional Ache categories for vegetation cover 
over scientific ones in the Mbaracayú Reserve (2006).  Robbins goes further in his 
inquiry of classification, putting the modelling process itself at the centre of inquiry in 
order to examine the ‘softness’ of ‘hard’ tools (2003).  He illustrates how landscape 
categories, primary inputs in land-use models, “are nothing more than a widely different 
set of reflectance clusters, aggregated based on the arbitrary decision-rule of the 
analyst… whether they are based on forestry typologies, ecological classifications, or 
hydrological units, (he might add ‘traditional classifications’ here) are inevitably partial 
mappings of the landscape” (Robbins 2003:249, parentheses mine).  It is not that one 
type of classification reflects knowledge that is better, worse, more scientific or more 
cultural than others.  Rather, it is that, “the process of resource use and conflict that 
gives rise to the systems of meaning each community deploys in the first place”  
(Robbins 2003:248).   
 
Likewise, Harvey and Chrisman (1998) illustrate how GIS is the outcome of negotiations 
between social groups through mediating ‘boundary objects’.  In their analysis, even once 
a definition of ‘wetlands’ is agreed upon, the accounts of 4 government agencies of 
which mapped area consists of ‘wetlands’ are in wild disagreement.  The authors cite a 
staggering 90% disagreement, and even a considerable extension in the areas delineated 
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by each agency results in high levels of disagreement.  This is explained by the different 
functions of each agency, invoking different “purposes, procedures, sources, definitions, 
and logic… each agency’s purpose delimits which methods are acceptable for fulfilling 
their mandate” (Harvey and Chrisman 1998:1689).  They explain: “The geographic 
boundaries of these different wetlands delineate administrative elements in the 
environment…  The boundary object ‘wetlands’ indicates the disciplinary and 
institutional boundaries of different groups” (Harvey and Chrisman 1998:1689).  It is 
concluded then, that “GIS technology and technoscience are not monolithic 
autonomous edifices but the localized results of processes of negotiation that involve the 
construction of artifacts to fit various social perspectives” (Harvey and Chrisman 
1998:1693). 
 
6.3 Modelling land-use outcomes in the Mbaracayú: Boundaries of evidence 
and participation  
Despite the work that has shown how social, disciplinary and personal preferences are 
often presented as matters of fact, modelling exercises continue to be used as under-
examined evidence in planning processes.  Moreover, models are often used to alter 
public values, by illustrating potentially ruinous outcomes of particular behaviours and 
attitudes.  An example of such a model is ALCES, a cumulative effects simulation 
program in the Mbaracayú.  This section describes the ALCES program, and looks at 
how modellers pay attention to the importance of both participation and evidence in 
developing land-use simulations for land-use planning.  However, participation and 
evidence for policy are clearly delineated – participation providing the normative basis 
for land-use planning and evidence providing the factual basis.   
 
In 2004, the FMB signed on to a three-year project in partnership with the Alberta 
Research Council24 called “Community Management of the Mbaracayú Reserve”.  The 
                                               
24 The sustainable land-use planning project was funded through the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA)’s Canada-Southern Cone Technology Transfer Fund (SCTTF).  The SCTTF was initiated 
in 1997 by CIDA, “to build linkages that could lead to sustained forms of mutual cooperation, including 
commercial, social, academic, and scientific cooperation”.  It is also emphasized that “CIDA’s overall 
objective in the Southern Cone countries is to contribute to the achievement of greater equity,” 
(http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca).  An endnote defines equity: “Equity is measured by comparing different 
groups within a society by their income levels, their level of access to services, their level of ownership of 
productive assets and of political and social participation and decision-making,”  (http://www.acdi-
cida.gc.ca, emphasis added).  Thus, technology transfer is not considered to be a strategy only for 
economic development, but is considered successful if it contributes to socio-political goals of equity and 
governance.  As discussed in Chapter 2, I was employed with this project from January, 2004 to April, 
2008. 
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project aimed to contribute to sustainable land-use planning in the CARJ by “enhancing 
the capacity” of local communities to sustainably manage the land-base surrounding the 
Mbaracayú Reserve.  The focus was on developing institutions for participatory decision-
making, and providing technical mechanisms to help guide this decision-making.  A key 
component of the project was the transfer of a software technology - A Landscape 
Cumulative Effects Simulator (ALCES) that would enable users to build models to 
simulate the environmental, social and economic outcomes of land-use options over 
given temporal trajectories.   
 
ALCES functions using evidence that has already been established through systematic 
research about relationships between land-use options and outcomes.  The outcomes 
that are examined are delineated by pre-selected indicators; measurable variables that 
reflect progress, or lack of progress, towards certain predefined goals.  Ideally, the 
number of indicators should be limited but those selected should completely and 
accurately represent the characteristics of the goals in the most parsimonious way 
possible.  To use an indicator with the simulator, there must be information available on 
how it is impacted by land-use.  If data does not exist on the relationships and 
trajectories of land-use vis-à-vis the indicator, then the indicator cannot be used within 
the cumulative effects simulator.  Once this relationship is determined, and entered into 
the computer program, how the indicators will respond to various land-use scenarios can 
be predicted.  Unlike GIS applications, ALCES is not spatially explicit.  This means that 
inputs and outputs are aggregated to the landscape level.  This is why outcomes are 
illustrated by graphs (see Figure 6.2) rather than on maps.  If the outputs were to be 
depicted on a map, the proportion of each outcome would be in accordance with the 
model projections, but the distribution of the outcomes (i.e.: what would happen, where) 
would be arbitrary and random.  
 
ALCES is designed to extend participation in land-use planning beyond the modellers, to 
a wide array of stakeholders including land-users and regional policy makers.  Advocates 
for the use of ALCES for facilitating participatory planning, claim that, “The active 
engagement of stakeholders in the modelling process and the transparency of the model, 
in which the key processes are all under the control of the user, promotes the 
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understanding and acceptance of the outcomes” (Schneider, Stelfox et al. 2003:no page - 
electronic resource).   
 
Indeed, according to the expert who prepared and presented the ALCES simulations to 
stakeholders in Paraguay, the first ‘Basic Step to Using ALCES’ is to ‘Identify ALCES 
Committees’25.  Thus, in May of 2006, the first meeting of Tangara, the Biosphere 
Reserve Committee for Paraguay’s Mbaracayú Biosphere Reserve convened.  Formed 
through a laborious process of community consultation, meetings with government 
officials and conversations with Paraguayan environmental organizations, the Biosphere 
Reserve Committee is considered to be a representative group that will ultimately 
participate in land-use planning and decision-making for the Mbaracayú Biosphere 
Reserve.  A pamphlet about the Biosphere Reserve Committee urges that: “The present 
and future of the Reserve depends on the participation of all” (Fundación Moises 
Bertoni and Alberta Research Council 2005). 
 
6.3.1 Establishing indicators and generating simulations 
Using both evidence and wider participation to establish indicators for use within the 
model is emphasized by the ALCES modeller, owing that they “should include variables 
that are meaningful to the local community and communicate both the ecological and 
socioeconomic implications of land-use” (Carlson 2006:6).  To begin establishing the 
suite of indicators, a search was carried out online and in the FMB library for studies 
undertaken in the Mbaracayú region, or surrounding areas where more research takes 
place, such as the department of San Pedro26.  The studies located provided economic, 
agricultural, land-use, land cover data and demographic data.  From this baseline of data 
availability, the modeller determined what indicators it would be possible to model 
(given certain data requirements for each indicator), based on what land-uses, and thus, 
what types of simulations could be generated (see Table 6.2). 
 
In order to enhance wider participation in the construction of the model, work was 
undertaken to establish ‘community-based indicators’ (See Box 6.1)27 – following other 
                                               
25 From a presentation given to ARC and FMB staff in Asuncion, Paraguay in 2005.    
26 The search for existing research reports that could supply data for indicators was in part my 
responsibility, in cooperation with the ALCES technician.  I conducted this work as a part of my 
employment with the ARC/CIDA project  (discussed in Chapter 2, and in Footnote 24).   
27 This work, discussed in Chapter 2 and in Box 6.1 was my responsibility, and undertaken as a part of 
my employment with the ARC/CIDA project.   
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projects involving the cumulative effects simulator (Parlee 1998).  Many researchers over 
the past decade have claimed that community-based indicators are vital to ensuring 
public, non-expert participation in the monitoring and assessment of project outcomes 
(Gasteyer and Butler, 2000; Nurick and Johnson, 1998).  Furthermore, compared to 
more conventional ecological indicators, authors claim that they are more likely to 
measure a wider array of social and political issues that are related to environmental 
management (Mitchell and Davis 2005).   
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Table 6.2.  Data required, sources of data and source details for selected 
ALCES indicators (Source: Author, based on information from Carlson, 2006) 
 
 
  
Indicator Data Required Source Study Source Details 
 
 
Net Agricultural 
Income – Soy 
Income – conventional 
and conservation 
agriculture 
W.J. Sorrenson. 
1997.  
Over 10 years - net income 
under conventional and 
conservation agriculture on 
135 Ha farms in San Pedro 
and Itapua 
Inputs 
Bickel, U., and 
J. M. Dros. 
2003.  
Litres/Hectare pesticide 
application 
Rate of expansion Dros, 2004 Projections of the government and soy industry 
 
 
Net Agricultural 
Income Small 
Producers 
Productivity 
Florentin, M.A., 
M. Peoalva, A. 
Calegari, and R. 
Derpsch. 2001. 
20 year crop productivity - 
small farmers in San Pedro 
Inputs and other costs Lange, D. 2005.  
Production cost and crop 
price – from 2-7 farms in 
San Pedro and Edelira in 
1998 and 2003, for each of 
corn, cotton and mandioca 
Includes pesticide inputs 
Rate of expansion UNDP, 2003 Based on population growth 
 
 
Natural Habitat 
Land cover of protected 
area FMB, 2003 
Based on GIS mapping and 
measurement 
Rate of Soy Expansion  Dros, 2004 Based on growth estimates – industry and government  
Rate of Smallholder 
expansion UNDP, 2003 
Based on population 
expansion 
Probability of 
conversion by landscape 
type 
Naidoo and 
Adamowicz, 
2006 
Based on historical patterns 
of expansion 
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Box 6.1.  Focus Groups and Community-based Indicators (Source: Author) 
 
Between August and October, 2005, I conducted 2 workshops in each of 8 CARJ 
communities in order to establish community-based indicators along with assistant 
facilitators.  Each focus group began with a presentation to introduce the concept of 
indicators, particularly, community-based ones, with a linkage made to the notion of well-
being. I explained to participants that I was seeking to establish community-based 
indicators so that local opinions, priorities and knowledge would be captured in 
monitoring and evaluating watershed changes. I asked the participants to think in a general 
sense about what well-being meant for them. Comments were captured on a large sheet at 
the front of the room, or on the floor, depending on where the workshop was being held. 
As concepts emerged, the facilitators used probes to extend and deepen the dialogue as to 
arrive at specific indicators.  
 
When participants were satisfied that all of their important points had been documented, I 
posted the list of indicators and each participant was given five “votes” and were asked to 
stick round coloured stickers next to five indicators considered priorities. The participants 
were encouraged to use more than one of their votes to emphasize any indicator they 
considered as very high priority. The number of votes for each indicator was tallied at each 
focus group to determine the priority ranking of that indicator.  
 
Focus groups as a data collection methodology is described in greater detail in Chapter 2.  
 
 
 
Many potential indicators were identified and discussed in the workshops, but the 
following tended to be thematic priorities: quality and quantity of and access to water; 
availability and access to forest products; quantity and variety of personal consumption; 
levels of agricultural production and agricultural income; and land distribution 
(distribution of land per person).  The focus groups generated many discussions about 
what sustainable development entails at the local level in the watershed, and how well-
being and sustainability might be measured by indicators (see Table 6.3). The thematic 
range of these discussions exhibits substantial breadth and depth, showcasing a number 
of overall themes and associated specific issues. These range from concerns about 
natural resources such as water and forest; to basic needs and services such as nutrition, 
health and education; to social concerns such as sense of community, language and 
religion; to economic concerns about production and income, technical assistance and 
infrastructure for goods and people. Finally, these concerns regarded concerns such as 
land availability and tenure. It was made clear in the focus groups, that indicating 
sustainability means addressing a variety of issues from a range of perspectives.  
 
This range of perspectives was not represented in the final suite of indicators chosen for 
inclusion in the simulations.  After the focus groups had been conducted and a list of 
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potential community-based indicators were established, each of the resulting indicators 
were discussed with the modeller to determine the feasibility of integrating them into 
cumulative effects scenarios. It was concluded that, “it was not possible to simulate the 
full suite of indicators identified at the workshop(s) …due to lack of information for 
many of the indicators” (Carlson 2006:6).  Ultimately, no new indicators were added to 
the original expert-led suite as a result of the focus groups, and some of the locally 
generated ideas about suitable indicators were abandoned.  
 
Table 6.3: Community-based Indicators from Focus Groups (Source: 
Author) 
 
Theme Indicator examples  Priority 
ranking 
Agricultural Production 
 
Cash crops  
subsistence crops  
1 
1 
Commercialization Quantity of products commercialized  
Sources of support for commercialization (those known and 
those accessible) 
1 
1 
Culture Level of use of Guarani  
Participation in religious events 
 
4 
4 
Education Levels of formal education  
Accessibility of education (cost/location)  
Literacy rates  
Opportunities to continue education beyond basic levels  
Opportunities for training/work  
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
Forest cover  forest products available for use  
satisfaction with availability of forest products  
1 
1 
Health Accessibility of medications through social or private 
pharmacies  
Accessibility of Health Centre  
2 
 
3 
Income Cash crops  
Employment income  
Distribution of income by household  
1 
2 
1 
Infrastructure 
 
Quantity and accessibility of means of transportation (for 
produce and people)  
2 
Property rights 
 
Incidence of land title 
Quantity of land owned by producer households  
Quantity of land-used per household  
4 
4 
1 
Technical  
assistance  
Number and type of workshops for men and women  3 
Water  
 
quantity of available water sources  
quality of available water sources 
existence/sufficiency of riparian zones  
accessibility/distance from water sources households  
1 
1 
2 
1 
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Thus, indicators for use with ALCES were determined “based on consideration of 
workshop outcomes, availability of data, and capacity of ALCES” (Carlson 2006:6).  The 
three indicators chosen for simulation with the ALCES software were: net agricultural 
income; net agricultural income for small producers; and remaining ‘natural’ area.  In the 
case of each of these indicators, some data was available through a previous study 
undertaken in the Mbaracayú, in neighbouring regions believed to be comparable, and 
more generally on global trends in the agricultural sector (see Table 6.2 for an illustration 
of these studies and data sources).  Furthermore, in each case, the indicator can be 
directly and quantifiably associated with distinct land-uses.   
 
The aim of using ALCES is to project the indicator outcomes relative to different land-
use trajectories, and based on this assess the sustainability of the trajectories.  Thus, 
indicator data must be available, or calculable, for different points along the trajectory.  
Data availability and the ability to directly and quantifiably relate these data to land-use 
scenarios determine the aptness of both potential indicators and possible trajectories or 
scenarios.  These requirements culminated in the assessment of three land-use 
trajectories: business as usual (current practices), increased conservation of natural 
habitat (where no human activity will be permitted, much like in the RNBM), and the 
implementation of practices that qualify as ‘sustainable agriculture’.   
 
Once the indicators were established and baseline data and data regarding their 
relationship with land-uses, the modeller generated the scenarios that illustrated land-
used patterns and outcomes in the CARJ over the next 50 years.  In 2006 a first draft of 
the report detailing the analysis was released, and in March of the same year scenarios 
were presented to stakeholders in the CARJ28.  The scenarios illustrated what would 
occur in relation to three different indicators, over the next 50 years, under three 
different land-use scenarios.   
 
To simulate indicator outcomes of land-use, certain assumptions are acknowledged and 
maintained throughout each scenario (Carlson 2006).  In these scenarios, “the 
assumptions used in the simulations were, as much as possible, based on empirical 
                                               
28 The scenarios that were presented were preliminary analyses, and this was made explicit at the outset.  
Further analysis was awaiting feedback and input from stakeholders, and identification of additional 
potential data sources.   
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findings from the region” (Carlson 2006:8).  All trajectories have the following 
assumptions in common:  
 
• Soybean expansion will occur at a rate of 6% per year.  This is based on 
international demand, and projections of the government and soy industry 
(Dros, 2004).  Furthermore, the amount of additional land occupied in this 
expansion will also be 6% because the majority of soy production involves 
sustainable agriculture (i.e.: maintains soil quality), and does not necessitate 
land abandonment.   
• In 2005, 60% of soy production in Paraguay was reported by Lange (2005) 
to have been produced using no-till.  However, in the CARJ, it is believed 
to be much higher, approaching 100% (personal communication).   
• Small scale agriculture expansion will occur at a rate of 1.5% per year -
based on population growth which was, in the area 1.5% annually between 
1990 and 2000 (UNDP, 2003).   
• Land cultivated by small producers will be abandoned after 26 years of 
unsustainable agricultural production that will render the land 
unproductive, and new land to replace it will be sought out (Lange 2005).   
• In 1998, Sorrenson et al. (1998) reported that .4% of Paraguay’s small 
producers employed no-till agriculture.  
 
With the indicators established, the relationships between these indicators and land-uses 
determined from previous studies, and the assumptions made explicit and confirmed to 
be ‘reasonable’ by stakeholders, the cumulative effects simulator was positioned to 
generate scenarios. The graphs (pictured) illustrate the scenario outcomes by indicator.  
Each of the three coloured lines represents a land-use trajectory:   
 
 162 
 Figure 6.2:  Indicator responses to three land use scenarios (Source: 
Carlson, 2006) 
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1. The first scenario (blue line) illustrates how three indicators respond to current 
practices.  Under current practices, land-used for shifting cultivation increases by 
1.5% which accounts for the population growth.  Soy production experiences a 
6% growth, reflecting the growth in the industry.  Expansion can only continue 
until a maximum of 78% of the Mbaracayú Biosphere land is dedicated to 
agriculture.  This is because 22% of the land is protected by either private 
reserves (including the Mbaracayú Forest Nature Reserve) or indigenous reserves 
is thus not available for agricultural expansion.   
 
2. The second scenario (green line) illustrates how the indicators would respond to 
a 4% increase in protected areas and reserved land in the CARJ.  The scenario is 
practically identical to the business as usual scenario except for that agriculture 
can only expand to cover a maximum of 74% of the land, as an additional 4% is 
protected as reserve.   
 
3. The blue and green lines show that there is little variance in the indicator 
response between the current practices and the increased protection scenarios.  
However, the real positive impact on the indicators is shown to result from the 
sustainable agriculture scenario (the red line), under which all producers are using 
sustainable techniques (namely no-till cultivation), soil quality is maintained, 
productivity increases, and agricultural expansion slows to reflect only increases 
in production.  No land needs to be cleared to replace degraded land as soil 
quality is maintained and the need for abandonment is eliminated.  Furthermore, 
productivity is not merely maintained, but increased under sustainable agriculture 
and thus incomes also rise.   
 
6.3.2 Implications of the simulations: Evidence-based policy recommendations 
Implementation of sustainable agricultural practices, according to interpretations of the 
ALCES simulations, plays a large role in averting social and ecological disaster (Carlson 
2006).  Under current practices, reads Carlson’s report, “the simulation predicts that in 
50 years the Cuenca will be a region of severe poverty and ecological degradation” 
(Carlson 2006:29).  However, it continues, “Fortunately, the scenario analysis indicates 
that economic and ecological ruin need not occur.  Sustainable agricultural practices, in 
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particular, have the potential to support the Mbaracayú program’s goal of supporting 
both biodiversity and the well-being of local inhabitants” (Carlson 2006:29).   
 
The practical implications of this analysis for the design of policy and interventions are 
clear.  Soy production, undertaken on large properties, using no-till cultivation, is 
considered sustainable because it has been shown to not compromise soil quality, and 
thus does not necessitate the abandonment of cultivated land and relocation of 
cultivation on newly deforested land.  Aside from the ‘inevitable’ six percent growth in 
land cover used for soy production, based on predictions about annual growth in the soy 
industry, soy production will not incur further deforestation.  According to the CES 
analysis, the practices of soy producers on large landholdings do not pose a threat to 
sustainability.  Rather, the simulations showed that ‘sustainable agriculture’ was typically 
practiced on large landholdings in the CARJ, and thus, large landholders were depicted 
as engaging in sustainable development!   
 
However, simulations also showed that small holders, as they abandon degraded land 
and clear new land for subsistence agriculture, would drive the area to ecological and 
economic ruin within 50 years.  This fate could be changed if producers, small 
producers in particular, recognized the risk of not undertaking changes in their 
practices, and engaged with sustainable agriculture. Based on these unsustainable 
practices, a focus on behaviour change in small producers is projected as required to 
maintain production levels, agricultural incomes, and ‘natural areas’.  Promoting 
sustainable practices is to advocate personal training, the production of technical 
manuals and disseminating radio messages about new crops and new and advanced 
practices (as we saw in Chapter 4).  Similarly, using the cumulative effects simulator 
programme, will show what kinds of land-use options will enable citizens to reach their 
environmental, social and economic goals.  These methods are aimed at increasing 
technical knowledge, improving available information and streamlining data.   
 
Overall, it is assumed that implementing these methods, environmental degradation 
and deforestation in particular, is more likely to be mitigated because: a) the simulator 
has shown people what they have to do; and, b) through technical assistance they have 
been shown how to do it.  If producers were aware of the detrimental environmental 
impact their practices were having (if they understood the error of their ways), and 
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were instructed in practices that would thwart these negative impacts, then they could 
and would change those practices.  Non-compliance with these strategies is attributed 
to a lack of the understanding and sophistication required to see the local, regional and 
global significance of the goal of reducing deforestation, and the vision to understand 
the impact of specific behaviours on the end goal.   
 
6.4 Modelling land-use outcomes: Blurring the lines between facts and norms   
The last section illustrated how ALCES is understood as both a product of, and a 
means of creating evidence.  Data was used to create the simulations, which then 
became evidence for basing policy choices.  The roles of the expert and the participants 
were clearly separated into the task of generating facts and the task of establishing an 
acceptable normative framework for decision-making.  The expert was to establish 
evidence by generating the simulations.  The public, was then invited to debate about 
land-use trade-offs and planning goals, in light of the evidence.  However, upon closer 
inspection, policy inputs cannot be neatly compartmentalized into norms on the one 
hand, and facts on the other.  First, debates about land-use trade offs and setting 
planning goals are not rooted in social facts regarding social, economic and political 
disparities between different groups of people.  Secondly, despite the assumed essence 
of the indicator outcomes as fact, choices, preferences and social factors profoundly 
involved in establishing and operationalizing the indicators used to illustrate meaningful 
outcomes of land-use for local people. 
 
6.4.1 Defining land-use trade-offs and planning goals: More than a normative perspective 
The idea that there can be universal norms surrounding trade offs of different land-use 
between different stakeholders overlooks how perspective on such matters is linked to 
socio-economic and political factors such as ethnic difference, inequality and different 
resource priorities.  Whether or not trade offs are beneficial, or even acceptable, 
depends very much on not only one’s physical position, but also social position.  Thus, 
attitudes and values about land-uses vis-à-vis socio-economic and ecological outcomes 
are not inherent, and do not emerge in absentia of facts.  Rather they are formed in 
relation to context that is perhaps not fixed, but does have material and political 
implications.   
 
 166 
The cumulative effects simulator is meant to explore the comparative advantages and 
disadvantages of potential land-use regimes.  But advantages and disadvantages are not 
universal; they depend on variables such as socio-economic position, livelihood pattern, 
access to resources and potential for opportunities.  As is characteristic for biosphere 
reserves, the Mbaracayú is home to diverse conditions making it vital to talk not solely 
about benefits and risks, but the distribution of these benefits and risks implied by 
different land-use scenarios.  As Carlson states in his planning principles, “Each land-
use generates advantages and each land-use generates disadvantages… The challenge is 
to balance the positive and negative effects of land-use options” (Carlson 2006).  The 
attempt to pin down some inherent and objective advantages and disadvantages of 
different land-uses lacks both utility and meaning in the context of the CARJ.  A 
‘balance’ of risks and benefits for one, does not likely represent a balance for others.  
Risks and the benefits of mitigating risks are viewed more appropriately as: differentially 
distributed within society; as generated by multiple sources in uneven ways; and as 
phenomena subjectively experienced by individuals and groups of individuals.  This 
nuanced and contextualized way of viewing so-called advantages and disadvantages will 
inevitably entail a richer analysis that delves more deeply into desegregation and 
distribution.   
 
The assumption that risk is spread equally among individuals, is implicit in a non-
spatially explicit ‘cumulative effects simulator’, which looks at net regional risks and 
benefits, and has very limited capacity to disaggregate these benefits.  However, the 
ability to exploit resources through the implementation of land-use options requires 
resources such as access to land and investment capital.  Access to these resources is 
clearly highly disparate in the biosphere reserve, and thus the benefits from land-use, 
generally, are realized differentially by different groups of people.   
 
There is plenty of disagreement about the advantages and disadvantages of various 
land-uses in the CARJ.  Padwe (2001) writes about an instance, that I also became 
familiar with during my fieldwork, that exemplifies this disagreement, and the ensuing 
conflict.  The conflict arose between different perspectives on desirable land-use 
patterns. 
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1. The FMB, whose main concern is deforestation and biodiversity conservation 
inside the reserve, who promotes forest conservation outside of the reserve, and 
who is generally in favour or excluding people from use of the reserve.  
2. The campesino community of Maria Auxiliadora – colonists who had come to 
the area roughly 10 years before; the migration facilitated by the IBR.  The 
campesinos wanted to improve their living standard by selling timber and 
expanding their agricultural base. 
3. The Indigenous Ache, who wanted to assure their continued access to sufficient 
forest for hunting and foraging, but were inhibited by both violent clashes with 
the residents of Maria Auxiliadora, and the FMB’s restrictions on entering the 
RNBM.   
 
Between 1997 and 1998, acute conflict was settled through a land deal, assisted by the 
FMB.  The  land was purchased from the landowners of Maria Auxiliadora, and the 
campesinos were relocated to new land that to many, was more desirable based on its 
proximity to roads and public services. Title to the land was granted the Ache (Palacios, 
personal communication).  For the time being, the land-use goals of all parties were 
been met.  But land-use preferences are not necessarily static, and may change over time 
with the presentation of changing social and economic circumstances and opportunities.  
For example, questions have been raised about what will happen to the relationship 
between the FMB and the Ache, should the Ache decide :  
 
Although the Ache currently state that their goal of hunting motivates 
them to maintain forest on the properties, they are subject to many of the 
same social and economic constraints which faced the colonists.  In the 
future Ache goals may change, they may desire more agricultural lands or 
money from timber sales, and deforestation may be the result (Padwe 
2001:138) 
 
Further, new demands on land-use may be introduced – this is exactly what happened 
in the example above.  Ten years after the Maria Auxiliadora land sale was struck, 
during my stay in the Mbaracayú , a new dimension in this conflict came to the fore: a 
prospective landowner produced a title from decades before, showing himself to be the 
owner of the property.  This challenge was overturned, but even though the attempt at 
expropriation was not successful this time around, it highlights ongoing pressures of 
emergent land claims (Palacios and others, personal communication).  
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Because of these wildly divergent perspectives on what kinds of advantages and 
disadvantages are generated by land-uses, establishing common goals for land-use 
planning is problematic.  Indeed, establishing goals is part of many planning processes, 
and is supposed to direct, limit and provide a structure for debate and ultimately, 
decisions made during the planning process.  Many planners would argue that setting 
goals is vital to the planning process, however, goal setting can be an ambiguous 
process, that often reaches agreement between disparate stakeholders by generating 
uncontroversial and vague goals that are abstracted to a degree at which they are no 
longer useful for making meaningful decisions.  For example,  the modeller suggested 
that the goals of land-use planning should “satisfy human needs while protecting 
resources for the future” (Carlson 2006).  Based on this vague criteria, he proposed the 
following as goals (Carlson 2006):  
 
1. Maintain the rich biodiversity of the RNBM 
2. Sustainable use  of the natural resources in the CARJ 
3. Improve the well-being of the local residents of the CARJ   
 
The exercise of setting goals becomes problematic for several reasons.  Firstly, goals are 
generally formed in a conceptually broad environment that is all too often deficient of 
meaning, elaboration of interpretation and recognition of diverse perspectives.  Goals 
are articulated in a language that makes them uncontroversial and difficult to debate.  
The goals above are not likely to be challenged as, broadly speaking, they represent the 
interests of all stakeholders.  For example, ‘improving the well-being of communities’, 
and ‘promoting the sustainable use of natural resources’ are not likely to be challenged 
by many people as worthy goals.   
 
However, when these statements are unpacked, it becomes apparent that the meanings 
they hold, and what decisions they entail, even how they will be measured, will not be 
the same for everyone. Yet these kinds of overarching goals have become idioms that 
can embody many manifestations, but are often assumed to be understood in the same 
ways by all stakeholders.  For example, the importance of maintaining rich biodiversity 
seems a benign statement, but which biodiversity is most important – medicinal plants, 
animals important for hunting such as the common tapir, or charismatic species more 
relevant to tourism such as the jaguar?  Why biodiversity is important will affect the 
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answer to this question – is it ‘ecosystem health’ (and who decides when an ecosystem is 
healthy?), potential for bioprospecting, or sustainable livelihoods?   
 
Sustainable use of natural resources is obviously important, but as was previously 
discussed, what constitutes ‘sustainable use’, and do these definitions limit the ability of 
poor farmers, with limited access to credit or labour, to act in ways that are sanctioned 
as sustainable?  How sustainable can natural resource use be considered, when one 
percent of the population controls eighty percent of the natural resources?  What 
aspects of well-being are considered vital or even important for local residents?  If rural 
employment increases, but is accompanied by an increase in pesticide related illness, is 
this acceptable or desirable?  How are unintended consequences accounted for?  
Furthermore, when trade-offs need to be made, which of these goals take precedence 
over the others, and who makes this decision?   
 
Furthermore, it is not only goals, but the priority of goals that needs to be analyzed in 
the planning process – however, this is often not taken into account, and goals are 
glazed over as equally important in order to satisfy all stakeholders.  If one goal is 
achieved, but another is not, how acceptable have the outcomes of land-use planning 
been?  This, I suggest largely depends on where you sit at the negotiation tables.  For 
example, if both NGOs and rural producers are involved in land-use planning, much 
different responses will be observed if biodiversity is seen to be maintained but small 
landholdings are perceived as insufficient (and vice versa).  A participant in one ALCES 
workshops wanted to address this issue by setting minimum criteria for achieving goals 
before their interpretation is opened up for debate:  “Some actions are simply not 
acceptable, and we must identify what those are before opening the conversation to 
more stakeholders” (participant in ALCES discussions, 2006).   
 
Ultimately, establishing this brand of ‘goal’ can justify a variety of outcomes that may 
not be desirable or even acceptable to large stakeholder groups.  In addition to the 
interpretation, the prioritization and operationalization of measures to reach goals 
further problematizes the processes involved with goal setting.  Perhaps, in order to be 
less ambiguous and problematic in planning, we need to abandon the expectation, or at 
least question the feasibility of the necessity between disparate stakeholders for 
agreement and consensus.   
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6.4.2 Indicators: evidence of how land-use change is experienced? 
Indicators provide evidence of the outcomes of land-use.  But to what extent are these 
outcomes unequivocal?  This section examines the indicators in more detail and finds 
that they do not provide an unbiased, unavoidable social and ecological trajectory for 
the Mbaracayú.  Rather, they provide one perspective that is deeply influenced by a 
variety of caveats, including the choices and preferences of the modeller and 
requirements of the model.  Selection of the indicators:   
 
1. favoured indicators with a short term, quantifiable relationship with land-use 
2. favoured particular reasons over others, about what indicator dimensions are 
most significant, which may affect the way in which the indicator is measured, 
and ultimate policy implications of taking a particular view on an indicator. 
3. was characterized by data requirements that were more complex than 
recognized 
4. favoured indicators for which there is data, potentially overlooking the politics 
of missing data 
5. favoured specific elements of diverse livelihoods over others 
 
First, selection of the indicators favoured those with a short term, quantifiable 
relationship with land-use.  Indicators are vital elements in models; they signal the 
changes in ouputs (such as income or forest cover) that correspond with changes in 
inputs (such as land-use practices and effective protection policies).  The signal is both 
in vector (direction of change, be it positive or negative; desirable or undesirable) and 
strength (the degree to which the change is effected).  Because of this assumedly 
‘predictive’ capacity, indicators have certain requirements that must be fulfilled.  The 
indicator must have a causal, quantifiable and incremental relationship with the 
outcome. 
 
Understandings and available evidence about causal relationships become problematic 
in conjunction with complex systems and socio-political processes.  For example, while 
the ‘well-being of local communities’ is an important goal of the land-use plan, the 
ability of ‘measurable indicators that closely reflect land-use changes’, to monitor 
progress towards this goal, are unlikely to be sufficient.  There are two reasons for this.  
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The first is the long term, complex and non-incremental, or non-fixed incremental 
connection between land-use and many aspects of wellbeing.  For example, concerns 
around health and education are important to local people, but indicators related to 
health and education are inappropriate for integration into the model because of the 
unclear links between these indicators and land-use options and changes.  Thus often, 
important local issues are disregarded either because of unavailable data, or more 
importantly, because the corresponding indicators are considered inappropriate as 
indicators of land-use (lacking a direct link with land-use).  Various participants in the 
ALCES workshops echoed this concern:  
 
The indicators presented for ALCES differ in good measure from those 
that were identified by the FMB staff in (indicator development) 
workshops; on this point I am very sorry that during the ALCES 
presentations the priority was to show the program and convince us of 
the importance and capacity of it, and not to work on key aspects such 
as developing appropriate indicators – those presented were identified 
and presented as the necessary ones (Comment made by FMB Manager 
at an ALCES workshop in Asuncion).   
 
Data availability is not the only factor affecting the suitability of an indicator for use in 
modelling.  In addition, the relationship between an indicator and any given land-use 
scenario must be both direct and quantifiable with different points in time in order to 
consider the indicator within the cumulative effects model. Both the causal link in the 
relationship between and indicator and land-use, and the precise strength of the 
relationship, need to have quantitative correlates to be used in the model. This 
effectively eliminates those variables and issues that may be highly relevant to land-use 
outcomes, but that are not easily quantifiable or exhibit a less clear or direct relationship 
with land-use. It also leaves out variables that cannot be linked to land-use outcomes via 
an inherently causal relationship. For example, education is likely to have dramatic 
impacts on land-use through many intermediate processes, such as literacy and 
alternative employment opportunities – but this relationship is likely better described as 
a correlation, or is not easily quantified (x number of years of education will result in 
reduced deforestation in the order of y number of hectares).   
 
It is certainly true that land-use change and thus indicator outcomes are long term 
concerns, potentially spanning many decades. Complicating the potential for social 
indicators even further is that relationships between an indicator such as education and 
land-use are likely to be understood over long periods of time; these indicators are not 
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likely to cause a response in land-use over the short term.  In sum, short term studies 
are not likely to find concrete links between many social indicators and land-use.  More 
relevant studies are likely to be expensive, long term and out of the reach of planners 
for the time being, and likely, well into the future.  Another concern for planners using 
models to engage the public, is that relationships that are demonstrable over a relatively 
short term are more likely to engage the public imagination and incite meaningful 
debate. However, shorter term projections that operate at the scale of participants’ 
foreseeable futures are likely to be more successful at engaging participants, by 
emphasizing the relevance of current patterns of land-use in a more concrete sense (e.g., 
distribution of land, land tenure, health, education and traditional livelihoods).  
 
Secondly, the indicators selected explicitly favoured particular dimensions of outcome 
over others.  This affects the way in which the indicator is measured, and ultimate 
policy implications of taking a particular view on an indicator.  For example, whether 
the expert is talking about natural area or local people are talking about forest resources, 
the object is the same, but the perspective changes, and this has implications for 
identifying the indicator. The existence and maintenance of water and forest are, in 
some respects, encapsulated by the expert-led indicator of “natural area”. The relevance 
of natural area to standing forest and the existence of forest products is apparent 
(though not all forests are equal in their production of all forest products, and, not all 
so-called ‘natural area’ is forest; it also includes savannah grasslands). The relationship 
between natural area and water quality and quantity, is also implied, assuming that the 
larger portion of land base accounted for by “natural habitat”, the more likelihood that 
riparian zones will exist, and be sufficiently large to protect water resources.  
 
In focus groups, local resource users recast these particular ecological issues as issues of 
access to resources.  Participants drew attention to an aspect of both forest cover and 
water not addressed directly by the expert-led indicators, but of tantamount importance 
to local people; namely, access and distribution of resources.  While the existence of 
clean water and forest products is relevant to resource availability, an issue of equal 
importance is accessibility. The degree to which resources are protected, or even the 
degree to which this protection contributes to maintaining high standards of quality, 
says little about who has access to, and control over those resources. Thus, the 
existence of forest cover, while an obvious prerequisite to access to forest, is an 
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incomplete measure of access to forest products. Several focus group participants 
commented that the indicator “forest area” needs to be accompanied by one which 
measures “forest area available for public use” in order to be an adequate measure of 
sustainable development. 
 
The different motivations behind establishing such indicators can have ramifications for 
how they become manifest in policy.  For example, expert-led indicators captured 
reduced forest cover and acute deforestation specifically because of the link with 
reduced biodiversity or carbon sequestration. On the other hand, community-based 
indicators captured the same but because deforestation can have negative implications 
for local people who use the forests for firewood, a source of food, and cash income. 
An overt emphasis on forest protection as a means of protecting biodiversity, without 
paying attention to local peoples’ dependence on forest resources and existing property 
rights, may cause hardship for local people such as displacement and restrictions on 
forest use. This calls attention to the importance of more inclusive ways of developing 
indicators.   
 
Thirdly, the data requirements for indicator calculations may be more complex and 
nuanced than meets the eye. Often, social, cultural and political context determines 
what kind of data is required for a particular indicator. For example, the expert-led 
indicator of agricultural income is measured with several data sources, accounting for 
productivity, production inputs and other costs, and the rate of small holder agricultural 
expansion. Intuitively, these data seem sufficient to arrive at a reasonable estimate of 
agricultural income for small producers. However, a perusal of the community-based 
indicators suggests many other contributing factors for small producers to profit from 
agricultural production. For example, commercialization support, means of 
transportation and improved infrastructure and technical assistance were emphasized in 
the focus groups as important factors relating to agricultural income (see Figure 6.3). 
Indeed, at existing levels of production, producers often encounter difficulties selling it, 
and heavily depend on intermediaries for commercialisation and transportation. If the 
price is low, however, producers may get stuck with crops and no buyer at all. 
Mountains of produce can be laid to waste before any buyer has made an appearance.  
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This example illustrates that contextual factors have a fundamental impact on how, and 
whether, farmers are able to market their production. This means that the otherwise 
reasonable assumption for agricultural income to be calculated with several core data 
sources renders the indicator inaccurate. Improved incomes in the watershed may 
depend somewhat on increased production. But, incomes would be much more 
responsive to other factors such as even marginal improvements in infrastructure. Thus, 
expert-led indicators may overlook mid points in development processes, and thus have 
significantly greater data requirements than meets the eye. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Smallholder income: Example of complex indicator data 
requirements (Source: Author) 
 
 
The fourth factor that confounds the idea of factual indicators is that indicators are 
limited by data availability, and missing data can be the result of concerted and 
deliberate decisions.  Obviously, a model has a high level of data dependence.  As 
Carlson emphasizes, “It is important to understand that predictions made by ALCES 
will only be as good as the information that is put into ALCES” (Carlson 2006).  
Without quantitative information about land-use patterns and relationships between 
land-use and ecological, social and economic indicators, the program cannot run.  
‘Avoidable Error’ and the quality of data have been posited as the fundamental issue in 
the successful implementation of ALCES.  Data availability was the most forthcoming 
limitation to using the community-based indicators in cumulative effects modelling. For 
this case study, data availability drove the design of the simulations. Once data sources 
were identified, the scenarios were constructed around them. This is not an uncommon 
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vacuum: net agricultural income 
(smallholder) 
 
Factors, impacted by social 
and political forces, affecting 
data requirements 
Commercialization support 
 
Means of transportation 
 
Infrastructure 
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problem, particularly in developing countries where there is little national funding for 
research activities. 
 
While not wanting to exaggerate the importance of insufficient or incorrect data for my 
argument, it is important to recognize how much of a shortcoming this can potentially 
be for using database-oriented tools for land-use planning, such as ALCES, in Paraguay.  
Data availability is neither a politically neutral phenomenon nor does it have politically 
neutral consequences.  It is important to look not only at the ‘missing-data’ issue, but 
also to examine and reflect on which data are missing, why this might be (aside from the 
obvious ‘lack of research and funding for research’) and how this might reorient the 
focus from certain activities to others.  This reorientation of focus may be a product of 
false assumptions, created by the elimination of a necessary part of the picture.   
 
For example, lack of data, research gaps, and lack of resources to conduct research are 
often (rightly) pointed out as serious obstacles to ‘feeding’ simulation models.  
However, the case may be that data is unavailable for more covert reasons, such as 
illegal activity.  For example, illegal logging has an observable impact on the landscape 
in the Mbaracayú Biopshere Reserve.  One only has to be present to see trees and 
processed wood streaming out of the region on the truck beds, in oxcarts and the backs 
of men.  However, because specific information and particularly official or peer 
reviewed studies, on the impact of logging, is not likely to be offered or asked for, this 
aspect of land-use is omitted from the cumulative effects analysis.  Meanwhile, the 
ecological burden of this activity is attributed to factors that are recognized by the 
cumulative effects simulator:  one of these being the unsustainable agricultural 
techniques used by small holders.  Thus, the excluded data is likely to compensate for 
‘missing explanation’ by exaggerating others.   
 
Most social indicators lack agreed-upon thresholds and quantifiable cause-effect trends 
backed by research. It is more likely for data to be available for expert-led indicators as 
the issues are more standardized and predictable, due to existing research on their 
potential causal effects relationships. Integrating expert-led with community-based 
indicators may be desirable, but research and data, particularly for contextually specific 
community-based indicators, are not likely to exist short of designing and implementing 
expensive surveys for the region in question.  
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Fifth and finally, indicators selected can favour certain elements of diverse livelihoods 
over others.  For example, the expert-led indicator “agricultural income” resonated 
deeply with focus group participants. With few opportunities to engage in wage labour, 
selling cash crops continues to be the most economically and culturally significant and 
stable way to earn income. The design of the ALCES indicator was well executed in that 
it captured differences between the high earners and the low earners in the watershed. 
This was done by splitting the agricultural income indicator into two: income from soy 
production, carried out exclusively on large properties in the Mbaracayú region, and 
income on small properties or parcels. To a large extent this helps to capture the most 
significant income distribution issue in the watershed: the differential in earnings 
between large and small land holders. This also reflects the difference in political 
leverage vis-à-vis a small but highly influential number of large landowners over the 
majority of poor small-scale producers. 
 
However, while an important part of a complex web that comprises overall livelihood 
strategies, selling cash crops is not the only concern, nor is it particularly the most 
important for local livelihoods. Focus group participants emphasized other facets of the 
rural livelihoods in the watershed, attaching major importance to levels of subsistence 
crop production for the status of nutrition and overall well-being. Opportunities for 
employment income, though indeed less emphasized than agricultural income, were 
nonetheless considered a vital part of livelihood strategies. This links directly to land-use 
in the watershed due to the largely mechanized nature of large scale soy production. 
 
6.5 Participatory planning or evidence-based participation? Challenging the 
expert as privileged participant 
Despite aspirations that modeling can become a tool for participatory land-use 
planning, the analysis of ALCES illustrates how all participants are not equal.  The 
modeler is privileged among participants because of his access to, and delivery of, the 
important and relevant facts, not because of some special understanding of the planning 
context or because he represents a broad range of interests in the planning process.  
However, the previous section offered various accounts of how the simulations 
developed within models, despite being presented as both incorporating and generating 
evidence, were based on data selected out of social and political preference, at times 
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convenience and even necessity – rather than scientific prowess.  Despite this the expert 
driven ALCES simulations are presented as the definitive evidence, that only the choice 
of smallholders to switch to sustainable practices could save the Mbaracayú from ruin; 
hardly an example of deliberative policy making.  
 
The deliberative critique of participation, examined in Chapter 3, provides a response.  
Emphasizing normative positions as potentially legitimate and credible bases for policy 
is important.  However, an emphasis on deliberation is not enough – the authority, 
credibility, and policy relevance of evidence has been shown to dwarf the importance 
for deliberation.  We must also engage with the evidence produced by the modelling 
exercise, to show that the land-use outcomes, presented as fact in the model, are also 
shaped by particular preferences, assumptions and norms that may not even be 
recognized by the modeller.   
 
6.5.1 Expert participant 
Despite the participatory aims of ALCES modellers, there is little room around the fact 
that the expert technician has a privileged understanding of the way data is used in the 
model.  Because of this, the modeller plays the primary role in all stages: from the initial 
literature review, data selection and, the orchestration of scenarios, and thus, what 
implications those scenarios will likely have for policy and practice.  In a case study of 
an experience of land-use planning with ALCES, taken from Alberta, Canada, where the 
software was developed, Schneider et al suggest that: 
 
In practice, we expect that the greatest utility of our modelling approach 
will be in facilitating land-use planning among groups of stakeholders.  
The primary benefit of the model is that it provides a level playing field 
of stakeholders to assess the costs and benefits associated with 
alternative management options… Because stakeholders must make 
explicit their assumptions and objectives and work together to define 
scenarios and assess their output, the model also facilitates 
communication.  (Schneider, Stelfox et al. 2003:no page - electronic 
resource).   
 
Carlson adds that,  
 
“ALCES provides a way to structure discussions among community 
members during land-use planning.  If community members can agree 
that ALCES is a useful way to evaluate land-use, ALCES provides a 
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transparent way for the community to come together and evaluate 
challenging land-use issues” (Carlson 2006).   
 
However, in practice, the process was remote from this participatory ideal.  One 
participant in the ALCES workshops in Asuncion seemed to echo the feeling of others 
when he suggested that, “If the idea was to discuss this (the potential of using ALCES 
in land-use planning in the CARJ), I am sorry that the attempt did not work, and at least 
personally, I feel that the idea was to show us, rather than work with us” (comment 
made by workshop participant).   
 
A potential outcome of the intensive and extensive involvement of the technician is that 
the apparent technical complexity in generating scenarios, combined with the seeming 
utility of the results may facilitate further intimacy between experts and policy 
formation, while aggravating and deepening the divide between policy formation and 
the public.  Part of this is because once the data are entered into ALCES, they become 
laws (or at least, ‘rules of thumb’), about the relationship between land-uses and 
indicator outcomes, and the science behind the data ‘disappears’.  Datasets are moulded 
into overarching facts that take on a life of their own once separated from the presenter 
and promoter, rather than scenarios that are based on the selective analysis of selective 
data.  The reasons for the selectivity and selection processes become invisible.  
Ultimately, these data-cum-laws are cast in a distinctly neutral and objective light, rather 
than interpretations that emphasize and favour particular interests and priorities over 
others.   
 
Simultaneously, it is the technician’s relatively exclusive access to knowledge about the 
data sources and the way that ALCES uses them, on the one hand and interpretations 
of this knowledge on the other, which gives rise to asymmetrical power relations in the 
negotiations.  Indeed, this uneven knowledge of the simulation tool (differential abilities 
to create and interpret simulations) lead to a troubling asymmetry in the power 
positions of different negotiating ‘partners’ in planning negotiations? (Svedin 1998:302).  
As Yearley comments on Taylor’s 1992 analysis: “The potential role of the actors 
themselves as conscious agents of change is highly limited.  The … modellers through 
their special skills and techniques are supposedly able to provide insights into the 
system which the actors themselves are denied” (Yearley 1999:247).  Furthermore, the 
simplistic policy implications that emerged from the ALCES scenarios compound and 
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extend these power asymmetries through assigning blame to campesinos for 
unsustainable agricultural practices.  The simulations position behaviour changes as 
voluntary – producers choose to implement or choose to not implement sustainable 
practices.  To choose to implement sustainable practices is to salvage the Mbaracayú 
from a certain future of poverty and desolation.  To choose to the contrary is to write 
its end.  
 
6.5.2 Participatory modelling or model-based participation? 
Combining participatory with evidence-based approaches is often more about using the 
model to shape participation than using participation to shape the model.  The idea of 
ALCES, is to use the facts about the outcomes of land-uses to reorient public values, 
norms and attitudes towards sustainable practices.  By showing people future impacts of 
land-uses, the modellers encourage the adoption of the land-use practices or systems to 
which the indicators respond most favourably.  The rationale is that if people can see 
the future implications of current land-use, they will be more likely to tailor their 
behaviours in a way that produces desired outcomes.  Fallibility in the scenarios is 
attributed to flawed or incomplete data (‘The results generated by the simulator are only 
as good as the data entered into it’); and the decisions that people make about land-use 
(‘Cumulative effects simulators cannot tell the future, because we cannot foresee the 
decisions that the community will make’).  Therefore, to improve the reliability and 
validity of the scenarios, improved data quality, and improved influence of the models 
over the decisions people make are prescribed. 
 
But improving the evidence, and the influence that evidence has over peoples’ 
behaviour is not so straightforward.  Rather than being ‘fed’ with facts and ‘producing’  
facts, models have been shown to that models is imbued with values, priorities and 
perspectives that are linked to social identity.  Furthermore, in the case of experts, this 
social identity is most often hidden - passed for some kind of universal, objective view.  
This spells the end of any potential for deliberation, because the model is taken for 
uncontestable truth.  This key problem is highlighted with regards to integrated 
assessment models (IAMs)29:  
                                               
29 IAM is a ‘container concept’ to refer to different computer programs (such as ALCES) developed to 
support IA.  IAMs are “computer models in which knowledge from many different disciplines is 
combined to assess the problem at hand in an integrated fashion.  IAMs are being used for several 
purposes, such as scenario analysis, (ex-ante) evaluation of the environmental, economic, and social 
consequences of different policy strategies…” (p. 323) Van der Sluijs, J. P. (2001). Integrated Assessment 
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Subjective choice and value-laden assumptions often remain implicit as 
they are hidden in computer code, in scientific documentation of the 
model, or in the minds of the modelers.  Often, the modelers themselves 
are not aware of the value-laden character of the assumptions made.  The 
value laden assumptions in IAMs remain largely invisible.  In a 
participatory setting this is undesirable, because stakeholders involved in 
the… debate need not necessarily share the values and subjective choices 
that underlie an IAM” (Van der Sluijs 2001:318).   
 
 
Thus, it is not simply that more knowledge is needed to get ALCES right – it is that the 
fundamental notion of what it means to ‘get it right’ is itself a matter of debate.  As put 
by Wynne different social facts influence environmental values differently:  
 
It is not, therefore, that scientific knowledge merely omits social 
dimensions that ordinary people incorporate in their evaluations and 
assessments.  It is that scientific knowledge tacitly imports and imposes 
particular and problematic versions of social relationships and identities.  
This seems a major factor in the sometimes negative public response to 
technical pronouncements, especially ones which, in their lack of 
institutional self-awareness or reflexivity, impose these social 
prescriptions without negotiation (Wynne 1996a:20-21).   
 
Yet, these discussions at a landscape level do not emphasize how advantages and 
disadvantages are disaggregated and the focus of analyses is impacted by the data 
dependencies inherent in such computer programs.  These points are of crucial 
importance, particularly in a society characterized by dramatically grave inequality, as is 
Paraguay.   
 
However, this chapter has shown this – each experienced differently by different people 
dependent on their social, political and economic locations.  Whereas the environment 
and development strategies are focused on primarily addressing one of these risks 
(deforestation) there are other risks that, for diverse stakeholders, loom largely in the 
foreground.  Thus, we see that the deliberate definition of deforestation as the supreme 
issue, is a political act, rather than reflecting some consistent, objective ‘state of things’.   
Sustainable development has been shown to be, only to a limited extent, defined by 
predicted, mechanical, ecological responses to certain behaviours.  In sum, “everyone 
assumes that agriculture must be sustainable.  But we differ in the interpretations of 
                                                                                                                                    
Modeling and the Participatory Challenge: The Case of Climate Change. Knowledge, Power, and 
Participation in Environmental Policy Analysis. M. Hisschemöller, R. Hoppe, W. N. Dunn and J. R. 
Ravetz. New Brunswick and London, Transaction Publishers: 317-347. 
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conditions and assumptions under which this can be made to occur” (Francis and 
Hildebrand, 1989:8, from Pretty, 1995:1248). 
 
Some critics of the ALCES modelling exercise, may be tempted to blame the 
incompleteness and inaccuracies on the fact that the modeller himself was an outsider, 
with little experience of Paraguay and particularly this region of Paraguay.  While this is 
not a completely dismissible issue, the analysis in this chapter has shown that 
exaggerating its importance is to miss more important aspects of the problems.  This is 
because the issue with modelling goes beyond the identity of the modeller, to the issue 
of ‘naïve planning’.  Drawing on the concept of naïve sociology (Wynne 1989) naivety 
in planning is illustrated when the analytical findings of the process make sense only in 
light of assumptions which are largely closed off to closer empirical examination. An 
example of this is how the data requirements for indicators are underappreciated and 
insufficiently nuanced.  For example, the indicator of small holder income is deeply 
profoundly by external supports such as technical assistance and infrastructure, but 
these are not considered in projected smallholder incomes.  Nor could they be 
considered in the indicator calculations because they are neither quantitative nor are 
they proportionate to income.   
 
Another example of an under-examined assumption is rapid rate of deforestation, based 
on a 26 year ‘expiry date’ for land cultivated by small producers.  After 26 years, it is 
estimated that unsustainable agriculture will exhaust the land to the point that 
productivity levels will be insufficient to profit from, and the land will be abandoned 
and new land will be deforested for agriculture.  This, combined with population 
growth (with corresponding agricultural expansion) will result in the total deforestation 
of non-protected lands (i.e.: outside the reserve) and the plummeting of smallholder 
farm incomes in fewer than thirty years.  But upon closer examination of the actually 
existing conditions in the CARJ, this estimate is a gross exaggeration on several 
accounts (these were discussed in Chapter 4):   
 
• Small holders use sustainable techniques.   
• Small producers, with an average of ten hectares of land, rarely cultivate all ten 
hectares at once, if ever.   
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• Small producers adapt by intensifying cultivation methods as yields are 
perceived to decline.   
• There is the potential for an increasing proportion of household income in the 
CARJ to come from migrant employment (i.e.: to Asuncion,  Argentina, and 
increasingly Europe).   
  
6.5.3 From modelling landscapes to ‘model’ landscapes 
This brings us to the question of whether or not a model can ever be ‘purely factual’.  
Modelling enterprises do not produce neutral snapshots of a landscape (Harvey and 
Chrisman 1998; Robbins 2003).  Rather, they provide representations of a landscape that 
correspond with particular views of the world, priorities, and values.  The ALCES 
representations of the Mbaracayú, unsurprisingly, not only correspond, but reinforce 
and legitimate the conservation and development landscapes discussed in Chapter 4.  
Contrary to the conventional view of the map as an objective representation, the well-
known critical geographer/cartographer Brian Harley’s careful analyses reveal the 
“textuality of maps, including their metaphorical and rhetorical nature… (and) the 
dimensions both of external power and of the omnipresence of internal power in the 
cartographic representation of place” (Harley 1989:1).  The ALCES program is 
nonspatial; it does not produce spatially explicit depictions of outcomes.  Rather, 
outcomes are predicted at an aggregated, landscape level.  However, despite the absence 
of a map, a landscape is still produced by the ALCES analyses.  And the ‘textuality’ of 
this landscape is clear: rapidly disappearing forests, are eaten away by unsustainable 
small producers as a benevolent NGO fights to save forests and the cultivation 
techniques of large producers set the sustainable example for all.  Blame for land 
degradation and deforestation lands squarely on the campesinos, and their rationality is 
further compromised by the ‘ALCES-generated fact’ that if they don’t change their 
behaviour, they confound their own well-being and even assure their own demise.   
 
The simplicity and aggregation fulfil the requirements of ALCES, to make descriptions 
and categories in ALCES useful and operational, and sharpen the focus on such a 
landscape.  Once again, we are reminded of legibility in the representation of 
landscapes, discussed in Chapter 4.  Legibility persists, and is insisted upon, despite that 
“the data from which such simplifications arise are, to varying degrees, riddled with 
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inaccuracies, omissions, faulty aggregations, fraud, negligence, political distortion and so 
on” (Scott 1998:49).   
 
6.5.4 Models: Use them or lose them? 
It is unsurprising that the matter of whether, and to what extent, modelling should be 
used in a participatory context is a contentious one.  But what does the present analysis 
mean for the role of models in environmental governance?  Are planners held hostage 
to either using models and surrendering deliberation on the one hand, or surrendering 
models for the sake of salvaging deliberation on the other?  Positions on the use of 
models range from advocacy to adamant opposition.  Advocates argue that despite 
uncertainty and knowledge gaps, models are the best (though imperfect) way to 
integrate knowledge and evaluate approximate outcomes.   
 
Critical advocates suggest there is a middle ground, where “complex simulations are no 
longer touted as predictive models but as heuristic devices to explore the logical 
implications of certain assumptions” (Peters 1991:116).  Indeed others seem to agree 
that models can be useful, but their limitations must be fully recognized by stakeholders 
before they can be implemented into the planning process without usurping public 
participation and stakeholder debate altogether.  For example, Van der Sluijs promotes 
the incorporation of ‘uncertainty management’ with the use of models:  
 
…it is not surprising that there is a controversy about the 
usefulness of IAMS for assessing climate change… Given this 
controversy, the use of IAMs can only be justified if all actors that 
deal with IAMs and IAM results are fully aware of the limitations 
and caveats of IAM-assessments.  This requires full-fledged 
uncertainty management (Van der Sluijs 2001:327).   
 
Likewise, Edwards suggests:  
 
If models are heuristic guides, then the political issue becomes 
what kind of bets to place. Should we centre our planning on the 
outcome viewed as most likely? To what degree should we plan for 
extreme, but relatively unlikely, predicted outcomes.  These boil 
down to questions about how much risk a society is willing to take 
and how much it is willing to pay to reduce it.  This construction – 
rather than the caricature in which science appears as a source of 
final certainty – places science in its most valuable and responsible 
role: as a very important source of information which cannot and 
should not by itself determine policy… (1999:466). 
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6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how “scientific models for policy purposes are a particularly 
fruitful site for studying science and expertise in their public contexts” (Yearley, 
Forrester et al. 2001:366).  The rationale of implementing sustainable practices in order 
to obtain sustainable development outcomes is confounded by a deeper analysis of the 
context upon which ALCES has been imposed.  The ALCES scenarios make clear 
evidence-based policy prescriptions.  Viewed alone, however, without the interrogation 
of more contextualized dimensions, cumulative effects simulators have the potential to 
inspire policy that does not confront cultural and political challenges and that is, in 
many ways, estranged from a reality that is recognized from local perspectives.   
 
The ALCES analysis of indicators outcomes of different land-uses in the CARJ has 
positioned sustainable development as an objective phenomenon that can universally be 
achieved through standardized, sustainable agriculture.  Its findings are positioned as 
evidence-based: apolitical and uncontroversial.  Sustainability is depicted as a technical 
issue that can be addressed through behaviour changes, which are, in turn a matter of 
voluntary will.  However, as we have seen, sustainability is not a matter of fact, but 
rather socially constructed in the image of power relationships.  Even in the face of 
severe inequality which places other livelihood concerns among, or above 
environmental concerns, practices on large landholdings are cast as sustainable while 
small producers are blamed for making unsustainable choices.   
 
Data availability and data quality are often identified as the main issues pointed out as 
problematic by modellers.  However, these are not the only, or most important 
conundrums raised by this tool. Working with the program necessitates use of technical 
discourse of indicators, outcomes and evidence-based relationships.  In other words, the 
expertise used to generate scenarios, the very nature of the computer program itself, and 
the specific policy recommendations to which the scenarios give rise, cannot 
accommodate more normative, political aspects of the sustainability problem. This leads 
to dramatic simplifications and the direction of blame for ecological degradation toward 
those whose concerns are not, and cannot be, integrated into the simulations. But this is 
not to say that the models are factual as opposed to normative.  Indeed, as we have seen, 
the facts to which the model gives rise, cannot be separated from normative positions 
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about what assumptions are acceptable, how indicators can and should be constructed 
and what policy recommendations are reasonable.   
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Chapter 7:  
Discursive sustainability: The politics of developing certification 
standards for soy 
 
In Chapters 5 and 6 I argued that environmental governance mechanisms based on 
evidence and participation need to be re-examined.  This is because there are various 
problems with the oft-taken assumption that evidence provides the factual basis for 
decision-making, while participation provides the normative framework.  First, evidence 
for decision-making, particularly in conditions of complexity and uncertainty, is a 
product of facts and values and norms.  This relationship, however, often goes 
unrecognized, and evidence is treated in a privileged way based on its supposed 
commitment to objectivity and neutrality.  Secondly, because of this privilege and 
resultant unquestioned relevance to decision-making, participation is relegated to a 
secondary concern – a search for a normative frame for decision-making that fits neatly 
within the confines of the evidence.  It has been argued that analyzing evidence-based 
policy mechanisms and making their normative commitments explicit, we can 
deconstruct the basis for evidential authority.  By adopting this approach, analysts 
achieve a more realistic view of the significant role of normative positions in policy 
making (including evidence-based policy making) and ultimately open debate to a wider 
range of potentially rational policy inputs and positions.  
 
Chapter 7 extends this argument with the analysis of a final case – a certification system 
for the sustainable production of soy.  The analysis in Chapter 7 supports and advances 
the argument that certification systems are more rightly seen as political processes than 
as evidence-based policies.  While evidence is invoked as the basis for sustainable soy 
production criteria, closer analysis reveals that this evidence is not as factual as it initially 
seems.  Rather, fact is mixed with values about development and sustainability to 
produce evidence.  Like models, discussed in Chapter 6, the basis of certification and 
labelling standards in evidence about sustainable practices, is often overblown.  The 
controversial and contested nature of certification is often overlooked in favour of a 
simplified vision of the function of certification bodies: to develop codes of practice 
that provide the instrumental effects of addressing the environmental and social 
problems induced by commodity production.   
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7.1 Introduction  
Certification labels, from ‘organic’ to ‘sustainable’, are becoming an increasingly 
prominent part of non-state market based environmental governance (Cashore et al., 
Cashore 2002; Cashore, Auld et al. 2003; 2006; Klooster 2006; Nepstad, Stickler et al. 
2006).  Standards must be seen as legitimate to be effective in influencing the behaviour 
of the producer (to implement the standards) and the consumer (to prefer the certified 
product based on superior production methods).  Legitimacy is often invoked through 
two means of standards development: stakeholder participation, and sound evidence 
about how standards link with sustainability.  Certification standards can embody public 
values by incorporating the priorities and perspectives of diverse participants in the 
process of standards development.  But in the face of disagreement, these values often 
fail to stand up against that which is regarded as evidence – knowledge often assumed 
to be factual and less dependent on emotion, individual interests and political 
perspective.  However, researchers increasingly recognize that such distinctions are 
inaccurate. This is important for the study of certification systems, because when 
evidence is presented as fact (as opposed to values), they are effectively cut off from 
normative appraisal and human judgment.  
 
This chapter examines the process of developing certification standards for ‘responsible 
soy’.  The standards development process is directed by the Roundtable on Responsible 
Soy (RTRS) an organization convened in order to define sustainability in the context of 
the soy industry, and to develop criteria for its production, trade and marketing.  The 
RTRS initiative has been taken for many things: a glowing example of corporate social 
responsibility and shameless corporate greenwashing; a sign of genuine concern about 
the ramifications of unmonitored production and an elaborate public relations scheme.  
One major objective of the RTRS was to bring together stakeholders to identify what 
kinds of measures are required to reduce the deleterious impact that soy production has 
had on the social and environmental landscape over the past few decades.  The RTRS 
aims to endow the soy industry with “‘democratic legitimacy’ (which) refers to the 
expectation on the part of citizens that capital investment does not, at the very least, 
undermine public environmental interests and minimally acceptable standards of social 
justice” (Mason 1999:12).  More specifically, both interventions specify the importance 
of including ‘multiple stakeholders’ for broad participation, dialogue, transparency and 
representation.  
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Originating in 2005, by its second year in existence, the RTRS was experiencing well-
organized and coherent opposition.  This chapter looks at the conditions under which 
the RTRS and the counter-movement took shape (and continue to take shape), 
organizationally, but more importantly discursively.  It explores how the opposition to 
the RTRS discursively constructed its position so outside of the thematic categories 
established by the RTRS, that it was impossible for it to have any influence over the 
RTRS agenda.  It is argued that one reason the opposition to the RTRS took such an 
extreme position, is the dependence within the RTRS on expert technical knowledge at 
the expense of other social and political concerns and responses to the impacts of soy 
production in Paraguay.   
 
I begin with a general discussion about the ways in which the development of 
certification standards is influenced by social norms and political factors, such as power 
relationships between stakeholders.  Recognition of these social influences promote an 
understanding of certification standards as promoting an interpretation of sustainability, 
rather than reflecting some universal understanding of sustainability.  Next, I provide a 
detailed account of the process that gave rise to the certification standards.  This process 
integrates public participation in defining the issues surrounding sustainable soy 
production, such as local employment, with evidence about rates of deforestation, 
agricultural techniques that maintain soil quality and zoning for agricultural expansion.  
This evidence generated within the specialist technical working group within the RTRS 
led to clear and strong evidence-based policy implications: sustainable agriculture and 
zoning for agricultural expansion can make soy production sustainable.  In the third 
section, I use the concept of discourse coalitions to analyze the culmination of the 
collection of so-called hard facts (or, the process inputs) that contribute to the 
development of certification standards (or, the process output) and ultimately, the policy 
implications.  The discussion draws implications of this case for creating a more 
deliberative context for the development of sustainable certification standards, by 
suggesting that evidence (in this case the work of the technical working group) needs to 
be more critically engaged than is typically done.   
 
In sum, this chapter makes the following arguments in turn:  
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• the RTRS certification standards development process provides an 
interpretation of sustainability, rather than achieving a universal 
understanding of sustainability; 
• participation in the RTRS certification standard development is often seen as 
the normative contribution vis-à-vis the factual contribution of evidence;   
• forthcoming standards for responsible soy production – commonly 
understood as based on the facts about soy production – emerge as a result 
of normative political struggle, rather than disagreement over the technical 
aspects of sustainability; and,  
• environmental values, judgements and preferences are not universal but 
emerge differently in relation to livelihood patterns, resource dependence, 
social identity. 
 
7.2 From facts to norms in certification standards:  ‘effectiveness’ and 
legitimacy  
The effectiveness of certification standards to improve environmental and social 
performance in different productive sectors is doubtlessly important.  However, 
increasingly, researchers are going beyond questions of effectiveness, to examine the 
ways in which certification systems are developed and deployed.  This line of inquiry 
reveals that certification standards do not reflect a straightforward and instrumental 
application of technical knowledge to produce desired outcomes, as has been 
commonly understood.  Rather, certification standards embody processes that are social 
and political in nature – they are a product of, and deployed in, contexts of societal 
values and norms.  This view begs greater attention to the inputs to certification 
systems, as opposed to the outcomes, as a key dimension of their legitimacy.  
 
Legitimate certification systems involve the development of standards generally taken as 
appropriate and rigorous, along with the monitoring apparatuses that ensure the 
standards are adhered to. Such systems endow commodities, often forest and 
agricultural products, with a guarantee the product was produced under conditions and 
through methods deemed sustainable.  Thus, certification provides ‘market barrier 
reductions’ (Stavins 2000) by appealing to consumer demand for ethical products, and 
providing a standard that the consumer accepts and trusts.  In some cases the producer 
may receive a premium for certification. In other cases, continued or enhanced market 
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access is the compensation for compliance with standards. In such cases, certification 
becomes a “market-based alternative to disruptive environmental boycotts” (Bartley 
2007:229).  Legitimate certification systems are often understood as pragmatic, widely 
applicable and relevant to a global understanding of sustainability (Seroa da Motta et al., 
1999; Nepstad, Stickler et al. 2006; UNCTAD 2008).  
 
Despite the optimism of some, several authors have indicated the failure of standards 
to result in the kinds of outcomes they claim. For example, contrary to their aims and 
claims, certification programs focusing on organic production and ‘fair’ trading have in 
many cases failed to improve the incomes of small producers (Kilian, Jones et al. 2006) 
and failed to increase the potential for small producers to have greater control over the 
terms of trade with which they are forced to engage (Getz and Shreck 2006).  Stringer 
adds,  
 
One of the early claims made about forest certification was 
that the development of environmental certification standards 
would become an instrument of development.  Through the 
lens of the global commodity chain framework we find there is 
little evidence to suggest that this is the case (2006:217).   
 
It is output-focused observations such as these that have inspired increased attention 
to less pragmatic and more political aspects of certification systems.  
 
In contrast to outcome oriented analyses, political scientists approach certification 
systems in terms of their development and means of deployment (Auld and Bull 2003; 
Schlyter, Stjernquist et al. 2009). Such concerns call attention to the importance of 
procedural or input legitimacy (Schlyter, Stjernquist et al. 2009) in certification systems 
(Cashore 2002; Auld and Bull 2003; Cashore, Auld et al. 2003).  These approaches 
criticize more orthodox studies for overlooking issues of conflict, contestation and 
struggles over power and representation (i.e.: the politics) that affect the standards 
development processes, and are ultimately reflected in the mechanisms themselves.  
Primary focus on effectiveness means that certification mechanisms become black 
boxed; outcomes and impacts are overemphasized and the processes that give rise to 
the standards, go unquestioned and unchallenged.   
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For example, even the same standards are not interpreted and applied in the same 
fashion everywhere. Much of this potential difference depends on the auditors and 
consultants hired to help companies implement standards: their level and type of 
expertise; their attitude to implementation; and their background, be it local or non-
local (Maletz and Tysiachniouk 2009).  Despite the typified expectation that such 
experts and professionals treat the subject matter in a consistently objective manner, 
“auditors have a certain freedom to interpret criteria and indicators in the way they 
deem to be most favourable for themselves, certified companies and society at large 
the way they understand it, and these understandings differ” (Tysiatchniouk and 
Maletz 2008:135).  Thus, it is not only the development of standards that introduces 
the mixing up of values and norms with the facts, but also unrealistic assumptions 
about their uniform and standardized deployment.   
 
Many authors also argue that the larger social and political context within which 
certification systems emerge are integral considerations in questions of policy making 
authority and legitimacy (Cashore, Auld et al. 2003). One of the most obvious aspects 
of this larger context is the dominance of neo-liberal thinking – particularly around the 
issues of corporate and environmental governance.  Certification is widely critiqued as 
an increasingly integral part of this privatized neoliberal governance (Bartley 2003; 
Walter 2003).  The globalization of capital flows and commercial activity, and the 
entrenchment of privatization and liberalization under neo-liberal reforms in the 
1990’s have led to an emphasis on privatized corporate governance, as corporations 
move further away from the regulatory eye of the state.  The consequent gap in 
corporate governance is felt particularly acutely in the developing world, where 
national regulation may be subject to even more restricted state capacity and/or state 
vulnerability to corruption.  This governance gap is said to induce a ‘race to the 
bottom’ in terms of social and environmental requisites for business, as countries vie 
to attract much needed foreign capital by providing the most relaxed terms for 
investment (Haufler 2003).  In this sense, the regulatory vacuum created by this 
‘postnational constellation’, becomes a key challenge to development and democracy 
(Habermas 2001; Scherer and Palazzo 2008).   
 
In its role as a part of neoliberal governance, certification has become increasingly 
mainstream, provoking critiques that this mainstreaming ‘restrains political struggle’ 
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and ‘limits the scope of action’ (Klooster 2010). For example, Walter asks if neo-liberal 
models for certification represents a shift from ‘civil disobedience to obedient 
consumerism’ (2003). As they become increasingly mainstream, support grows for 
certified products in conventional markets, and by conventional funders, but this 
occurs at the expense of democratic processes (Mutersbaugh, Klooster et al. 2005) and 
more radical critiques of the conditions that gave rise to certification in the first place 
(Bartley 2007). The concurrent roles of certification systems as ‘market mechanism, 
regulatory form and social cause’ are contradictory (Brown and Getz 2008) and suggest 
a naïve and dubious expectation that values can simply be inserted into markets 
(Klooster 2006). This is of particular concern as mainstreaming and an overall 
commitment to market principles attracts larger actors and entities, introducing 
increasingly vast differentials in power relations between producers, consumers and 
buyers (Taylor 2005; Taylor 2005).   
 
These power differentials are important, not least because they skew access to 
decision-making towards the most powerful actors in commodity chains. Such 
decision-making can determine which standards are established, despite that 
conflicting interests can give rise to very different ideas about how a favourable set of 
standards would look (Mutersbaugh, Klooster et al. 2005).  For example, some authors 
show that unequal distribution of decision-making power among stakeholders result in 
certification systems that are mechanisms of ‘control at a distance’ (Klooster 2005; 
Ponte and Gibbon 2005; McEwan and Bek 2009). These authors argue that small 
producers, who are less powerful and influential relative to others in the global value 
chain, are held hostage to the demands of international buyers or consumers to 
conform to standards which they had no input in creating. Compliance with these 
standards often involves costly investments which diminish the profitability for small 
producers, or exclude them from participation in the certification scheme altogether 
(Klooster 2005). Thus, while certification is often seen as a means of reducing market 
barriers, it can also be a means of erecting market barriers (Klooster 2005; McEwan 
and Bek 2009; Klooster 2010).   
 
Concerns about certification systems simply recreating power relations, rather than 
transforming them, are echoed elsewhere, as certification is identified as a marketing 
tool above all else: “While certification schemes were established with the goal of 
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sustainable forestry management, certification has become a market-based tool to 
promote forestry products” (Stringer 2006:717-718).  Stringer describes a ‘fundamental 
shift’ in the underlying notions behind certification:  “Instead of facilitating access to 
the international market for tropical wood, companies predominantly in core localities 
have subscribed to certification schemes in order to gain a competitive edge 
internationally” (2006:717-718).  Currently, certification “schemes appear voluntary but 
in time market forces may demand certified products” (Stringer 2006:717).   
 
Some worry that widespread recognition of the need for companies to subscribe to 
certification principles in order to maintain or increase their market share, may lower 
the standards of certification rather than raising the bar for practices.  Ultimately, if 
certification is considered predominantly a marketing strategy, it may be abandoned if 
not successful enough in gaining market share, or if the approach falls out of fashion. 
This questions the extent to which certification is an adequate replacement for state-
led regulation (Klooster 2006; Klooster 2009), or even a solution for current gaps in 
global environmental governance (Gulbrandsen 2004; Gulbrandsen 2008; Gulbrandsen 
2009). 
 
7.2.1 Input legitimacy: participation and evidence 
Concerns such as those discussed above have lead to growing scepticism about the 
legitimacy of certification to improve corporate performance on social and 
environmental issues (Becker-Olsen, Cudmore et al. 2006). One response is the 
ubiquitous call for broad stakeholder participation in developing certification standards 
and protocols as an integral aspect of a system’s legitimacy (Klintman 2009; Auld and 
Gulbrandsen 2010).  
 
Thus, the development of certification systems becomes an increasingly public affair, 
opened to a wider array of stakeholders.  This stands in contrast to the more traditional 
focus on shareholders in corporate governance, deemed necessary because corporate 
activities are no longer recognized as simply economically rational acts. Particularly in 
the postnational constellation, corporate activities have moral implications via their 
effect on various stakeholders  (Deetz 2007).  Accordingly, debates would involve all 
stakeholders who are impacted by corporate activities  (Mingers 2009).  Palazzo and 
Scherer (Palazzo and Scherer 2006) argue that moral legitimacy has effectively come to 
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be demanded of corporations under post-nationalism, and that strategic, or 
instrumental approaches are no longer widely accepted as sufficient or appropriate.   
 
But scepticism about the potential for authentic engagement between more and less 
powerful actors in certification debates abounds. For example, Taylor notes that, 
despite efforts on behalf of both the FLO and FSC to formally institutionalize 
stakeholders’ inclusion, “nonetheless, their internal governance and organization 
trajectories are shaped by the social and political relations of their respective 
commodity chains” (2005:140). Even less optimistic, Gulbrandsen suggests that “the 
steps taken by industry-dominated standards organizations to enhance autonomy and 
inclusiveness in part serve to justify a business-as-usual situation and avoid building a 
capacity and commitment to be responsive to environmental and social groups” 
(2008:579). 
 
Another means of achieving input legitimacy is developing certification standards on 
the basis of technical knowledge and expertise – often scientific expertise – even 
insofar as it is characterized by high levels of uncertainty (Auld and Bull 2003). 
Legitimate policy, as rational and neutral, pursued by ‘speaking truth to power’ 
(Wildavsky 1979) or ‘evidence-based policy’ (Fischer 2009; Kleinschmit, Böcher et al. 
2009) has been fundamentally challenged by sociologists of science, who see scientific 
and technical expertise as profoundly influenced by social and political forces (Jasanoff 
2004). In this respect, authority and credibility are not rooted in the inherent privilege 
of objectivity and access to truth, but actively defended through socially determined 
boundaries (Gieryn 1999). But if the growing domination of technical issues over other 
issues does not necessarily have the effect of improving certification systems in some 
way, it certainly has another effect: depoliticizing them (Klooster 2005). This is because 
the emphasis is “on technical regulatory mechanisms rather than processes that can 
deliver radical change… Expert knowledge becomes privileged and if shortcomings 
arise they can be fixed technically and managerially” (McEwan and Bek 2009:9).  
 
In some policy circles technical expertise persists as the preferred, unequivocal (or at 
least, the least equivocal) contribution to legitimate policy making. But some analysts 
challenge that the relationship between knowledge and policy is not so straightforward. 
For example, Fischer boldly claims that “in the ‘real world’ of public policy there is no 
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such thing as a purely technical decision” (Fischer 2000:43). He continues: “…there is, 
in fact, no linear bridge which connects the hard sciences to the public domain 
sciences. There is, in short, no epistemological road over which expertise can directly 
travel from one domain to the other” (Fischer 2009:144). Auld and Bull (2003) analyze 
the differences between two different models for decision-making in certification 
initiatives: one prioritizes participation; the other technical expertise. They find that 
indeed, expertise to be mediated by different normative assumptions behind the 
models, and thus, did not ‘translate’ into policy in the same ways. Each model 
produced very different outcomes in terms of establishing certification standards. 
These disparate outcomes were not because scientific claims were used more 
‘scientifically’ in one model as opposed to the other, in fact “none of the initiatives 
drew extensively on science… however, science still played an important role in 
influencing the character of the their respective standards” (Auld and Bull 2003:59, 
emphasis added).  
 
7.3 Evidence, participation and non-participation in the RTRS 
The RTRS emerged in 2005 in response to the impacts of the ‘soy boom’ of the 
previous two decades.  For example, the production of soy in Paraguay had increased 
manifold, bringing about a new potential engine of development for the country.  
However, the costs and benefits of the boom were extremely differential, and even 
observers with optimism about the potential of soy production for national growth, 
could not deny that the associated problems, particularly the social and political fallout 
of soy production, needed to be addressed (See Box 7.1).  Initiators considered both 
participatory and evidence-based approaches to be important elements of the RTRS 
process, seen to promote standards that adhere to public expectations for both 
democratic legitimacy and scientific rigour. Evidence was brought to bear on the RTRS 
process mainly through the ‘Principles, Criteria and Verification Development Group’ 
(‘DG’ for short) – a group of technical experts that would head up the articulation of 
the different iterations of the certification criteria.  Also, participation has been 
facilitated through a number of means, including: representation of, what the 
organizers view as, the major stakeholder groups (industry, finance and trade; soy 
producers; and civil society); and the initiation of consultation processes regarding the 
iterations of the proposals for standards.  These are discussed further in this section.   
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Box 7.1: Antecedents to a growing need for governance of the soy boom (Source: 
Author) 
 
Global demand for soy, and consequently production, rose to 214 million tons in 2005 (Charles 
2008) and is expected to rise further in the coming years due to rising demand for animal feed in 
China and India.  Most of the world’s soy expansion has occurred in South America; a trend that 
is expected to continue given land ‘availability’, relatively low land prices, and low overall 
production costs.  Paraguay is the world’s fourth largest soy producer and exporter – staggering 
considering its minute size and population, particularly in comparison with the US and Brazil, the 
world’s first and second largest.  In fact, after Brazilian President Lula da Silva expressed his 
‘optimism’ for Paraguay because of its potential to produce the raw materials for ethanol and 
biodiesel, during a recent visit to Paraguay, Paraguay’s then President Nicanor Duarte said “If 
Brazil is to become the Saudi Arabia of biofuels, why can’t Paraguay become the Kuwait of the 
21st century?” (Newsroom 2007).   
 
Exclusion from the boom 
Soy was introduced into the Paraguayan Agricultural repertoire in the 1980’s, and within the 
same decade Paraguay’s agricultural exports nearly tripled (Carter, Barham et al. 1996); the 
dominance it has come to have over agricultural production has been described as the ‘Soy 
Boom’.  The benefits of this boom, however, have seen very little redistribution (Carter 1994; 
Carter, Barham et al. 1996).  Primarily, there has been widespread exclusion of peasants from 
Paraguay’s economic growth, of which agricultural and related activities has (and continues to be) 
an important source of employment and income.  This exclusionary growth has limited peasant 
access to land and employment opportunities for two main reasons.  The first is the nature of the 
land market.  Although land has become prohibitively expensive for many Paraguayans, it 
remains comparatively cheap for even poor Brazilians, who immigrated in substantial numbers to 
buy once soy prices began to soar (Carter, Barham et al. 1996).  Furthermore, as Carter 
concluded in his study on willingness to pay for land, large farms grow faster than small farms, 
leading to an ever growing concentration of land holdings among those able to expand their soy 
production (Carter, Barham et al. 1996).  The second reason for the exclusion of most peasants 
from the soy boom is “crop characteristics and the relative economic importance of the 
countervailing class biases they create” (Carter, Barham et al. 1996:56).  Principally, these crop 
characteristics refer to the low labour and high capital investment requirements of soy 
production.  Each of these factors erodes the potential competitive advantage of high access to 
low-cost family labour but low capital availability.     
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 Box 7.2: Social and environmental impacts of the boom (Source: Author) 
 
For some observers, soy producers have joined the ranks of Paraguay’s pre-eminent public 
enemies.  Soy has been publicly branded a product of ‘forest crime’1 by Greenpeace.  Several 
high profile cases in the Mercosur soy producing region appear to support this alarming 
assertion.  For example, the murder in February, 2005 of 74 year old Dorothy Stang, a catholic 
nun and activist against large-scale agricultural expansion in Brazil, became an international 
incident and led to an outcry against soy producers, dubbed as “agrobandits” by the media (Jan 
Rocha, Saturday February 19, 2005, The Guardian).   Perhaps the most important case in 
Paraguay’s movement against soy, was that of 11 year old Silvino Talavera.  In January, 2004 the 
child died from exposure to agrochemicals used in the cultivation of soy, which were routinely 
applied to the soy crops around the periphery of which Silvino lived with his family.  With the 
support of NGOs and alliances, the 2004 acquittal of the two agribusiness owners responsible 
was appealed.  In November of 2006 they were found guilty of ‘creating public risks’ and 
committing homicide, each receiving a sentence of 2 years in prison.    
 
These characteristics of the soy boom in Paraguay have attracted criticism and blame for many 
of the social and environmental problems faced by contemporary Paraguay.  Environmental 
NGOs attribute rapid rates of deforestation and loss of biodiversity to large scale agricultural 
expansion.  Campesino land is being sold or forcibly overtaken by larger, more influential and 
powerful growers.  Finally, the soy producers themselves are facing the possibility of sanctions 
and boycotts from an international public becoming increasingly aware of soy controversies.  
Furthermore, growing resentment of soy at the local level is also increasing loss due to theft and 
destruction and introducing new production costs such as increasing levels of security.  
Considering this intensification and broadening of complaints against soy production and soy 
producers, the RTRS, it would seem, has emerged in a timely fashion.  
 
After its inception the RTRS took a few years to find its feet as an organization (See 
Box 7.2).  In 2007, based on nominations from various organizations, the RTRS 
executive board selected members of the RTRS to comprise the Principles, Criteria and 
Verification Development Group, or the ‘DG’.  Under the coordination of the 
consulting firm ProForest, author of the Basel Criteria, the DG worked to develop the 
multiple iterations and final version of the criteria for sustainable soy, and a verification 
system for monitoring these criteria.  As with the OC and the executive board, the DG 
is considered by the RTRS executive committee to represent a broad range of 
stakeholders with varied geographical and technical experience, including, once again, 
producers; industry, finance and trade; civil society organizations.  However this time, it 
was the decision of the executive board that civil society organization was too broad a 
category and in order to assure representation of a broader array of interests, civil 
society membership was divided into those organizations with a particular interest in 
environmental concerns and those with a particular interest in social concerns.   
 
Between 2005 and 2010, a series of key events earmark milestones in the development 
of the certification standards (See Table 7.1).  The work undertaken at the first DG 
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meeting in October, 2007 was based on ‘nine key impacts of soy in Brazil’ that were 
developed by 60 participants in the Technical Meeting of April, 2006.  Draft principles 
were developed based on these ‘key impacts’.  A public consultation was conducted 
with these principles through two principal means.  First, the document was posted on 
the RTRS website, and interested parties were asked to provide comments, 
electronically mailed to the RTRS.  Secondly, each participant was asked to circulate and 
discuss the document with his/her respective constituents, and solicit feedback and 
comments on the contents.  There was an approximate two-month time allowance for 
this process.  In February, 2008, at the second meeting of the DG, these comments 
were considered in the revising and refining of the principles and criteria for responsible 
soy.  Again, the documents produced at this meeting were subjected to another public 
consultation which took shape in much the same way as the former.  In November, 
2008, the third draft of the principles and criteria were again circulated for public 
consultation.  In May of 2009, a version of the criteria was developed for field testing.  
 
 
 
 
Box 7.3: Origins and early years of the RTRS (Source: Author) 
The road since travelled by the RTRS has been a long one, having its conceptual origins in the 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), which began in 2001.  In 2004, applying the 
RSPO concept to soy, the WWF in Switzerland, in conjunction with Coop Switzerland, 
commissioned a 30-plus page report entitled, The Basel Criteria for Responsible Soy 
Production.   The purpose of developing the Basel Criteria was “to provide a working 
definition of acceptable soy production that can be used by individual retailers or producers” 
(pg2)ADD.  The Basel Criteria was intended to have global significance, as “It is expected that 
companies meeting the requirements of the Basel Criteria will be well positioned to comply 
with any international criteria that are developed” (pg 2).    
The same year that the Basel Criteria were released, a group of stakeholders, known as the 
‘Organizing Committee’ (OC) came together to set up the RTRS, and plan for its initial stages.   
The OC counted three types of organizations among its membership:  Producers; Industry, 
Finance and Trade; and Civil Society.  These three categories became an organizing principle 
for bodies within the RTRS and its subcommittees, being understood as providing 
representation for all stakeholders in the soy industry.  Throughout the criteria development 
process the OC met monthly through conference calls, and had several live, face to face 
meetings.  In November 2006, the RTRS became a civil association under Swiss Law, and 12 
positions within an executive board were created, allowing 4 positions for each of the 
representative constituencies.  From the OC, members of the RTRS executive board were 
nominated and voted upon, filling 10 of the 12 positions.   
Between 2004 and 2008 the OC has been characterized by a somewhat shifting membership.  
Since its inception, some organizations have joined the OC and others have decided to leave 
the OC.  The departed include Cordaid, a Dutch NGO focusing on ‘structural poverty 
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Table 7.1: Key events in timeline for Responsible Soy Certification Criteria 
Development  (Source: Author) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The RTRS is not only proposing that it be the site for knowledge creation regarding 
sustainable soy, but also that, based on this knowledge, it develop the criteria for 
sustainable soy and undertake the monitoring of these criteria and the granting of 
certification to soy producers.  Concurrently with the development of sustainable soy 
criteria, the framework for an implementation and verification mechanism is also being 
developed by the DG.  At the 2008 meeting, the DG discussions went beyond 
‘principles and criteria’ to include how this knowledge about sustainable soy might be 
put into action through ‘implementation and verification models’.  This mechanism 
would be the medium through which the criteria would become policy for certification.   
 
The first draft of the implementation and verification framework was released in March 
2008 for public consultation.  The framework consists of two ‘pillars’:  the first is the 
‘certification of responsible soy production’; the second is ‘support to producers to 
improve social, environmental and economic performance’.  In the words used in the 
document,  
 
Month/Year  Key event in the development of responsible soy certification standards 
2005 First RTRS general conference, spearheaded by the WWF 
2006 Technical Meeting – 9 key impacts of soy that would form the guiding principles of the criteria 
2007 First DG meeting – development of principles and criteria 
Jan, 2008 First draft of principles and criteria circulated for public consultation 
April, 2008 Second draft of principles and criteria circulated for public consultation 
Nov, 2008 Third draft of principles and criteria circulated for public consultation 
May, 2009 RTRS Principles and Criteria for responsible soy production: Field testing version 
March, 2010 Principles and Criteria (draft) 
June, 2010 RTRS standard for responsible soy production, Version 1.0 
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The first pillar consists of a voluntary business-to-business 
certification system funded by market premiums. For this pillar the 
Principles and Criteria must be fully implemented and 
independently verified as with any certification scheme. This pillar 
is aimed at producers and processors supplying markets that are 
demanding certification…  The second pillar is a much wider 
programme aimed at working with a majority of producers to 
achieve targets based on the P&C over time, through a 
combination of training, incentives and other measures. The 
activities in the second pillar would focus on support and 
incentives for soy producers (RTRS 2008:2-3).   
  
7.3.1 RTRS and Participatory Governance 
Ultimately, the initiation of the RTRS was an attempt to promote multi-stakeholder 
deliberations about soy and sustainability, particularly in Latin America.  Despite the 
arguments of critics that the RTRS was not intended to be an inclusive and deliberative 
body, there is evidence that this was, at the very least, the intentional portrayal of the 
initiative.  One of the main objectives of the RTRS initiative, is to “Reach consensus 
among key stakeholders and players linked to the soy industry”30.  Who are these key 
stakeholders?  It continues that those “who should actively participate in the 
Roundtable on Responsible Soy” include31:  
 
• Members of the soy industry and chain of value throughout the world;  
• Any person in a position to contribute to the improvement of responsible 
soy production standards;  
• Parties concerned over the economic, social and environmental aspects of 
soy production. ·Any person who believes that it is our duty toward future 
generations to preserve valuable natural resources. 
 
After the first Roundtable meeting, one of several general agreements reached was “To 
ensure that this is a transparent, open, multi-sectoral, participatory and decentralized 
process”32.  Indeed, opportunities have been opened for all interested parties to 
participate in the RTRS.  One type of opportunity pertains to financial support for 
participating in conferences and meetings.  For example, recognizing the importance 
of the participation of social and environmental NGOs in the RTRS process, but also 
recognizing their comparative disadvantage in locating financial support for this 
                                               
30 http://www.responsiblesoy.org/objectives retrieved Sept 12, 2009. 
31 http://www.responsiblesoy.org/objectives retrieved Sept 12, 2009. 
32  http://www.responsiblesoy.org/events/1stroundtable, retrieved  November, 2007. 
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participation, DOEN, a Dutch NGO offered to financially support the attendance of 
international NGOs.   
Secondly, as has been previously mentioned, is the attention paid to representation on 
committees and in working groups.  All sub-group members are selected to represent 
three main categories of stakeholders: industry, finance and trade; producers; and, civil 
society.  Furthermore, in cases such as the formation of the DG for principles and 
criteria, further attention is paid to representation.  In this case for example, civil 
society is broken down into environmental and social civil society, to better represent 
the varied interests within this broad group.  Also in the case of the DG, the producer 
groups and industry, finance and trade groups have 9 and 6 members respectively, 
compared to the 4 members in each of the civil society groups.  This, according to the 
RTRS, attends to the need for “a DG composition which included a good range of 
geographical and technical experience”33.  However, these larger groups do not have 
proportionately larger decision-making power in the DG.  In any case where a decision 
might fall to a vote, each group will have the same number of votes, irrespective of its 
size.   
 
Thirdly, opportunities are opened for observance and participation in decision-making 
beyond the RTRS membership.  All documents that pertain to the RTRS, including 
minutes of OC meetings, attendance, presentations and general outcomes from 
conferences, membership, and organizational objectives, statutes and bylaws are 
posted on the website and are available for anyone to access.  Furthermore, key 
documents produced and revised by the sub-committees of the RTRS, such as the 
principles and criteria draft and the implementation and verification framework have 
been opened for around two months for ‘public consultation’, by being featured on the 
RTRS website along with pro-formas for comments.  Comments from the first public 
consultation were integrated into the second draft and the actual comments themselves 
were then posted on the website.  The same process is slated for the second public 
consultation, which concluded on May 30, 2008.   
 
At the same time as claiming legitimacy through participation and deliberation, the 
RTRS has from the beginning, had a strong foot-hold in expertise.  The technical 
meeting of 2006 was an example of this, when “Over 60 participants, including highly 
                                               
33 http://www.responsiblesoy.org/DG, retrieved November, 2007. 
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regarded international experts and key stakeholders from farmers associations, 
agribusiness, social and environmental NGOs participated in the science-based 
discussions over three days exchanging different regional experiences and perspectives 
related to soy production, processing and trade”34.  The aim of the workshop was to 
“develop and perfect criteria and indicators for sustainable soy production”35.   
 
7.3.2 Non-Participation as protest against the RTRS 
These various attempts at making the development of certification standards for 
sustainable soy a participatory process, no matter how sincere, were unsuccessful by 
several accounts.  This came as a surprise to some involved in the RTRS process 
(personal communication).  By addressing the issue of soy production, WWF had hit 
on something that, with seeming obviousness, would be of great interest to 
campesinos.  It seemed that through the objective of creating a more acceptable 
framework for soy production, an alliance was assured between soy producers, 
environmental NGOs and campesinos.  It also seemed that the talks proposed by 
WWF might succeed in providing an international forum for campesinos to articulate 
their grievances such as reckless pesticide use and rash deforestation.  
 
However, many campesino groups and some NGOs were pitted against the RTRS 
rather than joining the talks. In August, 2006, the second general meeting of the RTRS 
was held in Asuncion, Paraguay to convene producers and industries with interests in 
large-scale soy production.  Despite the apparent promise that a proposal of 
‘sustainable soy’ was expected to have for addressing the concerns expressed by 
campesino organizations, rather than participating in these 2006 talks, many 
participated in a ‘counter-conference’, organized by NGOs MOCASE (Via Campesina 
Argentina) and the Grupo de Reflexion Rural (GRR).  This counter-conference 
culminated in a demonstration of protest, involving hundreds of people, outside the 
RTRS.  It was led by various NGOs and peasant organizations, who rejected the idea 
of ‘sustainable’ soy on several grounds.  The aims of the counter-conference organizers 
were to “coordinate future strategies for a different agricultural model, based on 
principles of food sovereignty, land reform and local development”36.  
 
                                               
34 http://www.responsiblesoy.org/events, retrieved November, 2007. 
35 http://www.responsiblesoy.org/events, retrieved November, 2007. 
36 http://www.thepowerhour.com/news/forum_nospray.htm, retrieved November, 2007. 
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A similar situation was experienced by FMB staff to the ‘sustainable soy’ project that 
they have become involved with through DAP.  With motivations and rationale similar 
to those of the RTRS, DAP focuses on social and environmental goals in addition to 
economic goals.  They aimed to conform strictly to the established Paraguayan 
environmental legislation that relates to agricultural lands larger than 20 hectares.  
Furthermore, they would implement a ‘rural development’ program that would focus 
on agricultural extension and the creation of employment opportunities for 
campesinos surrounding their soy fields.  This approach was expected to satiate the 
campesino demands made of large producers.  However, it has not resulted in this.  
Rather, campesinos have more aggressively than ever, manifested their disagreement 
and disenchantment with the initiative.  In 2006 a DAP employee was murdered while 
clearing a field for planting soy and management has, on several occasions, hired 
military protection of the land. DAP personnel have claimed that the opposition to the 
‘sustainable soy’ initiative is due to a lack of understanding, and a stubbornness on the 
part of the campesinos.  One field worker with DAP explained how this led to 
communication problems: “We went there to hold a meeting in the community, to 
explain how we intended to work for the triple bottom line, and we couldn’t even talk 
to them because they were all drunk!”37.   
 
However, organizations representing the campesinos saw it a different way.  It would 
seem that despite the apparent attempt to address the concerns of local people about 
pesticide use, deforestation and general non-compliance with environmental 
legislation, the RTRS was not perceived as an appropriate venue for voicing their 
concerns.  This may have been at least partly, an observation that grew out of 
experience, rather than simply an assumption.   
 
Another instance of non-participation is the case of two NGOs, Cordaid of the 
Netherlands and and Fetraf-SUL of Brazil.  Both organizations initiated their 
involvement with the RTRS by assuming dominant roles, in the Organizing 
Committee (OC), which comprised only a handful of other members.  However, 
because of difficulties they perceived with the nature of their involvement, they 
withdrew from the OC and withdrew their membership from the organization entirely, 
                                               
37 Anonymous, personal communication, May 3, 2008. 
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shortly before the first Roundtable occurred38.  The RTRS website expresses thanks 
for the participation of these two organizations in the OC leading up to the inaugural 
events, and assures that particularly Cordaid will continue working cooperatively 
towards the goals of the RTRS.  However, it is apparent from the list of participants 
(found on the website), that neither organization even participated in the second 
RTRS, held in Asuncion in 2006.  The non-participation of the Cordaid and Fetraf-
SUL seems to be an explicit statement against what they saw happening during their 
tenure with the OC.  Furthermore, after witnessing the withdrawal of two relatively 
powerful NGOs – one Northern, one Brazilian – how could others have any faith that 
their experience in the RTRS would be different, or that it could potentially evolve into 
an effective and appropriate venue for their grievances?  
 
7.4 Interpreting soy facts: Discourse coalitions and the role of normative 
positions 
The emergence of the RTRS has created the backdrop for two very different 
discourses about the environmental and social politics of soy production in Paraguay.  
Despite internal inconsistencies, they have been presented as two ‘sides’ to the story, 
each vying for dominance over public opinion, and policy, ultimately achieving 
discursive hegemony.  These alliances, or discourse coalitions, each embody a story-
line, set of actors who use the story lines, and a set of practices at which the story lines 
are directed (Hajer 1995).  The story lines regard the very nature of the soy industry 
and its social, economic and political impacts on Paraguayan society.  The actors 
include ‘big business’, government, and powerful ENGOs on the one hand, and small 
producers, human rights organizations and smaller, less powerful ENGOs on the 
other.  The set of practices are: the ways in which the soy industry conducts business 
in Paraguay, adhering (or not adhering) to ethical and moral principles; and the practice 
of development itself.   
 
7.4.1 Dialogue and Consensus 
Featured strongly in the RTRS proceedings is the rhetoric of reconciling differences, 
establishing common goals, and working together for complimentary objectives.  In his 
                                               
38 This was not unprecedented.  For example, in 1998 Greenpeace and the Association for Private Forest 
Landowners withdrew from the standard-setting process engaged by the FCS, because they could not 
“compromise on certain criteria” Bostrom, M. (2003). "How State-Dependent Is a Non-State-Driven 
Rule-Making Project?  The Case of a Forest Certification in Sweden." Journal of Environmental Policy & 
Planning 5(2): 165-180. 
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recap of RTRS cumulative accomplishments at the second RTRS general conference, 
Alberto Yanosky spoke of working “towards a possible solution”, that being, the 
“integration of interests so that ‘everyone wins’” (Yanosky 2006).  Similarly, the RTRS 
technical meeting closed with emphasis on the likelihood and importance of “taking 
the (Roundtable on Responsible Soy) Initiative ahead in a positive “win-win” mode”39.  
Those who chose to participate in the counter conference were seen as obstructing 
dialogue.  One organizer observed that:  
 
All of the stakeholders were invited to sit at the table and discuss 
their interests – this included the campesino organizations.  However, 
instead of coming to the meeting and talking openly with the others, 
they chose to stand outside and demonstrate their opposition.  This 
wasn’t very helpful for anyone (personal communication, July, 2008).   
 
Likewise, the country’s Vice President included in his speech at the RTRS meeting that 
even with the potential costs, as a politician, of coming to the meeting, “I could be 
outside in the demonstration, but it seems to me that only with dialogue and 
interaction between the different parties, can this phenomenon be constructed” 
(IDEA 2006).   
 
In the 2005 RTRS general meeting, this use of sustained growth is emphasized through 
a series of slides presented by ABIOVE, illustrating ‘soybean crop as a vector of 
sustained development’(Trigueirinho 2005).  This may have been one impetus to a 
contribution of Cordaid to the deliberations, before its exit from the RTRS Organizing 
Committee.  This contribution was the replacement of notion of ‘sustainable’ with the 
notion of ‘responsible’.  Furthermore, Cordaid may have felt that this revised 
terminology sharpened and clarified the assertion that certification standards must 
focus on more than only environmental criteria, and that strategies which address 
social issues must also be showcased.   
 
This apparent enthusiasm for dialogue and deliberation reflects an optimism about the 
possibility of reaching a consensus around the core issues of the meaning of 
sustainable, how sustainability would be achieved, and even whether or not soy 
production could ever be ‘sustainable’ per se.  If this consensus was not reached, then it would 
not be because of an inherent impossibility for it to be reached.  Rather, it would be because some 
                                               
39 http://www.responsiblesoy.org/eng/index.htm , retrieved September 3, 2007. 
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stakeholders had chosen not to participate in the dialogue.  The protesters were portrayed by 
RTRS organizers as stubborn and unwilling to enter into discussion, thus jeopardizing 
the potential for something constructive and positive to emerge for all sides, because 
of the loss of an opportunity for deliberation.  In contrast, the RTRS is depicted as a 
group of ‘committed’, ‘professionals’ that would do what it takes to address the issues 
at stake in soy production and work to improve its negative impacts40. 
  
7.4.2 Inevitability and ‘Good’ness 
Soy, or “green gold” was portrayed as a driver of national growth and regional growth in 
the Mercosur countries through producing an important export (generating foreign 
exchange) and creating employment opportunities. The material presented by the soy 
producers focused on the global and national inevitability, importance and potential of 
soy and soy products.   To support its illustration of “soybean crop as a vector of 
sustained development” ABIOVE noted that:  
 
The evolution of crop techniques and the ‘tropicalization’ of 
soybeans allowed the extensive and rudimentary occupation of the 
‘cerrado’ to be replaced by an activity based on technology, with 
economic, social and environmental sustainability… The soybean 
crop development brought about an improvement in the quality of 
life and the development of infrastructure in the areas of transport, 
education and health (Trigueirinho 2005).   
 
This notion that soy producers are modernizing (thus improving) the regional 
agricultural base, vis-à-vis campesino practices, emphasizes that in comparison, 
campesino practices are rudimentary, unproductive and degrading.  For example, 
Steward found that:  
 
When pushed to acknowledge colonos (i.e.: campesinos) settlement 
they discuss colonos’ “environmentally degrading” land-use 
practices, which they see as having little or no regional economic 
benefit.  In direct contrast to their beliefs about colonos’ land-use, 
agribusiness stresses that soy farming introduces environmental 
and economic value to the landscape.  A Cargill soy buyer 
explained that agro-industrial development provides a more stable 
foundation for economic development (than previous development 
projects) because it is linked to the global agricultural market where 
soy has great product versatility and a lucrative world price.  Buyers 
believe that soy expansion to the Santarem region signals an 
upward economic growth trend, one in which all Santarem’s 
                                               
40 www.panda.org/about_wwf/what_we_do/forests/news/events_/index.cfm, retrieved August, 2008. 
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citizens will benefit and one which will not result in increased 
deforestation (Steward 2007:113, parentheses added). 
 
Additionally, the global benefits of soy production were emphasized.  Increased food 
production should be everyone’s target because of a rising global population and the 
need to satisfy world hunger(!)  Speaking about agricultural expansion and, in 
particular, intensification, one participant at the 2005 RTRS general meeting presented 
a slide that proclaimed, “We should keep moving forward and we should not rest until 
the complete elimination of hunger is achieved on the entire world!!!!” (Peiretti 2005).  
Shortly after, another slide assures the audience that particular practices such as no-till 
lead to “the achievement of a evolved farming system that ensures the actual and 
future food provision as well as the absolute and complete counteraction of human 
hunger…” (Peiretti 2005).  Furthermore, global demand will increase as soy is put to 
new and important uses such as a (cheap) source of protein, nutraceutical properties 
and a future source of energy through biofuel production.  These are benefits that 
accrue to ‘the developed and developing world’ (Peiretti 2005).   
 
It is a simple fact that more soy will be produced in Mercosur countries, and this is a 
good thing.  As Steward found in her research with Brazilian soy producers, “Soy 
farmers view themselves as fulfilling national economic goals when they purchase land, 
clear it, prepare it, and cultivate soy for the export market.  As one farmer explained, 
‘Soybean farmers believe they are national heroes’” (Steward 2007:111). 
 
7.4.3 Technical Solutions for ‘Sustainability’ 
While a handful of the presentations made at the RSS refuted the problematization of 
soy production (particularly on a comparative basis with the environmental damage 
caused by the economic development of other countries), those presentations that did 
acknowledge the impact of soy production, and the need to address this impact, 
focused on technical, pragmatic approaches, with little to no attention paid to social or 
political issues.  The emphasis was clearly placed on sustainable agricultural techniques 
and improved planning and zoning to address these impacts.   
 
The 2005 presentation on behalf of La Confederación de Asociaciones Americanas 
para la Producción de la Agricultura Sustentable (CAAPAS) focused on the potential 
of maximizing production on existing farmland to reduce the pressure to expand 
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agriculture into forested areas, given the inevitability of increased production to feed a 
growing global population: “To be successful at this purpose, we should base the 
process on science and on the full and wise utilization of all modern technology (from 
agro ecology to biotechnology) along with other type of empirical and even recycled 
ancestral human knowledge” (Peiretti 2005).  In fact, several presentations elaborated 
on no-till cultivation41, suggesting that no-till cultivation in and of itself constitutes 
sustainable production, given the potential of maintaining, even improving soil quality.   
 
In addition to improved production techniques, governmental environmental and 
agricultural agencies (SEAM from Paraguay and SAGPA in Argentina) and NGOs 
focused on higher level policies such as zoning and planning.  For example, one 
presentation suggested earmarking abandoned lands for soy expansion or converting 
cattle ranches no longer in use.  The WWF was particularly interested in routing soy 
production away from ecologically ‘high value’ areas42.   
 
The discourse of the RTRS asserts that:  
 
1) ‘responsible soy’ is a knowable and achievable phenomenon;  
2) that consensus can be reached regarding criteria for what it is and how it can 
be achieved through deliberation; and,  
3) the problems associated with soy can be addressed through technical and 
administrative means.   
 
Meanwhile, some of the most controversial aspects of soy production (those discussed 
in the next section) were scarcely included as brief asides, and detailed attention to why 
these issues were vital to consider, and how these issues might be addressed, was 
notably (and perhaps predictably) absent.  
 
                                               
41 No-till cultivation is a technique considered by many to be ‘sustainable’.  It involves planting and 
cutting a cover crop, and then seeding directly into it, rather than into the soil – eliminating the need for 
any tillage at all.  It is described and discussed further in Chapters 5&6, in conjunction with rural 
development and cumulative effects simulations.   
42 The WWF’s system of forest valuation has been a controversial WWF policy.  The focus on ‘high 
value’ areas such as high bio-mass rainforest has been shown to accelerate the conversion of secondary 
forest and semi-deciduous forests to agriculture.  Hecht, S. (2005). "Soybeans, Development and 
Conservation on the Amazon Frontier." Development and Change 36(2): 375-404..  Other authors have 
shown how this valuation system leads non or less valued forests to be considered as ‘soy reserves’.  
Steward, C. (2007). "From Colonization to "Environmental Soy": A Case Study of Environmental and 
Socio-Economic Valuation in the Amazon Soy Frontier." Agriculture and Human Values 24(1): 107-122. 
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7.4.4 Counter RTRS Movement 
The counter RTRS movement is pessimistic about the way in which soy production 
will contribute to Mercosur economies by promoting jobs and growth and the extent 
to which it can be promoted alongside environmental and social objectives.  Such 
concerns have led author and activist Eduardo Galeano to declare soy a ‘salvavida de 
plomo’ (a lead lifejacket), saying “this means bread for today but hunger for 
tomorrow” (Galeano 2006).  In this spirit, an impressive rallying of available resources 
and interest resulted in a surprisingly coherent reaction to the first meeting of the 
RTRS.  This is surprising, because to this day, the counter-RTRS movement lacks the 
distinct administrative and organizational corpus or the unified identity that have been 
achieved by the RTRS.   
 
Within the discourse of the counter-RTRS movement, the RTRS participants are 
constructed as dishonest cheaters who are concerned with nothing aside from the 
expansion of soy.  The objective of the RTRS was said to be an opportunity for the 
legitimization, rather than the transformation of the role of soy production.   
 
Everyone related to the production of soy will analyze and will 
decide upon strategies to continue expanding the soy model in our 
country and our continent… they try like this – confusing and 
cheating – to change the public opinion about the ecological and 
social disaster that they are causing (BASEIS 2006)43.  
 
Responsible soy always appears in quotation marks; the concept is considered 
impossible, and any attempt to establish ‘responsible’ large scale soy production would 
be based on lies, because ‘responsible soy’ is, in and of itself, a contradiction.  The soy 
industry has become a tacit way of describing a model of development, based on 
export crops, necessitating economic globalization and global integration – that are 
synonymous with colonization and loss of local and national sovereignty.   
 
The name, ‘responsible production’ of large scale soy is a fallacy, a 
demagogic expression used to hide the interests of the business 
sector in alliance with transnational corporations in response to the 
growing state of citizen consciousness regarding national and regional 
economic alternatives based on democracy, participation, inclusion 
                                               
43 todos relacionados con la producción de la soja  analizaran y decidirán estrategias para continuar 
expandiendo el modelo sojero en nuestro país y nuestro continente… pretenden asimismo – 
confundiendo y enganando – cambiar la imagen ante la opinion publica del desastre ecologico y social 
que estan ocasionando 
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and social, political, economic and environmental sustainability 
(ASEED 2006)44.   
 
Inherently the ‘soy model’ defies true development and true sustainability, based on 
democracy, participation and inclusion.  Soy as an ‘engine of growth’ results in active 
underdevelopment, culminating in absolute exclusion of  ‘the people’.  In stark 
contrast to the image of soy as a mechanism of local, national and regional 
development and prosperity, the counter movement charges that soy production leads 
to environmental destruction and the underdevelopment of society:  “All monocrops 
are destroyers of the ecosystems where they are installed; they generate poverty; 
unemployment; they exclude and expulse the local population” (BASEIS 2006)45.  The 
fields under soy cultivation become ‘green deserts’, a powerful trope which evokes 
environmental degradation, and the absence of people:  “The expansion of the “green 
deserts” that are all monocrops like soy, pasture and exotic trees, that promote an 
agriculture with machines, without peasants, without people”  (BASEIS 2006)46.   
 
Furthermore, countries succumbing to soy expansion are seen to be suffering the 
continued effects of colonization and oppression in the world order:   
  
According to the received wisdom, our countries must believe in 
the free market (even though it does not exist), honour the debt 
(even though it is dishonourable) attract investment (even though it 
is undignified), and enter into the World (even though it is through 
the service door).  Enter the World: the World is the market.  The 
market is global, where they buy countries.  Nothing new… This 
sad routine of the centuries began with gold and silver, followed by 
sugar, tobacco, guano, saltpetre, copper, rubber, cocoa, banana, 
coffee, petroleum.  What did those splendours leave us with? They 
left us without inheritance or desire.  Gardens converted to deserts, 
abandoned countryside, perforated mountains, rotten waters, 
caravans of unhappy people, condemned to hard times, empty 
palaces where ghosts wander… 47 (Galeano 2006) 
                                               
44 La llamada “producción responsable” de soja a gran escala es una falacia, una expresión demagógica 
usada para esconder los intereses del sector empresarial aliado con las corporaciones transnacionales 
frente al creciente estado de conciencia ciudadana sobre alternativas económicas nacionales y regionales 
en decidido proceso de construcción, basadas en la democracia, la participación, la inclusión y la 
sustentabilidad social, política, económica y ambiental, 
45 Todos los monocultivos son destructores de los ecosistemas en que se instalan; genera pobreza; 
desempleo; excluyen y expulsan a la población local 
46 La expansión de los “desiertos verdes” que son todos los monocultivos como los de soja, pasturas y 
árboles exóticos, promueve una agricultura con máquinas, sin campesinos, sin gente 
47 “Según la voz de mando, nuestros países deben creer en la libertad de comercio (aunque no exista), 
honrar la deuda (aunque sea deshonrosa), atraer inversiones (aunque sean indignas) y entrar al mundo 
(aunque sea por la puerta de servicio). Entrar al mundo: el mundo es el mercado. El mercado mundial, 
donde se compran países. Nada de nuevo…Esta triste rutina de los siglos empezó con el oro y la plata y 
siguió con el azúcar, el tabaco, el guano, el salitre, el cobre, el estaño, el caucho, el cacao, la banana, el 
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The opposition to the RTRS insists that their version of history be accounted for, and 
that the patterns of the past need to be considered in decisions for the future:  
 
Who will take responsibility for the environmental pollution caused 
by approximately 20 million litres of chemicals dumped on 
Paraguay this year?, The destruction of streams, rivers, springs and 
wetlands? The eviction of almost a hundred thousand small 
farmers from their homes and fields? The assassination of more 
than one hundred peasant leaders? The forced relocation and 
ethnocide of Indigenous Peoples and communities? The charges 
pressed against more than 2,000 small farmers for their legitimate 
resistance to this predatory system? Large scale soy monocultures 
are NOT possible without this litany of adverse impacts (ASEED 
2006).   
 
The basic charges of the counter-conference alliance are that the ‘development model’ 
which soy production epitomizes, is ‘irresponsible, unsustainable and anti-democratic’.  
The alternative development model proposed is one that:  
 
…promotes community sustainability and sovereignty, based on 
the specific characteristics of each territory. Such a model would 
produce healthy and competitive crops, while simultaneously 
promoting the decentralization of power and democratic decision-
making about land-use and production. Furthermore, it would be 
based on equitable land distribution and would halt social 
exclusion, eviction and forced displacement by reviewing legal land 
tenure and titles to ensure that they regulate and limit extensive 
large scale agricultural production. (ASEED 2006). 
 
The discourse of the counter-conference refutes the legitimacy of the RTRS by:  
1) rejecting outrightly, the conceptual possibility of ‘responsible soy’;  
2) by rejecting the possibility of a consensus among stakeholders on the 
definitions of key concepts such as sustainability; and,  
3) by asserting that the solution to the problems of soy impacts would require a 
change in the ‘model of development’.   
 
                                                                                                                                    
café, el petróleo... ¿Qué nos dejaron esos esplendores? Nos dejaron sin herencia ni querencia. Jardines 
convertidos en desiertos, campos abandonados, montañas agujereadas, aguas podridas, largas caravanas 
de infelices condenados a la fuerte temprana, vacíos palacios donde deambulan los fantasmas ” Galeano, 
E. (2006). Salvavidas De Plomo. La Jornada. D.F. Mexico City. 
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Table 7.2: Elements of soy discourses (source: Author) 
 
 RTRS Conference Counter-Conference 
Tropes 
Green Gold Green Desert 
Triple bottom line Green-washing 
Discursive Claims 
Consensus possible Consensus impossible 
RTRS process inclusive RTRS concept inherently 
exclusive 
Soy important globally Soy only for export - Focus 
on local markets 
Capitalist Populist 
Global Integration  Autonomy 
Globalization Colonization 
Pragmatism Ideology 
Agricultural intensification, 
increased productivity 
Monoculture 
Required Action Sustainable techniques Enforcement of legislation 
Adoption of different 
development model 
 
The kind of vehement opposition to the RTRS process epitomized by the resistance 
movement of campesino organizations has resonated throughout the criteria 
development process (See Table 7.2). Consequently, the criteria development process 
cannot be characterized by the development of a stable policy network and consensus 
around cognitive beliefs about what sustainable soy production entails. Deliberations 
within the RTRS have not lead to a set of uncontested, neutral and pragmatic 
certification criteria. Rather, agreement has coalesced around the larger narrative that 
speaks to the need for alternatives to soy production, but different policy actors 
account for this need in vastly disparate ways. For example, for soy producers, the 
imperative lies in reassuring European consumers of benign soy production; for 
international environmental organizations, the priority is to reduce the impacts of 
deforestation; for small producers, the issues of decreasing land availability and the 
harmful effects of pesticide use are paramount. Perhaps predictably, these perspectives 
are manifest very differently in the debate about what comprises ‘responsible soy’, even 
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within the RTRS. Ultimately, contestation, rather than consensus, has been the 
hallmark of the RTRS process.  
 
7.4.5 Coalition structure: Shifting alliances 
Within the RTRS, discourse coalitions have been formed by previously antagonistic 
groups of actors, such as environmental NGOs and soy producers. Within these 
coalitions, “the search for policy relevant facts is not unimportant, but it takes a back 
seat to storylines that offer social orientation, reassurance, or guidance” (Fischer 
2003:103). Discourse coalitions create conditions under which even unlikely alliances 
can be formed, imbuing particular ways of framing problems, and their solutions, with 
greater (and potentially increasing) power and resilience vis-à-vis alternatives. 
 
How new alliances have been enabled by the language of responsible soy was 
impeccably illustrated, when the Moises Bertoni Foundation (FMB)48, accepted a 5-
year contract with Desarrollo Agricola del Paraguay (DAP), a consortium of 
Paraguayan, Argentinean, Brazilian and American investors in Paraguay. As a 
participating organization in the RTRS, DAP implemented the idea of a sustainable soy 
production project on four properties accounting for  over 20,000 hectares in San 
Pedro, Paraguay. The contract was for consultancy services; the FMB would advise 
and implement environmental protection and rural development strategies to achieve 
sustainable soy production on the landholdings of DAP. While the initiation of the 
RTRS to some extent, legitimated the approach of DAP, it remained controversial for 
some FMB staff members and observers nonetheless because of past tension between 
environmental NGOs and the soy industry. Furthermore, some believed that the 
RTRS had inspired few, if any, changes in soy production practices and that the only 
shifts were the rhetoric used to legitimate soy production among those who were close 
to its problems. The fact that the FMB involved itself so closely with DAP through its 
initiation of the production of soy (sustainable or not) is only part of its controversy – 
three of the ten founding members, and principal investors in DAP are also long time 
board members of the FMB, some founding members. An alliance between soy 
producers and environmental NGOs, a notion that would have been unthinkable only 
a few years earlier, became not only possible, but considered by many as ‘progressive’. 
                                               
48 Discussed at length in Chapter 5. 
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This opened the door to the possibility of new alliances and partnerships that hitherto 
would not have been logistically nor ethically feasible.  
 
More generally within the RTRS, the sustainable soy discourse has made possible a 
degree of reconciliation between the environmental and empresarial agendas, to an 
extent that earlier observers of the RTRS process could not likely have predicted. Early 
in 2009, agro-services giants Monsanto and Syngenta were admitted as members to the 
RTRS, sparking an outcry from the public and from other RTRS members. These 
alliances may become insurmountably problematic because of the inability to integrate 
these companies into a discourse of sustainability, even at the most basic level, given 
their devilish public image and an environmental and social track record considered by 
some to be inexcusably, inarguably unsustainable. Whether or not these alliances 
become too difficult for some RTRS members to reconcile with the overarching 
storyline of sustainable soy, remains to be seen.  
 
The RTRS has been at least partly responsible for shifting alliances in the debate about 
the soy industry. Introducing the concept of sustainability (or, responsibility) into the 
proximity of the soy debate, has made a relationship of cooperation, rather than 
castigation, viable between environmental NGOs and soy producers. This has 
jeopardized their alliance with campesinos, whose larger suite of grievances were at 
least partially embedded in environmental issues.  Indeed, the alliance between some 
environmental NGOs and campesino groups has been a casualty of the RTRS, as the 
approach of environmental NGOs’ toward soy producers shifts from castigation to 
encouragement, cooperation and support for responsible soy production. 
Environmental interests are an effective rallying point between campesino groups and 
environmental NGOs, against soy producers. However, if the RTRS becomes an 
organisation that is seen to address environmental issues, and can help bestow 
credibility on large landholders who are working towards criteria compliance, this may 
jeopardize the wider legitimacy of campesino grievances against them.  
 
7.5 From sustainable to deliberative soy  
Within the RTRS proceedings, evidence is privileged on the basis that it is fact, and it is 
expected that rational stakeholders will participate in debates using this fact as a starting 
point.  However, the idea that participation should be shaped by knowledge within the 
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RTRS about so-called sustainable agricultural techniques has been clearly rejected by 
campesino groups, who rather than participating in the RTRS, have opted out of the 
discussions altogether.  This rejection underlines that these facts represent (rather than 
reflect) one perspective of what might comprise sustainable soy in a way that distinctly 
favours international environmental organizations, large landowners and agribusiness.  
Further, this representation dominates the RTRS proceedings, not because it is more 
accurate or truthful than others, but because it is advanced through power relationships 
within the RTRS and a trust in information presented as ‘evidence’.   
 
The RTRS was conceived of as a relatively straightforward, participatory process that 
would convene evidence about sustainable soy production techniques thereby creating 
consensus and cohesion among policy actors with regards to the facts about potential 
certification criteria. By improving the social and environmental conditions surrounding 
soy production, it was commonly held within the RTRS, that the process was bound to 
benefit stakeholders by improving the performance of soy producers. This is the case, 
even if the improvements are marginal.  But as we have seen, the RTRS has not garnered 
full participation by stakeholders. Notwithstanding the deep interest that campesinos 
have in the governance of the soy industry, they organized vehement public protests 
against the RTRS meetings. The opposition maintains an ongoing critique of the RTRS 
process and of the soy industry more generally.   
 
The seeming openness to participation of the RTRS, and the language of consensus and 
‘win-win’ scenarios causes some stakeholders within the RTRS to question the rational 
basis for opposition.  Particularly as their challenges to the criteria development process 
are not based on direct critique of the proposed agricultural practices and zoning laws 
that were proposed to make soy sustainable.  Indeed, challenges to the RTRS were not 
aimed at the technical or scientific basis for criteria development. Rather, they were 
aimed at the larger RTRS discourse that suggests as a matter of fact: the inevitability and 
goodness of the soy industry; of sustainability in the soy industry being a matter of 
technical solutions;  and even the very possibility of a  link between soy and 
sustainability.  
 
What has been taken for fact in the RTRS debates about sustainable soy, is not a 
matter of epistemological superiority, but of apparent differential power relations 
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within the roundtable.  What started out as a potentially transformative exercise, to 
address grievances against the soy industry, has ultimately resulted in confirmation and 
reinforcement of the status quo.  There has been no shift in power relations nor in 
social order at large.  In fact, the proceedings of the RTRS may even strengthen 
existing power relations by institutionalizing further disregard for a large part of the 
campesino experience and host of grievances.  Spelling further detriment to 
Campesinos, the discourse of sustainable soy seems to have jeopardized the alliance 
between campesinos and conservationists by creating the possibility for a new alliance 
between the traditionally antagonistic conservationists and agriculturalists.  
 
It was not participation that was rejected by the campesinos, but participation shaped 
by these discursive facts and the supposedly neutral evidence of how soy cultivation 
practices could be sustainable through the right practices and legislation.  Therefore, 
unwilling to be a part of RTRS discussions, they stepped outside of the RTRS process 
in order to advance their own discourse of soy and sustainable soy in particular, which 
differs radically from that of the RTRS’ protagonists.  As a result, the campesino 
discourse is largely absent in the RTRS debates; the development of sustainability 
certification criteria for soy is destined to contain and promote only the discourses of 
large, powerful actors such as the WWF and even larger and more powerful actors 
such as Andre Maggi, Cargill and Monsanto.   
 
7.5.1 A deliberative future for the RTRS? 
Authors have suggested that campesinos in the soy producing regions of South 
America have been left out of negotiations and the general debate about the role of,  
and regulations that should pertain to, soy production and further soy expansion in 
this part of the world.  This is partly true, but omits an important point.  Campesino 
representatives were invited to the negotiations and the ‘door remains open’ for them 
to participate in the future, but many of them have not only vehemently refused to 
participate, but have orchestrated coherent action against RTRS proceedings.  The 
most visible and coherent opposition to the RTRS has been established at substantial 
discursive distance from it.  My analysis has shown that it is in fact positioned in direct 
opposition.  This is significant, because the formulation of criteria for ‘responsible soy’ 
that is broadly inclusive of diverse stakeholders requires the establishment of some 
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common linguistic terrain.  Thus,  the new possibilities for the creation of shared 
problem definitions once a new language is agreed upon are foregone (Bostrom 2003).   
There are at least two possible scenarios that could explain how this anti-RTRS 
discourse will position the participating actors in future debates about soy production 
in Paraguay.  The first is that the RTRS will lose legitimacy altogether because of the 
lack of inclusion of a more critical approach to the potential sustainability of soy 
production, particularly considering the increasing publication of its severely negative 
impacts.  This would not be without precedent.  The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm 
Oil (RSPO), a parallel initiative, has been widely dismissed as a failure for just such 
reasons.     
 
The second possible scenario is that the Campesino groups are effectively left out of 
any future proceedings or decision-making.  As Fischer notes, without a common 
linguistic terrain upon which ideological battles may be fought out, there exists the risk,  
 
…of losing its direct influence and therefore often trades its 
expressive freedom for influence on the policymaking process.  
Given a hegemonic discourse, people who try to challenge the 
dominant storyline are often expected to position their 
contribution in terms of established categories (Fischer 
2003:88).   
 
By rejecting outrightly, the possibility of ‘sustainable’ or ‘responsible’ soy, this counter-
movement may have lost any possibility they may have had, to become ‘officially’ 
involved in the debate.  They have effectively shut down future opportunities to 
comment on what might comprise more or less responsible soy from within the RTRS 
decision-making body.  They have refused a role in the discourse coalition of the 
RTRS, by taking such a strong position against it, and by using parentheses around 
many of the linguistic categories established by the RTRS.  This is all the more 
important considering the RTRS is positioned to be the dominant discourse coalition 
in the debate about responsible soy. This analysis points to the need to critically engage 
with discourses of knowledge to give further space to marginalized groups in 
deliberations. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
The pragmatic debate about whether or not certification systems lead to positive or 
negative outcomes in terms of environmental and social sustainability is no doubt an 
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important one. However, alone, it only begs improvements in technical knowledge, for 
improved policy and more desired outcomes. This paradigm overlooks the issue of 
how within the development of certification criteria for sustainability, powerful 
agendas are often imposed on the less powerful actors in negotiations and decision-
making.  
Ultimately, any certification label that emerges from the RTRS criteria development 
process may put the global consumer at ease, and may well even result in reduced 
environmental impacts through improved agricultural practices and planning and 
zoning. On the other hand such a label is unlikely to address issues such as a more 
equitable distribution of land and opportunities that, for many campesinos, are at the 
heart of the problems with the soy industry. Once the criteria for sustainable soy have 
been finalized, soy producers will eventually begin to cultivate ‘responsible soy’ and it 
will be promoted and most probably accepted as such in international markets. 
However, like its conceptual cousins, products labelled sustainable, fair and otherwise, 
there is a strong possibility that over time the political asymmetries in the discursive 
struggles that have given rise to the responsible soy certification criteria, will become 
of secondary concern. 
 
The rational application of factual knowledge about sustainable soy production cannot 
alone explain the outcomes of the RTRS certification criteria development process. 
Rather, the outcomes reflect how discourses about the soy problematic contain and 
incite political struggle. Campesinos have been disadvantaged in this struggle and the 
RTRS process has born political costs to them. Indeed, analyzing the RTRS and 
counter-RTRS discourses illuminates ways in which certification systems, far from 
being pragmatic exercises in the development of sound, efficient and effective criteria 
for sustainable agricultural production are profoundly influenced by power 
relationships.  
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Chapter 8 
Critical deliberative governance: Rethinking participation and the 
politics of evidence in environmental governance 
 
This thesis began by asking the question: How do policy positions reflect normative positions in 
spite of appearing to privilege evidence in environmental decision-making and what does this mean for 
the relative contribution of participation and evidence to policy making?  To answer this question, I 
considered the following, in the context of environmental governance:  
 
• How and why might public participation pose legitimate challenges to evidence-
based policy implications for environmental governance?  
• What is considered to be evidence in environmental policy and how can it be 
often privileged in policy debates?   
• To what extent is evidence influenced by social and political factors?   
 
These questions become evermore important as ‘new’ modes of governance based on 
participation and deliberation are increasingly promoted, but often not reflected in 
environmental decision making (Fischer 2009; Dressler, Buscher et al. 2010).  Calls for 
greater participation, in large part, have been unsuccessful because they have not been 
accompanied by sufficient recognition of the normative arguments for policy 
inclusiveness; they have also neglected sufficient attention to barriers to achieving it .   
  
This thesis has combined the theoretical inquiry of C hapters 3 and 4 with the empirical 
investigation of Chapters 5, 6 and 7 to propose a response to these hitherto inadequate 
treatments of evidence and participation in policy studies.  Ethnographic fieldwork was 
undertaken for a total of 23 months over a four and a half year period, involving a 
variety of data collection methods.  The principal methods were participant observation, 
individual and focus group interviews and textual analysis.  Through these methods, I 
elicited data on three separate cases of governance mechanisms, that emphasize 
evidence and participation in environmental decision making.   
 
Each of the three empirical chapters of this thesis has analyzed a governance 
mechanism, selected because it has drawn on or generated evidence for decision making 
support in environmental policy.  However, with increasing attention toward 
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participation in policy making, have typically incorporated allowances for greater public 
involvement than was typically the case.  Straight conservation has incorporated 
productive activities through integrated conservation and development and landscape 
approaches (Twyman 2000; Hernandez, Janapa et al. 2003).  Modeling is rarely spoken 
about as the strict domain of experts; participatory modeling has become a policy 
mainstay (Cinderby 1999; Van der Sluijs 2001; Robbins 2003). Finally, public acceptance 
of certification standards as legitimate has come to depend largely on the input 
legitimacy bestowed by public participation in processes that lead to their development 
(Auld and Bull 2003; McDaniel 2003; Auld and Gulbrandsen 2010).   
 
Each of these governance mechanisms has been used in Paraguay as a means of 
achieving both environmental and democratic outcomes.  This is important in Paraguay 
as the country is widely seen as undergoing rapid and extensive environmental 
degradation.  Much of this is blamed on a lack of expertise and elite capture of decision-
making.  Moreover, the participatory aspects of these mechanisms are understood as 
going some way towards addressing the historic and continued exclusion of much of 
the public from decision-making, including environmental decision-making.   
 
Even in the context of such emphasis on participation, I found that evidence is treated 
unproblematically as the ‘best’ approach to defining and solving environmental 
problems (Leshner 2002; Clark and Dickson 2003).  In each case, I examined this ‘best’ 
approach – the evidence based policy recommendations.  Land classification led to 
recommendations of conservation and sustainable development (chapter 5).  Computer 
models led to recommendations of sustainable agriculture (chapter 6).  Standards 
development led to recommendations of sustainable techniques and zoning (chapter 7).  
I analyzed these recommendations and found that these unproblematized policy 
implications became problematic, as the evidence in each case came to be more 
completely understood as embedded in, and contingent on, wider social and political 
contexts.  Such contexts illuminate the complexity and uncertainty of evidence based 
policy as leading to some ‘best approach’.   
 
My analysis leads to three main findings.  The first is that deliberation can present 
legitimate and rational arguments in policy debate.  Secondly, public participation in 
conservation, modelling and standards development is often shaped and constrained by 
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what is considered evidence within these governance mechanisms.  Emergent norms are 
considered rational policy inputs only insofar as they are compatible with that which is 
presented as the evidence.  These first two findings lead to a rethinking of participation.  
Thirdly, while evidence is considered such because it is assumed to be based on fact, 
evidence-based arguments are often deeply influenced by social and political factors.  
These factors are fundamental in developing rationales for and against conservation, in 
navigating the complexity of the trade-offs depicted by models, and in assessing the 
extent to which soy production can be deemed sustainable.  This third finding leads to a 
rethinking of evidence.   
 
As a result of these findings, and the consequent rethinking of participation and 
evidence, I argue for a new theoretical approach to environmental governance, based 
on critical deliberative governance.  The framework emphasizes deliberation, because it 
posits that the main importance of public involvement in decision-making does not 
reference logistical advantages or buy in, as is sometimes suggested by those who 
advocate for participation.  Rather, from a deliberative standpoint, the importance of 
public involvement in decision-making is that rational and democratic policy making 
depends on it.  The framework is critical, because within it, evidence is not treated as a 
neutral and objective reflection of nature, but as socially influenced and politically 
influential.  Thus, evidence should not be automatically privileged over participation in 
policy debates, and evidence should be evaluated with consideration for its social and 
political commitments.    
 
Chapter 8, which concludes this work, synthesizes the empirical and theoretical inquiries 
undertaken, and brings them to bear on the central research question of this thesis.  It 
begins with the ways in which this research has led to a rethinking of participation and 
evidence respectively.  The third section discusses the implications of these findings for 
governance theory and public policy.  This section poses a way of operationalizing 
critical deliberative governance through three new policy principles.  I conclude with 
some comments on the future of critical deliberative governance.       
 
8.1 Rethinking participation: the need for deliberation  
This thesis has argued for a rethinking of participation, as participatory designs often 
fall short of enhancing inclusiveness in policy debate.  Despite that the rise of 
 222 
participation in the 1980’s as the new development orthodoxy seemed a welcome shift 
from top-down policy orientations, critiques of tokenism and instrumentalism 
dampened enthusiasm for the participatory turn (Cooke and Kothari 2001).  Such 
critiques charged that participatory approaches to development tended to lead to 
negative, albeit often unintended, consequences such as overriding legitimate decision-
making processes , undermining local knowledge systems (Mosse 2001), reinforcement 
of powerful interests and, stifling other potentially advantageous methodologies (Cooke 
and Kothari 2001).  But such critiques did not lead to the abandonment of participatory 
approaches to policy and planning; a commitment to the inclusion of public 
representation in public decision making persists.  However, concern for inclusiveness 
in policy processes is increasingly manifest in the language and theory of deliberation 
(Blowers, Boersema et al. 2005; Fischer 2009; Bäckstrand, Khan et al. 2010; Dore and 
Lebel 2010).   
 
Deliberation is hardly a new concept – but, as chapter 3 recounts, its usage has 
undergone a transformation over the past decades.  Indeed, the environmental and 
democratic wisdom of green politics has been extensively questioned, and what I have 
labelled ‘contemporary’ approaches to deliberation have been somewhat distanced from 
these green political beginnings (Jasanoff 2003; Fischer 2009; Dryzek 2010).  What 
makes these more contemporary approaches deliberative, however, is a continued and 
increasingly critical emphasis on communication as a means of democratic rationality.  
That is, the assertion that through free, equal and unencumbered communication, 
different perspectives can become the basis for rational policy, rather than a challenge 
for rational policy.   Thus, as a basis for public representation in decision-making, 
deliberation offers conceptual improvements over participation.  This is because in the 
deliberative purview, public inclusion cannot be reduced to acting as a vehicle for 
assuring the efficiency or effectiveness of predetermined decisions, nor a way of 
validating a priori policy positions.  Rather, deliberative policy processes are 
fundamentally necessary for rational policy outcomes (Fischer 2003; Hajer and 
Wagenaar 2003; Fischer 2004; Dryzek 2006; Fischer 2009; Dryzek 2010).  
 
The schemes to effect participation, adopted by each of my case studies, illustrate that 
when evidence is privileged, inclusive policy debate becomes impossible (see Table 8.1).  
For example, when evidence is generated within the governance mechanisms of 
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landscape classification, land-use models and sustainable soy criteria to create visions of 
sustainability, these visions become remarkably resilient.  Perspectives that do not 
coincide with the vision of sustainability that they create, are pushed to the margins of 
policy debate.  Such perspectives are often branded as uneducated, un-environmental, 
irrelevant or even attempted sabotage.  The participatory dimension of policy making 
(seen to contribute the normative dimension) is limited by, and shaped by, the facts 
(seen to be established through the evidence-gathering exercises presented in the cases).  
This is because participation is seen to be normative, not factual, and this normative basis 
for policy is taken as secondary to the factual basis. 
 
Chapter 5 showed how standardized landscape classification and associated models of 
conservation with development predetermine the FMB’s interventions in the 
Mbaracayú.  Supporting such classification and intervention regimes is the identification 
of the Interior Atlantic Forest a ‘biodiversity hotspot’ where rapid land-use change, in 
particular, agricultural expansion, creates an urgent need to protect disappearing 
ecological resources.  A dire account of the fading ‘vital signs’, along with inventories of 
Table 8.1: Rethinking participation in environmental governance (Source:Author) 
Governance 
mechanisms: 3 
case studies 
Means of participation Indications of (non)- 
participatory outcomes 
Conservation 
landscapes 
Sustainable rural development  
 
Standardized interventions 
implemented 
Key interventions not up for 
debate 
Land use 
modeling 
Community based indicators 
(CBI) 
Publicly organized evaluation 
of scenario trade offs 
CBIs are unusable 
Simplistic trade-offs seem 
obvious and eliminate the 
need for debate 
 
Certification 
systems 
Consultative framework 
Committee representation 
Web-based feedback on criteria 
iterations 
Dissenting voices are labelled 
uncooperative and irrational 
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‘unique biodiversity’ and damning reports of ‘human impacts’ lead obviously to policy 
recommendations of protection and exclusion49.  Furthermore, they lead to a focus in 
rural development interventions on sustainable agricultural techniques, with little 
attention to the barriers to adopting new practices, or development more generally, such 
as infrastructure and investment.     
 
Thus, despite the increasing talk of local participation in conservation landscapes, 
conservation itself is a key intervention that is not up for debate.  Indeed, rather than 
opening conservation to questioning and scrutiny, local participation in the 
conservation landscape instead takes the form of sustainable rural development.   This 
is seen as a concrete way that local people can contribute to the conservation landscape 
by reducing pressure on the conservation area and by contributing to broader 
sustainability in the wider region.  Conservation remains the core intervention and the 
central concern as opposed to producer livelihoods.   
 
Chapter 6 showed how rather than helping to shape the modeling exercise, participation 
was actually shaped by the models.  Three main forums were established for 
participatory contributions to the land use planning process.  The first forum was a 
series of focus groups to establish community based indicators for use in the models.  
The community based indicators would be modelled alongside the expert led indicators, 
ensuring that local concerns were part of the scenario outputs.  For different reasons, 
however, including technical incompatibility, indirect relationships with land use, and 
the lack of data availability, the  community based indicators that were established were 
unusable with the ALCES.   
 
The second forum for establishing public participation in land use modelling was the 
process of building consensus about land use planning goals.  The goals of maintaining 
the rich biodiversity of the RNBM, sustainable use of the natural resources in the CARJ, 
and improving the well-being of local residents are uncontroversial and self-evident.  
However, once details emerge about what these goals actually mean from different 
perspectives, this establishment of a normative framework for planning becomes much 
more complex and problematic.   
 
                                               
49 http://www.biodiversityhotspots.org/xp/hotspots/atlantic_forest/Pages/default.aspx 
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Similarly, the third forum for establishing public participation in land use modelling 
became a distinctly non-deliberative exercise.   The idea of the modelling exercise was 
to expose the respective scenarios (the modelling outputs) to public scrutiny and debate 
about their associated advantages, disadvantages and trade-offs.  This would lead to 
collective decision-making about which land use trajectory should be pursued.  The 
modelling exercise presented three scenarios:  business as usual (continued use of 
unsustainable agriculture by smallholders); increasing the quantity of protected area; and 
finally, the implementation of sustainable agriculture (involving the implementation of 
no-till agriculture by smallholders).  The scenarios clearly showed, that under the 
circumstances that were modelled, that the choices on offer were: ‘health, wealth and a 
bountiful environment’ on the one hand; and ‘disaster, degradation and ruin’ on the 
other.  Thus, assessment of the trade-offs between different land-use scenarios became 
needless, as the implications of any alternative to the evidence-based policy 
recommendations were unthinkable.   
 
Finally, as discussed in Chapter 7, the participatory design of the sustainable soy 
certification standards development process was key to its legitimacy, in a wider public  
environment of open hostility towards the soy industry.  Thus, all interested 
stakeholders were invited to deliberate on the ways in which soy production could be 
sustainable in technical terms.  Several measures were taken to ensure that the standards 
development process was participatory and inclusive: open invitations to meeting; 
careful attention paid to representing major stakeholder groups in committees and 
working groups; and open, public access to documents online, and online forums for 
public feedback and critique of iterative versions of the standards proposals.  However, 
the discussions about sustainability into which this participation was welcomed, focused 
on the technical requirements such as protecting soil quality and zoning agricultural 
expansion away from areas of high biodiversity.  Once some groups, particularly 
campesino groups, expressed a need to address questions of sustainable soy at a broader 
level, beyond these technical requirements, their contributions were branded unhelpful, 
uncooperative, and irrational.   
 
Each of the empirical cases show how local participation in environmental governance 
is invited, but only within the confines of what is seen as the baseline facts.  Thus, 
rather than generating new norms for policy, or identifying alternative norms, 
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participation in these cases can only reinforce more established, or dominant normative 
frameworks.  To reiterate the main point made at the beginning of this section, 
participation and evidence are commonly seen to contribute the norms and the facts 
respectively, to policy debates.   
 
While norms are negotiable, facts are seen as fixed.  But this rationale for the relegation 
of the contributions of participation to policy as secondary, is flawed in three respects.  
First, many authors see that policy is not primarily based on facts, but on norms.  This 
is particularly the case with respect to complex, ‘ill-formed’ problems that resonate 
differently for different stakeholders (Funtowicz and Ravetz 2001; Turner 2003; Fischer 
2009).  In such cases, the significant debates rarely centre around how to get something 
done, but rather, what it is that should be done in the first place  (Fischer 2009).  
Secondly, we must consider that participation is also a basis for facts in policy debates 
(Wynne 1996a; Basset and Zeuli 2000).  Often these facts, however, stand apart from 
‘formal’ evidence because they are not associated with the appropriate culture or 
process – they do not fit within the boundaries of this formality (Jasanoff 1987; Eden 
1996; Gieryn 1999).  Furthermore, they may be seen as having questionable relevance to 
the environmental policy problem at hand.  For example, some of campesinos’ 
contributions to policy debates regard inequality, seemingly viewed as peripheral to the 
issue of sustainability by the FMB or the ALCES modeller.  This suggests that the facts 
are relevant when they are associated with the ‘right’ normative position about 
conservation priorities and sustainability.   
 
The third reason why the separation of facts and norms is a flawed basis for policy 
debate is that facts are coproduced with norms.  Coproduction challenges assumptions 
about the factual basis of evidence, used to present arguments that are seemingly neutral 
and objective, thus privileged over normative arguments, and insulated from debate 
(Jasanoff 2004; Miller 2004).  The next section will rethink evidence, examining how 
establishing facts in each of the cases of evidence based policy, has depended on values, 
norms and judgements and thus, are inextricably linked with the social and political 
world.  
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8.2 Rethinking evidence: Critical improvements of deliberation 
Chapter 4 discussed how evidence often enjoys privileged access to credibility and 
authority in policy debate because of fact claims.  These claims are based on realist 
assumptions that through positivist methodology, evidence reflects, rather than 
interprets nature, and that such knowledge can then be neutrally applied to policy, 
leading to the ‘best’ outcomes (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998).   Thus, perspectives based 
on evidence cannot be considered just another contribution to policy debates (Turner 
2001; Turner 2003).  Rather, these perspectives are privileged when they are assumed to 
be based on facts rather than values, beliefs or norms.  Chapter 4 continued, that when 
opened up to critical analysis, evidence is found to embed value, judgement and 
normative position (Jasanoff 1990; Jasanoff 1992).  Furthermore, these values, beliefs 
and norms also influence which facts are considered as evidence, and which are not.  
This finding at once contextualizes and tempers the authority of evidence, and 
reinforces the role of normative decision-making.  Thus, evidence and the expert 
practices that give rise to it, need to become central to the work of policy analysts.   
 
Returning to the empirical cases in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, I examined the evidence created 
within and used by each of the environmental governance mechanisms.  Evidence, in 
each of the cases, was expected to lead to somewhat unproblematic policy implications.  
In each case, however, the evidence-based policy implications were contentious.  At one 
level, the analyses show why the implications were not universally taken as the best 
approach to environmental governance.  Evidence and the corresponding policy 
implications systematically present oversimplified, one-dimensional, decontextualized, 
depoliticized interpretations of sustainable development.  At another level, the analysis 
shows that the factual claims that make up the evidence-based policy recommendations 
are not always empirically supportable, and further, bear social and political influence 
(see Table 8.2).    
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Table 8.2: Rethinking evidence in environmental governance (Source: Author) 
 
 
Assessments of the Mbaracayú as an international ‘hotspot’ for biodiversity, are taken as 
evidence of the need for conservation with development interventions.  The 
implementation of conservation and sustainable development in the Mbaracayú 
subscribe to the rationale of zoning and land classification that has been adopted by 
integrated conservation and development and ‘lived-in landscape’ approaches.  In 
accordance with the Man and Biosphere landscape model, zones in the Mbaracayú has 
been cordoned off into the ‘core’ area, for conservation and the ‘buffer zone’ where 
sustainable development will contribute to the conservation of the core area and to the 
sustainability of the area overall.   The analysis in Chapter 5, however, shows this to be a 
reductionist account of the more complex history of the RNBM creation which goes 
beyond the need to protect biodiversity.   
 
The analysis in Chapter 5 also illustrates how standardized and portable landscape 
classifications, and the interventions they support, do not seem like the best approach, 
once the social, economic and political realities in the contexts where they applied, are 
considered .  Indeed, the conservation and sustainable development interventions that 
have been implemented in the Mbaracayú are problematic because they have been co-
produced with a narrow conception of sustainability and a limited consideration of 
environmental knowledge.   
Governance 
mechanisms: 3 case 
studies 
The facts in 
evidence  
The politics of evidence: Empirical 
scrutiny/normative contingency of 
evidence 
Conservation 
landscapes 
Conventional 
conservation with 
development 
interventions 
Ecological 
importance 
Land ownership is a questionable approach to 
conservation in a context of inequality and 
conflict over land. 
Rural development complex where risks are 
high, investments low, support unreliable and 
sustainability debated. 
Land-use modelling Expert led indicators 
Scenarios 
Policy implications 
Desegregation of advantages and 
disadvantages. 
Simplistic view of data requirements. 
Certification 
systems 
Development Group 
(DG): technical 
solutions for a ‘win-
win’ situation 
Counter-conference is able to rally its own 
evidence for opposing soy discourse. 
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The legibility enabled by standardized and portable landscape classifications, disables 
broader involvement in environmental governance.  Perspectives that reconsider and 
problematize the appropriateness and relevance of conservation and sustainable 
practices such as pesticide-intensive no-till agriculture are distinctly and pre-emptively 
excluded by the rationale of landscape classification. As the analysis showed in Chapter 
5 however, this rationale excludes certain ‘facts’, such as inequality, that question the 
appropriateness of conservation by land purchase and ownership.  Sustainable rural 
development, principally involving sustainable agriculture interventions, homogenizes 
campesinos in their use of ‘unsustainable practices’ despite that farm management 
techniques vary widely among campesinos, change over time and involve tried and true 
methods such as crop rotation and association.   A major consideration in the uptake of 
sustainable agriculture, is that many methods require substantial investment of time and 
money.  These barriers to adoption may be insurmountable for the poorest farmers.  
Chapter 6 offered a second analysis of the ‘best’ approach suggested by the evidence.  
The 50 year scenarios that were developed through the modelling program ALCES 
used a series of land-use options, and their relationship with three outcome indicators 
to demonstrate the unambiguous outcome of unsustainable agriculture: economic and 
ecological disaster and ruin.  In contrast, sustainable agriculture, would enable locals to 
avert disaster.  No-till cultivation, use on most soy farms in Paraguay, is defined in these 
scenarios as sustainable agriculture, because of its proven effect of maintaining soil 
quality.  Thus, it is the small farmers who are identified as using unsustainable 
agricultural techniques and upon whom the onus lies to shift towards sustainability.    
 
A closer look at the indicators used in the ALCES model, show that they do not 
provide an unbiased, unavoidable social and ecological trajectory for the Mbaracayú.  
Rather, they provide one perspective that is deeply influenced by a variety of caveats, 
including the technical requirements of the model.  My analysis illustrated these 
contingencies in 5 ways.  First, the model favours indicators with a short term, 
quantifiable relationship with land-use.  This excludes longer term concerns with a less 
direct or quantifiable relationship with land-use, such as health and education.  
Secondly, the selected indicators favoured particular reasons over others, for what 
indicator dimensions are most significant.  This affects the way in which the indicator is 
measured, and the ultimate policy implications of taking a particular view on an 
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indicator.  An example is the indicator of ‘natural area’.  If the indicator is considered 
important as wildlife habitat, then existence of natural area will be sufficient to measure 
the indicator.  However, if peoples’ access to resources is prioritized, then their access 
to the ‘natural area’ will be considered as a vital part of the indicator.   
 
The third problem with the identification and use of indicators with ALCES is that 
often, social, cultural, even geographical context determines what kind of data is 
required for a particular indicator.  Thus, some of the indicators were characterized by 
data requirements that were more complex than recognized.  For example, agricultural 
income is measured with data sources that account for productivity, production inputs 
and other costs, and the rate of small holder agricultural expansion. Intuitively, these 
data seem sufficient to arrive at a reasonable estimate of agricultural income for small 
producers. However, the community-based indicators suggest that other factors are 
highly relevant, such as commercialization support, means of transportation and 
improved infrastructure and technical assistance.  Fourthly, modelling scenarios favours 
indicators for which there is data, potentially overlooking the politics of missing data.  
Data availability is neither a politically neutral phenomenon nor does it have politically 
neutral consequences. Lastly, the indicators chosen favour specific elements of diverse 
livelihoods, such as agricultural income, over others such as subsistence production or 
remittances from participation in the migratory labour force.    
 
In Chapter 7, the analysis of the standards development process for sustainable soy 
illustrated a third case of evidence-based policy as the ‘best’ approach to environmental 
governance.  The process, initiated and promoted by the RTRS, gave rise to a discourse 
that asserts ‘responsible soy’ as a knowable and achievable phenomenon; that consensus 
can be reached regarding criteria for what responsible soy is and how it can be achieved; 
and ultimately, that the problems associated with soy can be addressed through 
technical changes to production methods and zoning legislation, to keep soy expansion 
away from areas of ‘ecological importance’.   
 
As Chapter 7 illustrated, the RTRS response to the problems and controversy 
surrounding the soy industry in Paraguay met with fierce criticism and staunch 
opposition.  In fact, the opposition argued that not only are the tenets of ‘responsible 
soy’ not knowable and achievable, but they are practical and conceptual impossibilities.  
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The opposition issued an outright rejection of the possibility of any consensus among 
stakeholders about the responsible soy criteria.  Opponents even rejected the potential 
for consensus regarding the definition of key concepts such as sustainability, given the 
vastly different perspectives on what might be accepted as sustainable and not.  Finally, 
the idea that technical solutions and zoning regulations can change the fundamentally 
exploitative practices and elitist model of soy production is soundly dismissed as a 
misrepresentative greenwash of the soy industry.  The opposition’s rejection of the 
RTRS discourse about responsible soy underlines that what the RTRS put forth as the 
‘facts’ about how soy can be produced sustainably are representations, rather than 
reflections, of sustainability within the soy industry.  
 
8.3 The politics of evidence: New insights for a theory and practice of critical 
deliberative governance 
8.3.1  Theory 
Critical deliberative governance framework contributes to social science theory by 
providing linkages between theoretical positions that conventionally have been viewed 
as irreconcilable by theorists.  The positions are broadly identified and discussed as 
deliberative governance, taking the Habermasian idea of communicative rationality as a 
guiding principle, and co-production, which is derived from a more Foucauldian 
approach to power and discourse.  Alone, each offers an incomplete approach to 
environmental governance.  These linkages address on-going critiques of each position, 
while advancing the central claims of each.  Each of these positions, I have argued, is 
necessary (but insufficient) for better environmental and democratic outcomes in 
environmental policy.   
 
As elaborated in chapters 3 and 4, deliberative governance and co-production offer 
perspectives on the governance-related issues of rationality, communication, democracy, 
and the fundamental relationship between truth and power.  Deliberative governance 
offers the hope of a universal rationality that is fundamentally based in norms and 
values.  Rationality is reached through communication that is open and accessible to 
public actors who all have the opportunity to affect the discursive outcomes.  
Establishing this rationality, a rationality that is the means of human emancipation, is 
the pragmatic goal of communication.  Truth, arising from unconstrained 
communication, and ultimately consensus, has a transformative effect on power.   
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Coproduction, on the other hand takes a different approach to these four elements of 
governance.  Rationality is a socially constructed phenomenon, potentially produced by 
power in society and social order more generally, rather than by unconstrained 
consensus.  Communication is predetermined by strategic discourse, regulated, 
constrained and shaped by social and political forces, often in those chambers where 
power resides.  This complicates the potential for democratic processes, as participation 
in debate is limited to that which is congruent with dominant discourses.  Truth and 
power are indistinguishable because they are co-produced.   
 
Table 8.3: Theoretical development towards critical deliberative governance 
(Source: Author) 
 Rationality 
 
Communication Democracy and 
Governance 
Relationship 
between Truth 
and Power 
Deliberative 
governance 
Universal yet 
normative 
 
Unconstrained 
consensus; 
continuously 
contested; 
Contingent/ 
ambiguous 
 
Hyper-rationalism? 
Communicative 
action/ deliberation 
 
Pragmatic; 
Generalized/ 
accessible;  
 
Symmetrical 
relationships  
Achievement of 
cultural rationality 
 
Potential for 
human 
emancipation 
Truth, as 
unconstrained 
consensus, becomes 
a normative 
foundation for 
critique. 
Co-
production 
 
 
In part socially 
constructed 
 
Coproduced with 
power; social order 
 
Abandoned? 
Strategic; Selective 
Pre-determined 
 
Regulated and 
restrained 
 
Power disparities; 
Exclusionary criteria 
for participation 
Individuals as 
vehicles for 
power 
 
Emancipation 
problematic 
Distinction itself is 
deceptive as it 
masks power as 
truth. 
Synthesis/ 
Reconcilia-
tion? 
 
Critical 
deliberative 
governance 
Challenge to the 
dominance of 
authoritative 
discourse and 
assumptions about 
universal norms 
 
Critique of pre-
determined notions 
of rationality 
Quality assurances for 
deliberation through 
critical discourse 
analysis and unique 
opportunities for 
challenge 
 
Power disparities 
exist, but are 
recognized and 
addressed 
Call for the 
democratization 
of discourse 
 
Critical analyses 
of dominant 
discourses 
empowers 
alternative 
discourses 
Sceptical approach 
to truth; reaching 
the ‘truth’ is not the 
main objective 
 
Reflection is 
possible, but not 
automatic - an 
explicit objective in 
governance 
processes 
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I have argued that, because of the important contributions of both the deliberation and 
co-production literatures have made to thinking around environmental decision-making, 
each needs to be considered in any emergent governance framework.  At the same time, 
each bears certain weaknesses.  Thus, the reconciliation, or synthesis of the two, goes a 
distance in addressing these weaknesses, while building on strengths.  Critical 
deliberative governance is borne out of such reconciliation. Critical deliberative 
governance takes rationality as a coproduction of normativity and empiricism, and 
ultimately as negotiable and contested.  Achieving rationality entails a critique of pre-
determined notions of rationality through on-going challenge to the dominance of 
authoritative discourse and assumptions about universal norms.  Communication is 
understood as impacted by power disparities, but improves the deliberative potential of 
communication through recognizing and addressing these disparities.  Ultimately, 
critical deliberative governance prioritizes reflection in policy debates over achieving 
‘truth’.  Such reflection is a possible, but not an automatic feature of engagement with 
public discourse.  It must be explicitly and purposefully engendered into policy practice.   
 
A further contribution to theory made by this research is by its comparative 
examination of the coproduction of facts and values at different scales of governance 
through cases that exemplify environmental decision making at these various scales.  
Sustainable agriculture and conservation interventions are implemented through NGO 
extension at the local level.  Sustainable land-use planning occurs at the regional level.  
Sustainable commodity production standards are developed and recognized 
internationally.  This research has illustrated the potential for this coproduction - and 
the impact of this coproduction on deliberative potential – at various levels of decision-
making.  For example, the understanding of conservation landscapes and sustainable 
agriculture, mediated by expertise as factual, objective and uncontested by a local NGO, 
was shown to be subject to normative input in a similar way to international 
certification standards development.  In between the ‘local’ and the ‘global’ scales of 
governance, regional land use planning, also understood and conveyed as factual, was 
also normatively influenced.  Indeed, the politics of evidence permeates decision-
making over a range of scales, calling into question overly optimistic accounts of the 
potential for greater democratic deliberation in local level governance processes.  
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8.3.2  Practice 
Critical deliberative governance can improve environmental governance engendering a 
more critical awareness of how participation, deliberation and evidence, the building 
blocks of contemporary environmental policy, relate to the politics of knowledge.  In 
each of the case studies, the attempt to integrate evidence and participation in 
environmental governance realized the environmental and democratic advantages of 
neither.  Participation has not deepened the democratic legitimacy of environmental 
decision-making because it has been limited and shaped by evidence, despite that it can 
be based on unrecognized evidence itself.  So-called evidence-based recommendations 
for policy are often reductionist, incorporating facts selectively and failing to 
acknowledge the way in which these facts are inextricably linked with norms, values, 
beliefs and judgments.  Indeed, the findings of this study thus lead us to fundamentally 
question conventional views of policy processes as gaining normative insights from 
participation and factual insights from evidence.   
 
In contrast to separating facts and norms as springing from evidence and participation 
respectively, this thesis has argued that facts and norms are co-produced in policy 
processes.  Co-production must be accounted for in policy that does not uncritically 
accept so-called evidence as an unduly credible or authoritative source of knowledge in 
policy debates.  Further, co-production must be accounted for in policy that does not 
privilege evidence to the exclusion of other perspectives, or the inclusion of public 
perspectives only insofar as they are accommodated or even shaped by evidence.  
Support for evidence means support for certain facts and norms.  Thus, the nature of 
these norms must be made explicit, if evidence is to be made a part of democratic 
processes.  Thus, co-productionist approaches to policy debate can thereby improve the 
contribution of each to democratic and environmental outcomes.   
 
Analyzing ways in which facts and norms are coproduced in participatory and evidence-
based policy processes is a key concern of critical deliberative governance.  As a 
framework for environmental policy, a critical deliberative approach will help 
stakeholders to more fully engage the contributions of evidence to policy problems, as 
well as illuminate more space for the emergence of novel, non-dominant positions in 
policy debates.  A more reflexive, less essentialist approach to knowledge can strengthen 
a deliberative approach to policy analysis, by making explicit the social basis for 
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authority and credibility, and opening up its tenets to debate.  This critical approach to 
knowledge is vital for a democracy in which normative arguments are not effectively 
closed off by formal and authoritative expertise. 
 
But how can we incorporate the concept of co-production into everyday environmental 
governance frameworks?  How can a co-productionist approach to environmental 
policy be implemented?  In short, this can be done by building an understanding of the 
politics of evidence.  In Chapter 1, I outlined three of what I called ‘critical social 
science approaches’ to improving the analytical understanding of evidence and 
evidence-based policy.   I now recall these approaches by arguing the need for 3 policy 
principles to improve the use of evidence and participation in policy debates, and 
discuss how the case studies support the implementation of these principles.  The three 
approaches/principles are means of understanding the politics of evidence.   
 
The first policy principle is that representations of reality are socially and politically influenced 
interpretations, not reflections of nature. 
 
Seeing environmental problems and solutions as constructed does not mean that they 
are not real – but it does mean that how we represent the natural world and reality are 
deeply influenced by these social and political institutions and practices (Jasanoff 2004).  
Representations are interpretations, meaning that environmental problems and 
solutions carry different meaning and have different implications from different 
purviews.  These purviews are often socially and politically determined by social identity 
(Wynne 1996b).  Among these variable purviews, however, some gain prominence and 
this is not a matter of what perspective is essentially better or more true than others, but 
a matter of institutions that are fundamentally a product not of nature or some 
immutable reality, but of human consideration.  Boundaries demarcate the credible 
from the improbable;  the authoritative from the untrustworthy (Gieryn 1999).  These 
boundaries are not natural, inherent or immutable, they are social and political creations, 
that are maintained through power (Knorr-Cetina 1982; Kinchy and Kleinman 2003).    
 
Representations and interpretations take on a salience when they are expressed through 
policy. Conceptual boundaries become physical boundaries.  Landscape classification 
systems become maps which have discursive and material consequences for people, as 
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they determine access to resources, and where and how conservation and sustainable 
development interventions are carried out.  Models become trade-off scenarios, using 
simplistic representations of cause and effect to pressure complex decisions and exact 
blame.  Processes of negotiation and contestation about how to define sustainability for 
commodity production becomes a seal of approval on a supermarket shelf.  These 
salient markers of sustainability are thus essentialized.  This first policy principle, 
however, reminds that they are not natural incarnations of sustainable landscapes, land-
use, or production.  Rather, they are representations and interpretations: open to debate 
and dissent, albeit resilient to challenges because of their relationship with power.   
 
The second policy principle is that consideration of the social, political, economic and physical 
aspects of context is vital for an understanding of environmental problems and the impacts of potential 
solutions. 
 
Environmental problems and solutions are often defined and deployed in universal 
terms.  Moreover, approaching ‘global’ environmental problems has been endowed with 
a kind of noble sense that we are ‘all in this together’ (Finger 1993; Miller 2004).  Global 
environmental knowledge, applied in standardized ways, is expected to give rise to 
consistent outcomes for biophysical and social systems.  These universal approaches 
epitomize a ‘naïve sociology’ (Wynne 1989) of governing environmental problems 
through evidence assumed to be unattached to human interpretation.  In both bio-
physical (Wynne 1996a; Forsyth 2007) and socio-political respects, however, 
understanding, defining and treating environmental problems is highly dependent on 
context.   
 
The importance of the second policy principle is emphasized by how each governance 
mechanism analyzed offered universal problem definitions and solutions to 
sustainability issues.  The policy implications generated by each case of evidence-based 
policy purported to assume a public character (Porter 1995) – objective and non-
partisan.  But the implications were ultimately shown to be particular and situated 
transformed from one context to the next50.  For example, in the ALCES modelling 
                                               
50 See a poignant fictional account of the transformation of familiar objects in foreign contexts, in 
Barbara Kingslover’s The Poisonwood Bible Kingslover, B. (1998). The Poisonwood Bible. New York, 
Harper Flamingo.  In the story, a missionary and his family travel from the USA to the Belgian Congo: 
“They carry with them everything they believe they will need from home, but soon find that all of it—
from garden seeds to Scripture—is calamitously transformed on African soil”…  
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process, people were asked to come to an agreement on general principles that would 
then guide the land-use planning process. It was assumed that advantages and 
disadvantages of various land-uses will accrue to stakeholders in the same kinds of ways, 
and that ‘planning principles’ can be aggregated to a point where they become universal, 
without losing meaning.  However, it is found, however, that agreement about broad 
goals such as ‘maintaining biodiversity’ quickly lose coherence once questions arise 
about which biodiversity is important, and which are the best ways of conserving it.  
Finally, the goal of the RTRS is to develop and apply sustainable soy certification 
standards universally.  This idea, however, seems somewhat absurd when one considers 
the different contexts of soy production, and the associated rural agricultural 
populations, levels of inequality and access to land and resources, labour standards and 
violations recourse etc.  surely, sustainable soy production would look much different, 
and have different implications in the Argentina, for example than in Paraguay.   
 
The third policy principle is that discourse does not just communicate reality, but interprets and 
creates reality, and maintains power relations.   
 
Discourse creates (rather than communicates) ideas and associated social and political 
practices through interaction and interpretation.  Discourses are,  therefore, products of 
broader processes of social learning as opposed to comparatively narrow processes of 
cognitive learning (Hajer 1995). This is, in part, what makes discourse political.  Rather 
than based on cognitive beliefs about causal relationships, effective policy coalitions 
emerge around discourses.    This means that the most significant tie that binds policy 
coalitions is not knowledge about natural systems, per se, but rather overarching 
storylines, or discourses, that are broadened and simplified, appealing to different actors 
for different reasons. This enables, despite potential incoherence and incongruence 
between beliefs, different stakeholders to come to discursive agreement.  This is one 
reason that discourse comes to embody how discourse is the embodiment of power 
relations, though this is often concealed. Moreover, this link with power is also how 
preferences for and against particular discourses are consolidated.  These preferences 
can then become norms in society, a means by which people become self-regulating, or 
technologies of government.  
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Discourses permeate all of the cases: from the ways in which classification systems 
create notions of sustainable landscapes; to indicators and outcomes becoming the basis 
for evaluating sustainable land-use planning.  In the case of the RTRS, the analysis 
showed how discourse coalitions created conditions under which an unlikely alliance 
between the soy industry and environmental organizations was formed.  This alliance 
imbued the RTRS discourse about sustainable soy with greater (and potentially 
increasing) power and resilience vis-à-vis alternatives.  This not only excluded, but 
actively denounced the opposition, portrayed as unreasonable and irrational. 
 
These three policy principles can help build a more complete understanding of how 
evidence-based policy implications can get it ‘right’ (for some) and ‘wrong’ (for others) 
in environmental policy.  This is the politics of evidence, and it has implications beyond 
the improved use of knowledge in decision-making.  A better understanding of the 
politics of evidence, through enhancing policy sensitivity to 
interpretation/representation, context, and the power dimensions of discourse also has 
profound implications for the potential for deliberation.  Such an understanding 
challenges the factual basis of evidence, by showing that this basis is dependent and 
contingent on values, beliefs, norms and assumptions.  Thus, evidence is not objective, 
neutral and immutable, but social, political and contestable.  Consequently, it raises the 
profile of normative positions in policy debate, such that they can be taken seriously.  
 
The theoretical framework of critical deliberative governance, resolves the tensions 
between the roles of evidence and participation in emergent policy debates.  It does this 
by strengthening a policy commitment to both the consideration of an expanded range 
of perspectives and by strengthening a commitment to evidence.  Critical deliberative 
governance, however, takes neither participation nor evidence lightly.  It interrogates 
both. By engaging policy inputs with more analytical rigour and critical perspective, and 
by fundamentally improving approaches based on participation, deliberation and 
evidence, critical deliberative governance has the potential to become the new gold 
standard in environmental policy making.  
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